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I-Introduction

From the 1890s to 1917 the United States thrashed about in a wave
of reformism that originated and gained momentum in the urban
centers, crested at the national level between 1900 and 1916, and
ebbed with America's involvement in World War I. The feverishness
of the times produced myriad political, social, economic, and scientific
campaigns which met with some measure of success as well as numerous setbacks. One area of reform that has not received the attention
to which it is entitled is the public health movement. 1 Specifically,
state and municipal health matters of the Progressive era have been
neglected by scholars. Nonetheless, the few existing studies deserve
serious consideration. 2 Their coverage, however, leaves a great deal
to the imagination when one tries to grasp the total picture of what
municipal and state officials, as scientific people, encountered when
they fought for the passage of new laws, struggled to enforce existing
ones, and battled with the politicians, quacks, dissenting businessmen,
and pervasive ignorance that threatened their efforts.
Thus, the field remains open for a comparative study of state and
municipal health administration. For that purpose the career of Lucius
Polk Brown serves as a vehicle to focus on food and drug work as
one aspect of the public health movement within the context of
Progressivism. In many respects Brown was typical of Progressive
reformers. A middle-class, Anglo-Saxon Protestant and a professional,
he represented a link between the nineteenth-century agrarian and
l
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the twentieth-century urbanite. More importantly, however, such men
as Brown in public life exhibited the features of a prototype, a new
character on the American scene-a scientist out of the agriculturalexperiment-station mold-ready to challenge politicians on their own
ground, all in the name of reform. Major currents under way in
American society affected the development of Brown's professional
life and shaped his public career. The professionalization of science,
the specialization of politics-varying in degree from North to South
-and the tendency of reform efforts to spawn bureaucracies were
significant forces acting on him.
Brown's entry into public life coincided with the professionalization of science and the peculiar specialization of politics. The rapid
urbanization and industrialization of the late nineteenth century
had spurred a drive toward professionalization. Trained specialists
replaced the gentlemanly amateurs, formed exclusive organizations,
and attempted to convince the public of their value to society.
Autonomy-escape from outside control and regulation of the behavior of members-remained an elusive goal in American society. 3
Science and politics did not represent the only examples of the
professionalization process, nor were they parallel in their development. These two areas of expertise are important to this study, however, because Brown, a professional scientist in government work,
functioned in the same realm as professional politicians. The success
of his work depended in large part on the degree of cooperation that
could be achieved between the two rival power blocs. He, along
with other scientists, required a favorable climate of opinion in
securing funds to perpetuate his position and develop his ideas;
politicians, too, curried the favor of the electorate in their neverending search for votes. Because scientists and politicians found it
imperative to operate in the same arena, their spheres of influence
overlapped; and occasionally, scientists and politicians clashed when
they became opponents struggling for autonomy.
As scientific knowledge, especially in bacteriology, grew in
volume, public health reaped the benefits. Flamboyant reform crusades
commonly occurred in cities. Brown's work as state pure food and
drtJg inpector in Tennessee from 1908 to 1915 focused on cities and
towns for practical reasons; his position as director of the Bureau of
2
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Food and Drugs in the New York City Department of Health
between 1915 and 1920 demanded specific concentration on urban
problems. His presence and that of other scientists in. the urban
milieu alarmed politicians, not necessarily because their objectives
differed, but because they jealously guarded their interests.
Cities not only fostered professional politicians and scientists
but also served as their battlegrounds. In the cities the ward bosses
and the urban machines they represented achieved a more cohesive
organization than the political masters at any other level during the
late 1800s and early 1900s. The careers of Martin Lomasney of Boston;
"Big Tim" Sullivan, Richard Croker, and Charles F. Murphy-all of
New York City; William Flinn of Pittsburgh; George B. Cox of
Cincinnati; Roger B. Sullivan of Chicago; and Ed Crump of Memphis
illustrated the adeptness of the urban bosses in the pedecting of professional techniques. 4
The scientist, too, was an urban creature. Howard Mumford
Jones, in The Age of Energy, has written: "The biological ( or for
that matter chemical or physical) laboratory is a creation of art
urbanized culture. It requires lighting, heating, services of supply,
continual sanitation, the aid of technicians, a capacity to acquire
and install new instruments quickly, cold rooms, dark rooms, humidifiers, a continual supply of glassware, of specimens, of chemicals, of
technical papers, all housed in a modern building which is theoretically
possible on a country site but which in fact is seldom or never found
very far away from an urban center." 5
As urban characters, politicians and scientists developed their
specialties. The professionalization that affected politicians in the
post-Civil War generation resisted classification into such definite
stages as that of science, but government service became a full-time
occupation at the city, state, and national levels. As the population
grew and the task of governing increased in complexity, American
politics became the realm of a group of specialists who served an
apprenticeship by performing menial party jobs. They collected rewards-patronage positions-for loyal service and graduated into an
elite of highly skilled experts adept at the art of compromise.
Even contemporary observers noted the trend toward specialization that was taken by politics. Herbert Croly acknowledged that
3
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politics, like business, had become specialized and organized when he
proclaimed: "The American system of local self-government encouraged the creation of the political 'Boss,' because it required such
an enormous amount of political business. Some one was needed to
transact this business, and the professional politician was developed
to supply the need." 6 Whitelaw Reid, editor of the New York Tribune,
contended that governing the United States was an art that could not
be learned in a week or two. Instead, the adroitness required to manage
parties . could be acquired only by long experience. 7 Social critic
Lincoln Steffens, viewing politics as the realm of a special type of
businessman rather than that of a professional politician, argued: "The
politician is a businessman with a specialty. When a businessman of
some other line learns the business of politics, he is a politician,
and there is not much reform left in him. Consider the United States
Senate, and believe me." 8
The options of the politician varied, depending on his ambition
and his ability. Municipalities afforded such nonelective posts as ward
boss or chieftain of an urban machine. City government offered a
number of elective possibilities as well. State offices had an attraction
for some. The federal echelon served as a mecca for outstanding men
in the field who scrambled for congressional posts and the juiciest
political plum of all, the presidency. Whatever his goal, the expert
conceived of himself as a professional whether he became a ward boss
or reached the United States Senate. 9
The gentlemanly reformer, unschooled in the art of politics,
could expect little but scorn from the professional. George Washington Plunkitt, a district leader in the Tammany organization, vented
his disgust with the inexperienced reform groups in the following
manner: "They were mornin' glories-looked lovely in the mornin'
and withered up in a short time, while the regular machines went on
flourishin' forever, like fine old oaks." He further commented that
the reformer could not sustain himself in politics because "politics
is as much a regular business as the grocery or the dry-goods or the
drug business. You've got to be trained up to it or you're sure to
fail." 10 Such men as Plunkitt scorned all nonpolitical professionals in
government, regardless of their credentials.
Professionalization was not isolated to the United States. Max
4
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Weber, lecturing at Munich University in 1918, noted international
trends toward professionalization and examined politics and science
as they were developing in several Western countries. Overenthusiastically, he maintained that political bosses in the United States were
"dilettantes" and that evils of such organizations as Tammany Hall
could be eradicated by civil-service reforms. As for scientists, the
sociologist implied that they should not become involved in politics
or seek legitimation from outsiders. Their work, in itself, justified
their existence. 11
Weber's advice came too late for American scientists, who already
were seeking recognition through various avenues including public
service. Their course from amateurism to professionalization had
proceeded systematically during the nineteenth century. They specialized, formed their societies, and received recognition as a legitimate
elite. The alternatives for the professional scientist varied. Teaching,
preferably at the university level, proved attractive for some; industry
likewise had some allure. A few scientists chose self-employment in a
consultative capacity. Government jobs, however, drew some of the
most dynamic and politically oriented individuals. 12
Lucius Polk Brown's experience in government service spanned
twelve years and touched on two dissimilar political systems. Machine
politics during the Progressive period were developed more thoroughly
in the North than in the South. Although such urban bosses as Edward
H. Crump of Memphis and such demagogues as Coleman L. Blease,
Thomas E. Watson, and Benjamin R. Tillman could be found in the
South, urban machines appeared more frequently in the North. The
perfection of political strategy derived some motivation from the twoparty system. Because the rural South during this time remained almost solidly Democratic as a consequence of the Civil War and its
aftermath, the professionalization of politics was retarded. 18 Also, the
absence of a substantial immigrant population and the fact that most
Negroes in the South remained rural dwellers deprived would-be bosses
of a natural following. The gentlemanly amateur still cropped up in
southern state and local politics as a viable candidate of factions
within a single party. In the North the gentlemanly amateur appeared
but generally received the scorn of the professional, who looked on
him for what he usually was, a reformer, "a mornin' glory."
5
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Furthermore, the concentration of scientists appeared more frequently in large northern cities where greater opportunities existed.
Scientists were scattered throughout the emerging urban areas south
of the Mason-Dixon line; however, like their northern brethren, they
felt the lure of government work. When the individual scientist entered the domain of the politician, he sometimes became a part of
bureaucracies that were already in existence; or if he participated in
reform crusades, he almost inevitably contributed to their creation.
In doing so, he renounced much of his own freedom as a professional,
tempering his own activities to fit the overall organizational purpose.
Herein lay a potential area of conflict. The professional worker, closely
aligned with his peers, was less likely to exhibit a high degree of
loyalty to a particular organization than was a nonprofessional employee.14 Brown waged his campaigns and fought his political battles
as a professional scientist. Nevertheless, he sacrificed some of his
professional independence when he entered the bureaucratic framework. His first experience in Tennessee did not call for abandonment of professionalism. Retention of the New York job after a
political crisis in 1918 almost demanded that he forsake his identity
as a scientist and complacently adjust to the role of a bureaucratic
figurehead.
Lucius Polk Brown was a professional scientist who became a
bureaucrat during an era when middle-class reformers first attempted
to order American society through integrated systems. In Tennessee,
he created an enforcement agency, enlarged its staff, developed a
hierarchy of authority, and made it self-perpetuating. In New York
City, he entered a metropolis with a maze of government agencies.
The Department of Health alone had sufficient bureaus, administration, and staff to foster the inertia that was typical of latter-twentiethcentury structures marked by excessive multiplication of power and
concentration of authority. 15
Brown's career provides a unique opportunity for studying a
scientist involved in reform, evaluating his successes and failures within
bureaucratic frameworks at different stages of development, and interpreting his struggles with politicians; it holds considerable potential
for developing some fresh insights on the public health movement
during the Progressive era. This book is first a study of a professional
6
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chemist who participated in food and drug control at the major
governmental echelons-municipal, state, and federal. Second, it deals
with Progressive health reform in the rural South and similar work
in a northern metropolis. Third, it takes into consideration the accomplishments and failures of scientific experts who entered the realm
of public health. Above all, however, it compares and contrasts the
work of Brown within a developing bureaucracy in Tennessee and a
well-established bureaucracy in New York City.

7

2-With Brown in Tennessee:
The Right Man, the Right Place,
the Right Time

As the twentieth century approached, Tennessee legislators and
municipal authorities directed their attention to public health matters.
Mindful of the health problems that had plagued generations of
Americans and receptive to the scientific expertise that might alleviate
these problems, lawmakers responded to the demands of concerned
citizens. By 15 January 1908, when Governor Malcolm R. Patterson
named Lucius Polk Brown to the post of state pure food and drug
inspector, the state had a new law outlining his responsibilities and
enough socially conscious residents to support his work. Brown's
professional development had kept pace with the progress of public
health in Tennessee. When the state needed someone with his
qualifications, he was the right man, in the right place, at the right
time.
Brown's heritage was Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and southern
agrarian. He was born at Hamilton Place in Maury County, Tennessee,
on 1 April 1867-the oldest of the five children of George Campbell
Brown and Susan Polk Brown. John Brown, the founder of the Brown
family in the United States, was an Englishman who had come to
America in the eighteenth century from Northern Ireland. A Presbyterian minister, he settled in Augusta County, Virginia, and established Liberty Hall Academy, the forerunner of Washington and Lee
University. Lucius Polk Brown's great-grandfather, George Washington Campbell, became secretary of the treasury under President James
8
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Madison, first minister of the delegation to Russia under President
James Monroe, and a senator from Tennessee; his grandfather, James
Percy Brown, seived as an attache to the American embassy in Paris.
His mother's people were the famous Polks of Middle Tennessee: his
great-grandfather, Colonel William Polk of Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina, fought in the Revolution; his great-uncle, Leonidas
Polk, was the Confederate general and Episcopalian bishop who had
once set out to make his fortune with a remedy for diphtheria; and
his cousin, James K. Polk, had been president of the United States.1
As a youth, Brown lived with his parents on Ewell Farm at Spring
Hill. He grew up during the difficult years of Reconstruction, but in
an atmosphere of gracious country living in the southern tradition.
He had the advantage of a sound preparatory education in private
schools, including Montgomery Bell Academy in Nashville and a high
school at Bellvue, Virginia. His family was not wealthy, but it was
financially secure because of its landholdings. The Browns had managed to retain more than eleven hundred acres when a wise executor
prevented the widow Elizabeth McKay Brown from investing in
Confederate bonds. In 1867 this same lady, by then the wife of General R. S. Ewell, brought the first registered Jersey cow to Tennessee.
Her interest in this particular breed contributed to the success of her
son Campbell as a stockbreeder and farmer and to the bent of her
grandson Lucius toward chemistry. As dairymen, the Browns placed
high priority on production standards, and chemical analysis held the
key for determining the quality of milk. 2
Thus, Lucius Polk Brown turned toward chemistry. In the
autumn of 1885, when he was eighteen years old, he enrolled for his
first year of study at the University of Virginia. This signaled the
beginning of his preparation as a professional chemist. Instead of
pursuing a course of study that would have resulted in a professional
or titled academic degree, he earned untitled "degrees" in chemistry
and related sciences, an alternate program offered by the university
at that time. His college days, however, were not all spent in the
laboratory. The handsome, broad-shouldered, brown-eyed young man
also played football, rowed, and boxed. Professors acknowledged his
progress and recognized him as an able, conscientious student excelling in laboratory courses.3
9
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In 1889 Brown left the University of Virginia and returned to
Tennessee. For the next four years he divided his time almost equally
between farming and chemical experimentation in scientific agriculture. His contacts with agrarian life had remained open during his
student days, for his father wrote to him often, informing him of
activities at Ewell Farm and seeking his advice on the type of stock
that should be purchased to improve the bloodlines of the dairy herd
and the racehorses. 4
Brown's return to the farm did not preclude his scientific interests; perhaps it promoted them, for he soon began laying foundations
for his career as a chemist. In October 1889 he secured employment
as acting chemist at the University of Tennessee Agricultural Experiment Station in Knoxville. Then in its infancy, the station itself had
existed little more than two years, and the embryonic laboratory of
the chemical division had been in operation only nine months when
Brown became its director. His official duties included analysis of
milk samples to determine butterfat content, comparison of varieties
of sorghum to find the type best suited to the climate of Tennessee,
and investigation of the quality of fertilizers. 5
The pleasant interlude of professional work soon ended. Brown
resigned as acting chemist with the experiment station, effective 1
July 1890, and returned to Ewell Farm to help his father, now aged
and ill. Collecting samples from the herds of his prominent Middle
Tennessee neighbors, the promising young chemist continued his
work with methods for determining the content of butterfat in milk,
especially those that could be adapted to the needs of the dairy farmer.
He also kept himself informed of the results from similar tests at other
state agricultural stations. 6 In 1893, Campbell Brown died, leaving
Ewell Farm in the capable hands of his oldest son, who had been
closely involved in operations there for the preceding three years. The
responsibilities that Brown assumed left him little time for his chosen
profession.
An ambitious man of varied interests and immense energy, Brown
soon tired of the limited life of a farmer. Being an astute observer of
contemporary events, he noted the rapid strides that the United States
was making toward urbanization and industrialization. Neither he
nor American society in the late nineteenth century could escape
10
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completely the rural heritage or resist the lure of urban dynamism.
Now in his late twenties, he decided that the time had come to advance his career.
Nashville, in close proximity to Ewell Farm, became Brown's
base of operation. Tennessee's largest city and capital boasted a
population of 76,168 in 1890 and served as a major commercial and
wholesale market between the Ohio River and the Gulf of Mexico.
The pace of life in the city slowed during the depression of the 1890s,
but in spite of economic difficulties, Nashvilleans could not have
helped but notice the decisively urban qualities that their city reflected. The numerous buildings, the rapid suburban expansion, the
business conducted, and the smoke billowing out of soft-coal furnaces
legitimized claims of urbanization. Alongside the metropolitan features
were holdovers from the less-sophisticated country town. Most of
Nashville's inhabitants walked to work, to market, and to school;
wealthier citizens had not yet fled the downtown area; and cows still
grazed from 6 A.M. to 6 P.M. in certain designated places. 7
To this town in transition, Brown went in search of opportunities
as a professional chemist. By 1894 he had become a partner in the
laboratory of Memminger & Brown, and eventually he assumed
the ownership and presidency, changing the name to Lucius P. Brown
& Company Analytical Chemists. From 1894 to 1908 his career advanced rapidly, and he established a reputation as an able chemist.
Routine analysis consumed much of his time during these years, but
his association with private companies provided him with other
opportunities. For a time he served as director of both the Harley
Pottery Company and the Hurricane Iron & Mining Company. His
interest in geology and his involvement with these firms led to a
number of mining ventures. He worked with phosphates in Tennessee
and Florida over a period of several years, prospected for rutile in
Virginia during 1903, and acquainted himself with the minerals of
Utah, spending the summer of 1904 in that state. 8
The aspiring professional at the turn of the century needed the
approval of his peers. Graduate or advanced education, membership
in professional organizations, and publication of articles and books
offered the logical avenues to recognition. After Brown joined Memminger in Nashville, he continued his education at Vanderbilt Univer11
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sity, where he enrolled as a graduate student in chemistry during 1897
and 1898. From 1894 to 1908 he joined such scientific organizations
as the American Chemical Society and the Engineering Association of
the South as well as a number of state and local societies. Later he
affiliated with more highly specialized groups. He also published
articles on the mining of phosphates in Tennessee, their quality,
compositions, and uses. 9
Changes in Brown's personal life accompanied his professional
progress. In 1896 he was married to Jessie M. Roberts, the daughter
of Albert Roberts, editor of the Nashville American. She died of
pneumonia in 1897, leaving an infant son, Campbell Huxley. Brown
remained a widower for six years. Then, in 1903, while on a prospecting trip in Virginia, he met Susan Catherine Massie, the sister of one
of his classmates at the University of Virginia. They were married on
12 December 1903 at "Three Springs," the Massie home. The Lynchburg News, which carried a special article on the wedding, likened it
to the "festive scenes of ante-bellum days." This union, which proved
to be happy, produced three daughters, Susan Massie Polk, Lizinka
Campbell, and Lucia Cabell.1°
Toward the end of the 1890s a new sense of direction became
evident in Brown's professional life. During earlier years he had
dabbled in farming, agricultural chemistry, and private business.
Increasingly, after the tum of the century, his orientation was toward
government service. Keenly interested in the new pure food and
drug campaign, he found opportunities awaiting him in the state
government. On 14 January 1903, Brown applied to Governor James
B. Frazier for formal recognition as chemist in the Tennessee Bureau
of Agriculture. Because official occupants of that post had delegated
their responsibilities to Brown over the years, he argued that his
previous record showed his qualifications for the work. Apparently
nothing came of the request, but Frazier asked him to represent
Tennessee at a meeting of the National Association of State Dairy
and Food Departments in St. Paul, Minnesota, in July. Brown did
not show up at that meeting because he was in New York and did
not receive the invitation in time, but when the eighth annual convention of food officials gathered at St. Louis in 1904, he attended.
Thereafter, his career was intricately laced to this organization. His
12
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professional interests by this time definitely included government
service as a specialist on food and drugs, and the annual meetings
of the association provided forums for the exchange of ideas on
legislation, enforcement, standards, and chemical procedures. 11
By the time that Brown developed an affinity for food and drug
control, efforts to improve public health had advanced tremendously.
Social conscience and early modem scientific thinking had gradually
supplanted demons, Divine Providence, and miasmas as explanations
for disease. Although problems of gigantic proportion continued to
haunt public health workers, beneficial changes were being made.
By the late 1870s the germ theory had gained precedence over earlier
views, largely as a consequence of the contributions made by the
French chemist Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch, a German physician.
Americans received this new knowledge with fascination and soon
grasped its usefulness in the control of communicable diseases. 12
Brown grew up in a state that was perplexed by typical health
problems of the nineteenth century. Tennesseans reacted slowly but
positively to new scientific discoveries. Their fears of recurring
epidemics led to the establishment of the state and municipal boards
of health. In Memphis, for example, the yellow-fever epidemic of
1878 had sparked improvements. Sanitary conditions there during
Reconstruction resembled those of a medieval city. A pure water
supply was practically nonexistent; unscrupulous dealers watered the
milk they sold, polluting as well as diluting it. The Public Ledger of
18 September 1867 reported that the streets were "huge depots
of filth, cavernous Augean stables, with no Tiber to flow through and
cleanse them." Garbage, refuse, and dead animals produced a stench
unrivaled, according to a carpetbagger, by that of Cairo and Cologne. 13
When the epidemic of 1878 struck, most citizens fled, leaving
behind a motley crew of Negroes, poor whites, self-appointed nurses
and doctors, and some professional physicians. The horrors could be
observed in decomposed human bodies and dead rats that had expired
while eating diseased flesh. According to a medical estimate, the city
lost 5,150 people out of a population that never exceeded 20,000
during the siege. The year after this catastrophe, officials established
a public health program and a board to administer it. 14
Memphis was not alone in its filth. Nashville was also notoriously
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unclean. Poorly drained streets, open sewers, and garbage heaps were
commonplace. The privies, urinals, cesspools, and kitchen drains of
the state penitentiary polluted streams that flowed through the town.
Slaughterhouses discharged their offal in the same manner. Authorities
there had first established a board of health in 1866, when Asiatic
cholera appeared in the United States. The board floundered for a
decade, however, until it came under the influence of John Berrien
Lindsley. His work in Nashville, particularly during the yellow-fever
epidemic of 1878, earned him the respect of the medical society.
When in 1877 the Tennessee legislature created a state board of
health in response to the demands of physicians, Lindsley became
secretary; in 1884, president. The stinginess of the lawmakers hampered the work of the board; nevertheless, his efforts strengthened
preventive medicine in the state.15
Health issues in Tennessee during the 1880s and 1890s continued
to be relegated to the local level, and state administration remained
weak. The most obvious interest in improvements came from health
workers in the urban areas, but newspaper editors, writing for rural
readers, frequently complained of unsanitary practices-if they could
be attributed to the evils of city life. The editor of the Clarksville
Leaf-Chronicle denounced the Nashville medical colleges for dumping barrels of dissected cadavers into the Cumberland River. In
addition to creating sanitary problems, these strange cargoes washed
up on river banks, presenting county coroners with numerous problems. Other state editors urged better care for the insane, denounced
cigarette smoking, and opposed corsets and similar restrictive feminine
apparel.1 6
Improvements in public health came slowly in Tennessee and
elsewhere in the United States during the late nineteenth century.
Rapid urbanization, mushrooming industrialization, and streams of
immigrants complicated existing problems. The federal government
made no move to interfere seriously with the practices of big business
either in the realm of working conditions or in the quality of products
manufactured. Without centralized control nationally, local governmental units could make little headway. Millions of immigrants from
southern and eastern Europe flooded major industrial cities, serving
as a ready supply of cheap labor for the factories. When accidents
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crippled them or they fell victims to diseases brought on by unfavorable working conditions and the abject poverty that low wages forced
upon them, they became recipients of private charity or starved.
Newcomers who maintained the strength to work congested the
tenement districts and contributed to sanitary and housing problems.
Cities were ill prepared to cope with the problems of the "new"
immigrants. Even in New York City, where the Board of Health in
1866 had made such promising beginnings, political corruption and
the overwhelming difficulties of the Lower East Side slowed the
progress of public health.
The conditions of the streets, described by George Edwin
Waring, Jr., as he found them in 1895 when he became director of
the street-cleaning department, indicated that earlier efforts to purify
New York City had been stymied:
Rubbish of all kinds, garbage, and ashes lay neglected in the
streets, and in the hot weather the city stank with the
emanations of putrefying organic matter. It was not always
possible to see the pavement, because of the dirt that covered
it. One expert, a former contractor of street cleaning, told
me that West Broadway could not be cleaned because it
was so coated with grease from wagon axles; it was really
coated with slimy mud. The sewer inlets were clogged with
refuse; dirty paper was prevalent everywhere, and black rottenness was seen and smelt on every hand. 17
Although such problems were not restricted to major metropolitan areas, their magnitude in large cities attracted attention. The
reaction of socially conscious citizens to conditions of big-city life
provided the impetus for Progressivism. Reality, to this generation
of reformers, was "the bribe, the rebate, the bought franchise, the
sale of adulterated food." 18 Wherever they found sordidness, neglect,
or unpleasantness, whatever their motivations, they sought to change
it. Once public health became an issue in this multifaceted campaign,
it steadily increased in importance.
Pure food and drug control was in part an outgrowth of the
"new" public health movement in urban areas, but it also owed its
existence to agricultural scientists at the state experiment stations.
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Although later in Brown's career he became aligned with big-city
reformers, his first experience with food and drug purity and consumer
protection stemmed from his brief tenure at the Tennessee Agricultural Experiment Station. During his years in private business,
many of his counterparts continued to operate within the framework
of experiment stations. As these bastions of scientific agriculture grew
in importance, the work magnified in scope to include a concern
for the purity of food, water, and drugs. 19
The interest in food and drug control was well placed. As Walter
Lippmann so aptly stated, the "ordinary purchaser" does not have
time "to candle every egg he buys, test the milk, inquire into the
origins of meat, analyze the canned food, distinguish the shoddy."
Consumers were no better qualified to prescribe their own medicine.
Yet, they stubbornly relied on the strange and exotic wares of patentmedicine dealers. 20
Food and drug swindlers victimized the public, and state legislatures began passing laws designed to solve the problem. Often this
occurred after legitimate businessmen urged the lawmakers to take
action. These early efforts antedated the passage of effective food
and drug laws to control the manufacture, distribution, and sale of
products involved in interstate commerce. State officials soon recognized the need for federal regulation and launched a concerted
effort to secure congressional approval. They were aided by the
revelations of such muckrakers as Samuel Hopkins Adams and Upton
Sinclair. Adams exposed the evils of patent medicines and related
malpractices in his series "The Great American Fraud," printed in
Coliier's Weekly. Upton Sinclair, a foremost critic of American
society, attempted to win converts to socialism with The Jungle, but
readers bogged down in the gory, nauseating descriptions of the
Chicago meat-packing industry.
Concern for a better quality of food was not limited to muckrakers and local officials. After the Spanish-American War, General
Nelson A. Miles raised a cry against impure food when he charged
that "embalmed beef" had caused sickness among soldiers in Cuba.
In May 1903, Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, chief chemist of the Department
of Agriculture, organized his famous "poison squad" to determine
the effects that artificial additives in foods had on the human body.
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The findings indicated that all such substances were deleterious, a
position that Wiley doggedly maintained throughout his career. 21
Although sensationalism was important in securing the passage
of national legislation, the careful behind-the-scenes efforts of the
Association of State and National Food and Dairy Departments
proved to be the determining factor. As early as August 1897 these
scientific reformers, many of whom were cast in the experimentstation mold, came together at Detroit for the first annual convention.
From this time until 1906 they waged a relentless campaign to
Dromote passage of federal regulation. No less a person than President
Theodore Roosevelt recognized the role played by state food and
dairy inspectors. In a message to Congress, Roosevelt made these
remarks: "It is primarily to the action of these State commissioners
that we owe the enactment of this law, for they aroused the people,
first to demand the enactment and enforcement of State laws on
the subject, and then the enactment of the Federal law without which
the State laws were largely ineffective." 22
With the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Law of 1906,
most states updated their statutes to complement the federal legislation. Those having no enforcement apparatus moved to establish
some agency for food and drug control. Brown's native state had
given little support to the battle for domestic food and drug legislation
at the national level, but Tennessee lawmakers could not totally
ignore the Progressive forces at work in the nation. In 1897 they
reorganized the state Board of Health. Consisting of three physicians
and the state commissioner of agriculture, as ex officio member, the
new board numbered among its duties the responsibility for enforcement of the pure food laws. The effrontery of the legislature at this
time could hardly be exaggerated. While authorizing the board to
establish and equip a chemical and biological laboratory "with such
experts as they may elect," the lawmakers emphasized: "It is the duty
of said board to see that the provisions of this act are carried out
without any additional appropriations." 23
Genial Democratic Governor Robert L. Taylor, in his biennial
message of 1899, reminded the legislature of its obligations: "We
have a pure food law as many other states have. Other states are
putting their laws into execution, and therefore driving the adulterers
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and dealers in impure food into states which have no such laws, or
if they have them, they are not executing them. We are in the
condition of having the law on our statute books with no appropriation
for its execution." The governor then recommended: "In the interest
of the producers and for the consumers of our state, I suggest that
your honorable bodies would do well to confer with the members of
the Board of Health upon this important question, and act and make
such appropriation as you may feel the best interest of the state
requires." 24 Four successive legislatures, however, made no concrete
efforts to implement the enforcement of existing laws.
In the Fifty-first General Assembly of 1899, proposals dealing
with the regulation of the sale of narcotics and impure food died in
the House Committee on Sanitation. In 1901, new bills met the same
fate, with the exception of legislation to empower the state Board of
Health to enforce the pure food law; the Committee on Sanitation
recommended passage, but no further action was taken. A bill to
prevent adulteration of food and beverages, sponsored by John
Watson Morton of Davidson County, came to a vote on the floors
of both houses in 1903. The House favored it 56 to 28, but the Senate
rejected it 17 to 9. The legislators of 1905 saw no measures come to
a vote in both houses. 25
Voting patterns from 1899 to 1905 revealed no obvious opposition bloc to food and drug legislation, although Republicans from East
Tennessee and a few Democrats from Shelby and Knox counties
sometimes voted negatively. On the other hand, delegates from the
same areas occasionally cast positive votes. Of the four major urban
areas-which included Knoxville, Chattanooga, Nashville, and Memphis-the representatives from Davidson County and Nashville most
consistently lent their support; those from Memphis and Shelby
counties, their opposition. The intransigence of the legislature apparently was not a product of any carefully conceived plan to prevent
passage of pure food and drug bills but, rather, the failure of the
representatives and senators to take upon themselves the responsibility
for additional appropriations. In all likelihood, the legislature, consisting primarily of representatives from rural areas, believed that the
cities, where the exchange of most goods took place, should assume
the burden of maintaining food and drug purity.
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Before the Fifty-fifth General Assembly convened in 1907,
Congress had enacted national legislation. The federal law that was
signed on 30 June 1906 applied to the manufacture, sale, or transportation of adulterated, misbranded, poisonous, or deleterious foods,
drugs, medicines, and liquors. This law, however, was limited to the
manufacture of such items in the territories and the District of
Columbia, and it applied to interstate traffic. If a state failed to enact
and enforce laws of its own, unscrupulous and ignorant dealers were
at liberty to manufacture and distribute dangerous goods within its
boundaries. The recent federal action and the responsibilities it placed
on the states themselves for their internal safety from adulterated food
and drugs, coupled with pressure from concerned citizens, finally
moved the Tennessee legislature. 26
The debate over the pure food and drug issue in 1907 centered
on two questions: ( 1 ) whether to enact a new law or make an appropriation to enforce the old one; and ( 2) if a new law were passed,
to whom responsibility for enforcement should be assigned. Shortly
after the legislature convened in January, Representative Currie Dixon
of Haywood County announced that he would try to secure sufficient
appropriation to enforce the pure food law of 1897. He estimated
the cost at a modest $3,000 per annum. This move was accompanied
by a statement from medical authorities that the amount of food
adulteration in Tennessee was "something startling." Within a week,
two bills were introduced in the General Assembly to prevent the
manufacture of adulterated food and drugs, one assigning responsibility for enforcement to the Board of Health and the other creating a
new office. Another measure required manufacturers of patent medicines to list the ingredients of their products on the labels. 27
Sponsored by Democrat W. B. Marr of Davidson County, House
Bill 141, discarding the old law and calling for creation of a new office,
showed the most promise. Governor Malcolm R. Patterson supported
the concept of a separate office. In his address to the legislature on
23 January, he called the food and drug law of 1897 "practically a
dead letter," and he urged that it be revitalized by an appropriation or
that a new one similar to the national act be passed. He further
recommended the creation of the office of state chemist, "to be filled
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by a man of established reputation in his profession," and that this
official be responsible for enforcement of the food and drug laws. 28
Even with executive support, Marr's bill did not pass before
it had been carefully scrutinized by legislative committees, the Board
of Health, businessmen, pharmacists, physicians, and farmers. When
the House Committee on Sanitation met, members of the medical
profession, merchants, and manufacturers appeared to debate the
merits of the measure. The committee attached an amendment to
the bill, which provided that it should take effect on 1 January 1908,
and unanimously recommended it for passage. Shortly after this
action, on 4 February, the Board of Health called a special meeting
to consider all pending health measures, including those dealing with
food and drugs; but they took no action. Druggists from Nashville
and other cities met the next day at the headquarters of the local
board of trade. They decided to do whatever was necessary to protect
their own interests, an indication that they were not completely
favorable to the pending legislation. The House Committee on
Finance, Ways and Means held two long sessions before approving
the bill. In the interim, "some unknown party," according to the
sponsor of the bill and other irate lawmakers, took the document out
of chambers and changed it materially. At the second meeting of the
finance committee, the measure generated a heated discussion, then
squeaked through by a vote of 9 to 7. While committees debated
and stalled, farm organizations and medical societies urged passage.
When the bill finally came to a vote in the House, representatives
approved it by a vote of 74 to 19.29
The Marr bill encountered difficulties in the Senate Committee
on Finance. Druggists were on hand to present their views. Their
representative, Charles Martin, urged that the state law conform as
nearly as possible to the federal act and that responsibility for its
enforcement be entrusted to a commission made up of the secretary
from the Board of Health, the commissioner of agriculture, and the
secretary of the State Board of Pharmacy. The finance committee
recommended that a druggist be placed on the Board of Health and
that a Senate measure known as the Mansfield bill be substituted for
the Marr bill. When the issue came before the full Senate, they
debated how enforcement should be handled. Interestingly enough,
20
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both the Senate and the House largely ignored the position of pure
food and drug inspector, proposed by the Marr bill. The idea that
enforcement belonged with the Board of Health instead of with
"men who have interest in its non-enforcement" prevailed in the
Senate. The Mansfield measure was tabled, and the Marr bill was
called up for a vote. The Senate approved it, 21 to 9, and sent it
to the governor. Patterson signed it on 9 April.3°
The new Pure Food and Drug Act of 1907 complemented federal
legislation. Under its provisions, no person could "manufacture for
sale, produce for sale, have in possession with intent to sell, or sell
or give away, any article of food and drugs" that was adulterated or
misbranded. Violation was a misdemeanor. Conviction for the first
offense carried a fine of not less than $10 or more than $100, ninety
days' imprisonment in the county jail, or both; a second offense, not
less than $100 or more than $1,000, imprisonment for not more than
eleven months and twenty-nine days, or both. To enforce this law,
the General Assembly created the position of pure food and drug
inspector, to be filled by "a chemist of established reputation and
ability," chosen by the governor for a term of two years beginning 15
January of the year appointed; his salary was to be $2,500 a year.
Responsibilities included the establishment and maintenance of an
office and laboratory and the inspection and analysis of food and drug
samples. To accomplish these objectives, the inspector received $1,000
"or as much thereof as may be necessary" per year, not to exceed $100
a month. The law required that he keep careful expense accounts,
report to the Board of Health as often as requested and to the
governor annually, and publish all violations at least twice a year. 31
Because Lucius Polk Brown's varied experience in chemistry
qualified him for the office of pure food and drug inspector, he
followed legislative action on the Marr bill with considerable interest.
Securing appointment, however, required careful political maneuvering. Even as Patterson considered the matter, local opposition to
state and national food and drug legislation mounted. Early in 1908
the quality of food and drugs in Tennessee was as unacceptable as in
the rest of the nation. Amid rumors of stringent federal enforcement,
A. M. Tillman, a district attorney in Nashville, declared that a product
branded "strawberry jelly" was as likely to be turnips as anything
21
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else. Wholesale grocers, according to Tillman, did not like the food
and drug legislation because they found it humiliating to depreciate
their products with revealing labels. One Nashville grocer, fearing federal enforcement and presaging future difficulties, reported that the
local courts would impose only minimum fines; he did not know what
the recourse would be if the federals moved into the city. 32
With opposition already in evidence, the governor selected his
appointee with care. The office of pure food and drug inspector
carried a relatively substantial salary and held enormous possibilities
for political favoritism. As soon as the law went into effect, Brown
mobilized his supporters. On 2 January he conversed with John
Thompson, the secretary of agriculture, who volunteered to talk to
the governor on his behalf. The secretary, nevertheless, believed that
politics required the appointment of a man from Memphis. That
same day the applicant also saw Dr. S. S. Crockett and suggested that
he use Thompson to convey to Patterson the endorsement of the
medical profession and to ref er to the advantages of selecting someone
with a private laboratory, because the legislature had not appropriated
enough money to equip such a facility. Brown's candidacy received a
considerable boost, a few days later, when the Board of Health and
Representative Marr endorsed him. 33
Patterson called Brown to the capitol on 9 January for an
interview and asked him to return two days later, at which time he
informed him that he thought his appointment possible. While
making suggestions concerning the work of the new department,
Patterson emphasized its importance to his administration. Although
the inspector was to ignore politics as much as possible, the chief
executive made it clear that he expected support from all of his
appointees. Brown assured the governor that he would give both
political and personal devotion, and Patterson promised to make the
official announcement on 15 January 1908. Fortunately, Brown, a
Democrat, never found it difficult to keep his commitment, for
throughout the years that he worked as a food and drug administrator
he came to respect and like Patterson for his intelligence and sense of
fairness. 34
A combination of forces had led to enactment of the state pure
food and drug law and the appointment of Lucius Polk Brown to the
22
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post of pure food and drug inspector. These included an increase in
scientific knowledge; the intensification of environmental problems
by urbanization and industrialization, which sparked Progressivism
and gave new impetus to public health reform; the mobilization of
muckrakers, agricultural scientists, and other groups that crusaded for
federal regulation of food and drugs; and Brown's professional interests, which steered him toward food and drug control and consumer
protection.
In 1907, state legislators seemingly acknowledged the soundness
of scientific theory and succumbed to reform propaganda. Their almost innate financial conservatism had not been eradicated, however,
by the mere enactment of a law. Their miserly habits revealed themselves in the small appropriation. Nonetheless, Lucius Polk Brown
knew their ways and their limitations and sought opportunities to expand his department and increase its effectiveness. Once the quest for
pure food and drugs had begun, it dominated health matters in Tennessee for almost eight years. The flamboyant crusade owed its success
and its prominence to Brown, whose personality and character determined the course to be followed in building a bureaucracy and
enforcing the law.

3-The Scientist
as a Southern Bureaucrat, 1908-11

Tennessee, at the tum of the century, was a slow-moving southern
state. Prohibition, feminist agitation, and communal living commanded the attention of a few, but most residents conducted their
lives in a leisurely, simple fashion. Occasionally, the Democratic party,
which represented the overwhelming majority of Tennesseans, suffered
from factionalism; but in 1897, Robert Love Taylor returned to the
governor's chair, and dissidence subsided temporarily. The nineteenth
century in the state closed with a centennial extravaganza. Preparations
remained incomplete in 1896 when the one-hundredth anniversary of
statehood occurred, but residents celebrated unabashedly the next
year. Fights over the liquor question, however, punctuated the early
years of the twentieth century, disrupting the relative tranquility of
the state.1
When Lucius Polk Brown became pure food and drug inspector
in Tennessee, a dynamic individual entered a social and political
environment that was about to be tom by prohibition. This issue
dominated state politics during the first two decades of the twentieth
century. Brown, however, attracted support for pure food and drug
control, an important side issue, and, at the same time, remained aloof
from the political squabbles brought on by the liquor question. This
feat, lasting from 1908 to 1911, was made possible by the nature of
Tennesseans. Not the type, generally, to seek out new ideas, they
waited for floods of national reform to wash over them. They were
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cautious in their thinking and were often suspicious of outsiders. As
a native, Brown possessed definite advantages. He had distinguished
ancestors in a society that placed importance on such matters, and
he came from a prominent farming family. His ties to the soil, in a
state composed of 1,743,744 rural dwellers in a total population
numbering no more than 2,184,789 in 1910, earned him the respect
of an agrarian people. While they might believe some of his ideas
strange, they did not reject them outright. 2
Acceptance as an individual was one matter; developing and
enforcing a successful food and drug control program, another. In
Tennessee, Brown faced problems that ran the full gamut-mislabeling and adulteration by design and ignorance, malicious intent to
cheat customers, and drug addiction were commonplace. Ignorance
posed a more serious threat than malice. Although Brown was an
able chemist, food and drug administration was a new field for him.
Furthermore, he faced the responsibility of establishing an entirely
new department in the state government.
Between 1908 and 1911 Brown's inexperience, combined with
the problems inherent in the establishment of a government agency,
gave the appearance of confusion as he groped for policy and pleaded
for additional financial assistance. Out of the chaos, however, he
gradually built an enforcement agency that was acceptable to the
majority of Tennesseans. More of a practical scientist than an ivorytower philosopher, Brown kept his ideas simple. A realist, he knew
that his work depended on public approval. He therefore devoted
considerable time to selling the concept of food and drug control,
and he moved cautiously against businessmen who violated the law.
He believed that proper public health education, coupled with fair
enforcement of the laws, would provide the remedy for Tennessee's
problems. His first two terms in office were formative ones for him as
well as his department. His enforcement was sketchy and fragmented
as he uncovered the varied difficulties of food and drug control in
the state, but during this time he gained valuable experience and
improved the quality of goods available to consumers.
Brown began building an enforcement agency as soon as he was
appointed. The development of this office from 1908 to 1915
demonstrated the remarkable tendency of Progressive innovations in
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government to become expansive. During his tenure, Brown obtained
departmental status for his office; changed his title from inspector to
commissioner, in fact if not in law; enlarged the investigative force
from a one-man operation to an eight-man agency directly involved
with inspection; and secured increases in appropriations, which raised
them from $4,700 in 1908 to more than $25,000 in 1914.3
TENNESSEE PURE FOOD AND DRUG

DEPARTMENT

IN 1908

GOVERNOR

PURE FOOD AND DRUG------------ -BOARD OF HEALTH

INSPECTOR

Although these alterations in the potential of the food and drug
department were dramatic, they hardly kept pace with the new
responsibilities being assigned to it, some of which were actively
encouraged by Brown. A report authorized by the Council on Health
and Public Instruction of the American Medical Association contained a thumbnail sketch of the Tennessee department as it
appeared in 1915, the year that Brown left the state to assume a new
position in New York City:
The department of food and drugs is supposed to be under
the supervision of the department of health, but the connection is slight, as the chief inspector is appointed directly by
the governor, and there is a special appropriation for the
department. Six inspectors and two chemists are supposed
not only to look after adulteration, including milk, but to
enforce the "sanitary law" in regard to the cleanliness of
hotels, restaurants, bakeries, stores, slaughterhouses, etc., the
"hotel law," and the very important "anti-narcotic law," as
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well as to assist in the enforcement of the "weights and
measures" law. Nevertheless, good work has been done by
this small force. 4
This description indicated that the office of pure food and drug
inspector carried substantial possibilities for political favoritism. The
Board of Health exerted some influence over the inspector, for the
law required that he make periodic reports whenever the board might
request them; he reported to the governor only once a year. He,
therefore, determined standards of purity, sanitation, and quality
with almost no direct supervision. Although the Board of Health
had some control, the Food and Drug Department, as it evolved
under Brown, took the initiative and received full cooperation and
no opposition from that agency. Thus, no system of checks or balances
really affected the inspector except the likelihood that the governor
would not reappoint him when his two-year term expired if his policies
had been politically detrimental to the administration.
The Tennessee legislators had created opportunities for scientific
tyranny which could have been seized upon by an unscrupulous appointee if the governor had made a poor choice. The majority of the
lawmakers were probably as unconcerned about this remote possibility
as the National Association of State Dairy and Food Departments
had been in 1902 when the issue had been raised. An editorial from
a western newspaper, read at the annual convention by Dr. William
C. Mitchell of the Colorado State Board of Health, commented on
"a dangerous tendency toward a centralization of power" to be found
in a certain provision of the Hepburn pure food bill. The proposed
legislation made the chief chemist of the Department of Agriculture
the sole judge of food and drug standards, which the editorial deemed
"a power more absolute and quite as far reaching as any ever enjoyed
by the most absolute of monarchs and one which would raise visions
of opportunities for 'grafting' so stupendous as fairly to stagger the
imagination of even the most ambitious of 'political bosses.' " 11
The thinking of the experts who urged passage of the food and
drug legislation and of the lawmakers who responded to them provided an example of the myopia that characterized the Progressive
generation. The experts pitted themselves, as the champions of
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society, against evil food and drug adulterators, but they ignored or
failed to realize the possibilities for usurpation of individual freedom
that were at their disposal. They drafted legislation creating jobs for
themselves; secured the appointment of each other through professional recommendations; banded together in national, state, and
regional organizations; and enforced, largely at their own discretion,
the laws that they helped to write. To their credit, it should be noted
that most of these people were conscientious, public-spirited officials
who tried to educate those who were affected by the laws and to
prosecute them only as a last resort.
In Tennessee, Brown steered a moderate course although opportunities abounded for political favoritism and unreasonable standards.
The situation in which he found himself at the time of his appointment could only be described as bewildering for the most dedicated
official. Given the absence of an effective state health administration,
it would not have been surprising if he had taken on dictatorial
tendencies. Brown, however, calmly set about almost immediately
organizing the work of his one-man department and developing
strategy for a crusade against impure food and drugs. The speedy
establishment of a laboratory to test samples was an absolute necessity
for effective enforcement. Inadequate funds prevented him from
setting up an independent state laboratory. He owned private facilities, however, located at 818 Church Street in Nashville, a godsend
for the state and probably a factor in his appointment. The Board of
Health directed him to purchase additional equipment and to put
aside two rooms in his building for state work; no sublaboratories
existed. Eventually, the department moved to offices in the capitol
annex. 6

Brown was as concerned about preparing himself for his new
duties as he was with organizing his department and informing the
public. To feel sure of himself and his interpretation of the state law,
he requested a meeting with Charles T. Cates, Jr., the state attorney
general. When they discussed legal matters on 19 February 1908,
they found themselves essentially in agreement. To keep abreast of
national developments, Brown established close ties with Harvey W.
Wiley and the various organizations of food officials. Within three
weeks of his appointment, the inspector went to Washington, D.C.,
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to discuss with Wiley the correlation of state and national investigation of food and drugs. The Nashville Banner carried an overly
optimistic report of the trip as well as the preliminary work of the
new appointee. According to the newspaper, everything necessary to
begin work had been established, and enforcement of the state law
would begin immediately. Brown, a man not given to overstatement,
recorded in his diary that the comments were "entirely unwarranted." 7
After setting up an office and acquainting himself with the law,
Brown initiated a program to inform the public of the dangers presented by adulterated food and drugs. A concerned citizenry, as he
knew, could exert enough pressure to force state legislators to fund
the department adequately. While touring the cities and towns of
Tennessee in search of impure food and drugs, the inspector lectured.
Described as not having been an "after-dinner speaker," he wasted
little time on formalities. He focused his attention on common problems, how they could affect human health, and how they should be
remedied. His itinerary of October 1908 included stops in Crossville,
Lafollette, and Chattanooga as well as the Nashville area. In Chattanooga he collected samples and talked with a group of physicians,
an effort that Brown described as "only moderately successful." 8
In the beginning he was confined largely to Nashville and to
Davidson County because of limited resources. As money and help
increased, so did the scope of investigation and enforcement. Nonetheless, Brown covered a good deal of territory, even in 1908. In
December he spoke again in Chattanooga, this time to the Kosmos
Club. He complimented them on their city market, talked about his
work, and used stereopticon slides to illustrate his lecture. Later,
one city physician told the club the reason that their city had no
inspector: "There are five good reasons," he said, "the mayor and four
commissioners." 9 The apathy of local officials, however, could not
deter interested citizens. By 1909 Chattanooga had a market inspector.
Aware of the attitude of dishonest businessmen toward adverse
publicity and informed customers, the framers of the state pure food
and drug law had provided for the publication of the names of offenders. In Brown's first report to the Board of Health, he outlined plans
for issuing bulletins dealing with misbranding and adulteration. He
tried, however, to give businessmen every opportunity to conform to
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the law before subjecting them to prosecution. Shortly after his
appointment, he conferred with the Board of Pharmacists, whose
members promised their assistance and requested fair treatment. In
an effort to enlighten the merchants of Nashville, he addressed the
Retail Grocers and Merchants' Association in mid March. A Nashville
newspaper reported that a unanimous resolution favoring the state law
had been adopted at the meeting. Joseph Ezell, president of the group,
in a letter to the editor, declared that the article was incorrect: "It
has been reported in your paper of the 17th that the Retail Grocers
and Merchants' Association at their meeting Monday night passed a
resolution endorsing the state pure food law. This is a mistake which
we desire to correct, as no such resolution was even introduced at the
meeting." 10
The rebuttal had its significance. Not all members of the local
trade association supported the law or the inspector. Resentment
festered, but the political climate was not favorably disposed toward
the businessmen until late in 1911. The state pure food and drug law,
however, remained a topic of conversation at their meetings. In
February 1909, H. L. Scott, a grocer, proposed that the law be
amended to conform to national standards. 11 Apparently those who
participated in the discussion remained ignorant of their foe, for this
act was merely an extension of national legislation. Their comments
reflected their apprehension; members of the association had not yet
decided whether to submit to the authority of the pure food and drug
inspector.
The suspicions of the food dealers were unwarranted, for Brown
dealt fairly with businessmen. Following the course outlined in the
Pure Food and Drug Law, he took samples from food and drugs
believed to be adulterated, analyzed them, and issued warnings which
were followed by prosecutions if a second sample showed that the
dealer had failed to comply with standards. During his first year in
office, he issued three circulars. The first summarized the Pure Food
and Drug Act; the second described the minimum standards for
syrups and molasses, which he put into effect on 1 October; and the
third, addressed to those selling food and drinks at fairs and other
public gatherings, dealt with sanitary procedures.12 Any food dealer
who openly opposed the law placed himself in a precarious situation,
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for he invariably alienated some of his customers; a few businessmen
took the risk. The inspector, in late 1908, said that some merchants
regarded pure food laws as interference with their "inalienable rights."
He emphasized that he was concerned only with common honesty
and the health of the people.13
To give merchants and manufacturers ample opportunity to
conform, Brown made no hurried attempt to enforce the law strictly
during 1908. By late October, however, he had misgivings about his
policy when he discovered, while on a tour of the state, that merchants,
although warned of the consequences, flagrantly violated the law. He
reminded them that a second offense would result in prosecution. 14
If his findings, based on the examination of 517 samples collected
from April 1908 to January 1909, were indicative of the quality of
food and drugs for the state as a whole, clearly a great need existed
for the rigid enforcement of the statutes; 53.17 percent were illegal
or adulterated. 15
Realizing the nature of human beings as well as the grave
consequences that impure products had on the health of the public,
Brown tried to maintain his keen sense of humor in dealing with'
jobbers, merchants, and patent-medicine men. Early in 1908 he
entered into a lively discussion with a dealer in sugar cakes who had
marked his cakes "Home Made." Brown insisted that this title be
removed from the label because the product resembled maple sugar.
Later in the year he encountered a patent-medicine nian who sold a
remedy called Lethia. The inspector decided that the label was not
legitimate, the product having been named for the mythical Greek
river of Lethe in Hades, whose water, when consumed, caused forgetfulness. The official himself was often the butt of jokes, which he
took in stride. He found a letter from a friend of his brother George's
particularly amusing. It arrived in a peculiar envelope bearing an
advertisement for Red Raven Splits, a soda water. Labeled in large
red letters, it proclaimed: "Joe Anderson, The Live Druggist, Chattanooga to Lucius Polk Brown, Meddler, Deviler, Fly Inspector, Pure
Food and Other People's Business;"16
While some of the labels were amusing, others misled and cheated
customers. Grocers, for example, willfully or unwillfully, robbed their
customers by selling oysters containing an illegal content of water.
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During January and February 1909, Nashvilleans consumed 30,000
quarts of oysters. If these contained 35 percent more water than was
legal, something that was not unusual, then approximately 10,500
quarts of water were sold as oysters. Assuming that merchants sold
the seafood at 35 cents a quart, customers paid $3,675 for water.17
By the end of Brown's first year in office, Tennesseans began to
realize the value of pure food and drug regulation. Newspapers had
given complimentary coverage throughout 1908. Not until late in
the year, however, did organizations praise Brown publicly, indicating
that a strong base of support was developing for him and his work.
The Nashville Housekeepers' Club passed a unanimous resolution
endorsing his actions. Likewise, the Nashville Board of Trade commended him and approved his ruling that hotels, restaurants, cafes,
boarding houses, and all public places where meals were served should
inform their patrons as to whether they served butter or oleomargarine.18
Brown's first year as pure food and drug inspector proved to be
a crucial one, for it provided him the time that he needed to begin
public health education, establish a fledgling department, attract
staunch supporters, and alert office seekers to the political potential of
his work. Furthermore, he found it desirable to coordinate his goals
with those of other food and drug officials at the state and federal
levels. The lessons he learned during 1908 made it possible for him to
conceive of a logical course of action for the future. From 1909 to
i915 his activities centered on four major objectives: waging campaigns against those who were violating the laws, educating the masses
to public health needs, increasing the size and power of his department, and building a national reputation for himself in his profession.
Frequently these objectives blurred and overlapped, but they represented · the basis of his operations. Although hampered by limited
funds, his work remained relatively undisturbed by mounting political
tensions in the state until the latter part of 1911. During the intervening years, Brown established a department capable of weathering the
storm that could have wrecked it, developed a general philosophy of
enforcement, and built a reputation for himself that was impervious
to petty political attacks.
·Brown's initial efforts suited politicians and other state bureau32
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crats, paving the way for additional legislation to promote his work.
Early in 190<), Representatives Samuel Lee Chesnutt, representing
Hawkins and Sullivan counties, and David B. Puryear of Sumner
County introduced a bill in the House, requiring sanitary conditions
in all places where food was prepared, manufactured, packed, stored,
or distributed. Written by the Association of State and National Food
and Dairy Inspectors, recommended by Brown, and supported by the
governor, this legislation, complementing that of 1907, passed without
any difficulty. 19 The Board of Health rallied wholeheartedly to back
Brown during his first year, and when it met in May 190<), it authorized
the inspector to appoint deputies to help him enforce the Sanitary
Food Law. The health authorities also commended the legislature for
having provided funds to add an assistant chemist to the Pure Food
and Drug Department. 20
In the same year, Democratic Senator J. T. Baskerville sponsored
a bill to "prevent fraud in the weights of articles" sold in the state.
Although the measure was weakly constructed, it passed, and it helped
Brown to cope with mislabeling. Subsequently, when the inspector
became an official of the Bureau of Weights and Measures of the
United States, he requested and received authority to take charge of
the standard weights and measures located in the state capitol and to
act as state sealer. He declared that the creation of a separate bureau
would be unnecessarily expensive. 21
This tactic of voluntarily taking on additional responsibilities or
of making recommendations that would lead to other duties resulted
by 1915 in a significant accumulation of power in the hands of one
man. Acting often on Brown's recommendations, the legislature made
the Pure Food and Drug Department a catchall for miscellaneous
chores requiring some scientific expertise. As its duties increased, the
department grew stronger and gained a degree of security. Certainly
the prerogative of the inspector to prosecute could have been used
maliciously, but Brown used the power of enforcement sparingly.
After ample time had been provided for food suppliers to confonn
with the existing legal standards, he adopted a method that was
common among Progressive reformers for dealing with flagrant offenders. He put his technique-the campaign-into effect during the
summer of 190<) and revived it thereafter when the need arose, usually
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during the sultry months of spring and summer. The characteristics
of the campaign technique included a full-scale inspection of a given
city or town for a period of time that generally ranged over a week
or two. Accompanied by officers from his own department, when they
became available, by city and county health officials, and by newspaper
reporters, the pure food and drug inspector descended on foodhandling establishments. When he discovered dealers who violated
the law, he subjected them to the righteous indignation of the press,
but infrequently to prosecutions and fines.
The summer campaign of 1909 in Nashville had all the trappings
of those that were to follow. On 11 . May, Brown swept down on the
lawbreakers like an avenging angel. He received full local press coverage, wreaking undesired publicity on the offenders. Concerning himself especially with contamination by the common housefly, he
staunchly avowed: "I will continue the campaign until the whole city
is in good shape." Fifty places were inspected the first day at the city
market. Brown found that there were numerous violations, and he
issued orders demanding full compliance with legal standards. One
of the greatest needs proved to be screened windows and doors.
Alluding to the Sanitary Food Law, which had become effective on 1
May, the inspector declared: "An ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure." He stated that he had encountered little opposition
because ignorance, not indifference, was his greatest foe; and he
occasionally referred to another proverb when he dealt with lawbreakers: "Cleanliness is next to Godliness."22 Brown indulged in these
platitudes because they could be understood by the lawbreakers and
the general public.
Two days later, Brown-accompanied by Blaine Dudley, the
inspector of food and marketing in Nashville, and a reporter from the
Banner-toured the city, inspecting stores. They found unscreened
windows and doors, toilets adjoining kitchens, open jars of refuse,
dirty walls, dusty bread trays, an absence of cuspidors, and decaying
food. Flies and insects entered easily from all sides. Chickens
roamed freely in one establishment. Wherever the inspector went,
owners generally received him with courtesy-tainted by a degree of
distrust. 23
Efforts in Nashville continued throughout the summer. In July,
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Brown issued an ultimatum that the farmers' market must be screened
by the end of the month. Twenty-four hours later the Board of
Public Works announced that city employees would do the work if
the municipal treasury would provide the funds. A few businessmen
tried, without success, to prevent compliance. The inspector also
ordered the installation of cuspidors to cope with some of the accumulation of filth on floors that were customarily subjected to a flushing
with water about once a week. 24
The campaign technique had its limitations, for two years later,
Brown again dealt with problems growing out of the unsanitary
conditions of the farmers' market. A decision in the case of Jack
Walters, a jobber, during April 1911 hindered constructive efforts.
Walters's attorney pleaded that the Sanitary Food Law was unreasonable and that standards set by it were impossible to attain; the jury
acquitted the defendant. In July, Brown obtained warrants for the
arrest of several men operating booths in the market, but when they
promised to conform, he obligingly agreed to drop the charges. 211
Later, in mid September, Squire Dan U. Burke, a Nashville
justice, bound over twenty butchers to the criminal court on bonds of
$2 50 each for failing to screen fresh meat. Assessing the action taken,
Brown recalled that he had tried to improve the market since 1909.
He added: "The requirements . of the food inspection were put on
the lowest point consistent with protection of public health, as I
realized the city intended building a new market house as soon as
possible, and hence I wanted to work a minimum of hardship on stall
owners. The latter, however, failed to appreciate the situation and
continued to sell their foods under insanitary conditions, also failing
to comply with promises made to me." 26
Perhaps the campaign was the best tactic available because of
the magnitude of the problem, the small size of the department, and
the difficulties in securing convictions when Brown did reluctantly
take cases to court. Apparently the inspector remained convinced of
this, for in 1912 he used the technique in Memphis, a city he had
rarely visited between 1908 and 1911. Mr. Grump's Memphis had a
reputable city health department, and Brown had relied heavily on
the services of G. W. Agee (a prominent bacteriologist) and other
local health officials there during preceding years when appropriations
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were lean. They had managed to secure several convictions. 27 In
April, Brown and two of his assistants, Dr. L. J. Desha and Dr. John
Frick, arrived in the river city. The press announced their arrival and
warned of "sad times ahead for those whose records in the state lab
are not clear." While the officials were in town, authorities there
imposed fines on two dealers who had not screened the doors and
windows of their shops. Brown, however, recommended a minimum
penalty for C. M. Dinstuhl, owner of a candy store, who saturated
his cherry chocolates with brandy.28
The relative success of the campaign technique merits attention,
for it was a common procedure employed by state food and drug
officials. It was not altogether unlike the prohibition raids used first
at the state level and then by federal authorities, although the raid
was secret whereas the campaign was often announced in advance by
the press with the objective of obtaining compliance with the law
rather than sensational convictions. Both the prohibition raid and
the campaign had their faults, usually the failure to force conformity
over a long period of time. The seven years that Brown served can be
used to a limited extent in measuring the success of the campaign
technique ( see table). 29

Year
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914

Number of Samples
Food
................
················
•········•······
............... .
................
•···············
................

206
261
128
220
181
213

Percentage
Adulterated

Number of Samples Percentage
Drugs
Adulterated

54.4o
4 2·53
343
43.70
204
Figures Not Available
45.oo
367
185
49.7 2
39.80
156

The percentages for these years showed that food adulteration,
with slight fluctuations, declined over the seven-year period. Drug
samples generally improved in quality except in 1914, when the
department devoted more time to narcotics than ever before. The
decline in the adulteration of food may have been more significant
than these figures indicate; by 191 3 Brown reported to the governor
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that his inspectors searched for illegal goods only, giving little or no
attention to those believed to be legitimate. 30
Very little of a definite nature can be derived from these figures
in trying to measure the success of the campaign technique. Generally,
however, it led to short-term, clean-up efforts which had to be
revitalized periodically by renewed campaigns and the constant
vigilance of authorities. Those who violated the law out of ignorance
were gradually enlightened and tried to conform. Balky merchants
who opposed the law sometimes complied, at least outwardly, for fear
of gaining undesirable publicity and losing customers. Flagrant offenders continued to violate the law if they could afford to lose customers
or if they catered to a caliber of people who remained uninformed or
unconcerned; seemingly, they had little to fear in the way of prosecutions and fines.
Convictions were difficult to obtain, and Brown was lenient
toward offenders, often accepting their word that they would conform
and allowing them to escape prosecution. Concerned principally
with securing pure food and drugs for the state, not with inflicting
severe punishment, he issued warnings first and brought charges later.
Nonetheless, he prosecuted a number of cases that were dismissed at
the whim of the presiding judge or the jury. Two important cases
went against Brown. In the first case he took to court, a petit jury
acquitted Joseph Ezell, a former president of the Retail Grocers and
Merchants' Association, when he was charged with selling oleomargarine as butter. The Jack Walters case likewise ended in a
dismissal when a jury responded to the defense attorney's argument
that the Sanitary Food Law of 1909 was unreasonable.31 These setbacks revealed to Brown that the judicial system was content with the
warnings that he issued but was not necessarily willing to inflict
punishment when these warnings went unheeded. Brown found it
far easier, however, to prosecute Negroes and foreigners. Every
successful conviction under the Sanitary Food Law of 1909 involved
Negroes or individuals with foreign names. A total of eight Negroes
paid fines, along with B. Haiman, Xavier Faucon, and Tom Velasco,
all of Nashville, and John Canale of Memphis.32 This may have
reflected a racial bias of Brown's, or, more likely, of the judges' and
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juries'. In any event, it seems highly improbable that Negroes and
foreigners were alone in violating the Sanitary Food Law.
The fines collected during any particular year between 1908 and
1912 probably never exceeded $260. The official reports contain totals
for only two years, 1909 and 1912. In 1909, $260 was collected; in
1912, $195. The maximum fine meted out to any single dealer during
these two years was $25; the minimum, $5. 83 Newspaper coverage of
arrests and convictions tends to substantiate the conjecture that $26o
was probably the largest sum collected in one year. Total fines in
1914 under the Anti-Narcotics Law, however, may have exceeded
earlier figures slightly, for some $50 penalties were imposed on
physicians who issued prescriptions illegally.
When these feeble amounts are compared to fines and convictions
in the neighboring state of Kentucky during 1906 and 1907, when
convictions seemed to be especially numerous, the difficulty of enforcing the Tennessee law becomes clear. Food experts in the Blue-Grass
State secured a total of 268 convictions and had 153 cases pending at
the time they issued a report. During this period, the Division of Food
Control, headed by Robert M. Allen, working out of the Agricultural
Experiment Station in Lexington, cooperated with Louisville health
officials to obtain a pure milk supply. They secured eighty convictions
of men who were charged with feeding distillery slop to cows and
keeping dairy animals in filthy stables. Each offender received a fine
of $100 and a jail sentence of fifty days, the latter suspended when
the defendant promised to cease such practices. These eighty convictions alone netted $8,000, which was recycled back into the Division
of Food Control to cover operating expenses.34 In Tennessee, fines
could be used only for publication costs.
What success Brown managed to achieve in bringing about
conformity to the law could be attributed in large part to public health
education. Efforts in this direction were rather constant throughout
his service in Tennessee. He relied on lectures, bulletins, circular
letters, and displays. In 1914 he issued weekly press releases which
found their way into small-town newspapers. One of his more interesting ventures centered on an essay contest for school children. Cooperating with the superintendent of public instruction, Brown offered
two medals, first and second prizes, for the best themes dealing with
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hygiene or public health. The subject for 1910 received the awesome
title "The danger to health from the common housefly and how it
might be avoided." 35
On the lecture circuit, Brown remained active. In addition to
periodic discussions with civic groups, he offered to deliver two
lectures annually, free of charge, to each medical college in the state.
The colleges took him at his word, and he found himself speaking in
Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Nashville. Sometimes visual aids complemented the lectures. When employees of the department prepared
an exhibit dealing with patent medicines and false weights and
measures for the Fiftieth State Fair, it was also displayed at other
large public gatherings. 36
If money were available for printing, the department issued a
bulletin each year; the bulletin of 1910 was typical. Using language
that the layman could understand, the inspector dealt with different
subjects affecting public health. This publication, released in July,
included such topics as the dangers of canned products and patent
medicines. Metallic caps and containers posed a serious threat
because they were made of lead and zinc, elements capable of entering
into combinations with the acid in such food products as peppersauce
and vinegar. Brown sometimes demonstrated such reactions, before
live audiences, by placing a nail in a canned product and allowing a
coating to accumulate. 37
In the same bulletin the inspector revealed his apprehension of
drugs and patent medicines. Much of his early work centered on
headache remedies. Distinguishing between eyestrain and that particular variety of pain "which has its origin only in the cold gray dawn
of the morning after," he denounced those cures that were supposed
to alleviate suffering no matter what the cause. Brown claimed that
most of these products were derivatives of coal tar or opium and that
when used in large amounts, they caused changes in blood composition, depression of the heart, and sometimes stupor, coma, or death.
Habitual use could lead to addiction, as well as to death. 38
Such publications as the bulletin of 1910 went to any state
resident who requested them. The Pure Food and Drug Department,
as a rule, dealt more closely with urbanites than with rural dwellers;
but Tennessee remained an agrarian society during these years, and
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therefore the inspector tried to win the support of farmers. In 1910,
Brown, a farmer himself, addressed the delegates to a state agricultural
meeting in Nashville. In this speech he outlined the ways in which the
Pure Food and Drug Law benefited them. Dairymen, he claimed,
profited when illegal practices of competitors were halted; and efforts
to keep bleached flour and mixtures of ground meat and cereal off
the market increased the demand for high-quality sausage, hamburger,
and flour. Fruit growers prospered from regulations preventing the
sale of acetic acid as pure apple vinegar. Because sorghum was of
considerable importance to farmers in Tennessee, Brown admitted
his concern that adulterated molasses competed with high-grade
products. In commenting on impure drugs, he said that the farmer
had more at stake than other citizens because his livestock as well
as his family were threatened. 39
Although farmers were victimized by food and drug swindlers,
some of them had no objections to duping their customers, as the
following exchange illustrated:
DELEGATE: What about making cherry jelly out of
blackberries?
BROWN: I have never heard of a man doing it. I would
like to catch him though.
DELEGATE: I have it at my house.
BROWN: What do you add to it, a little hydrocyanic acid?
SAUNDERS: Leaves of the cherry tree.
BROWN: That is the same thing.
DELEGATE: It makes good cherry jelly, all right.
BROWN: Don't you sell it for cherry jelly where I am. 40
Aware of the delight that some farmers took in marketing exotic
goods and in duping agents of the department, the inspector included
a recipe for the manufacture of imitation cider in Bulletin Number 3,
and he commented that most of the product formerly sold in the
state had been artificial. Alerting consumers, he listed the stomachrevolting ingredients, which included one hundred gallons of rainwater, six gallons of honey, five ounces of powdered alum, and two
pounds of yeast. Brown recommended that this concoction ferment
for at least fifteen days before the addition of eight ounces of bitter
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almonds and the same amount of cloves. After it had set for twentyfour hours, two or three gallons of good whiskey should be added. 41
Public health education, although of merit, had its limitations. To
enforce effectively the laws entrusted to him and to implement his
policies, Brown found it imperative to increase the number of employees in his department. Every report he filed with the governor
included renewed pleas for additional appropriations. At the end of
one year as food and drug inspector, he asked for more funds to
enable him to hire two assistant chemists on a full-time basis, a parttime chemist during busy months, a laboratory helper, and a stenographer. During 1909 he began to realize his dream for a full-fledged
departmental staff. He hired an assistant chemist at a salary of $1,800,
recently provided by the legislature. L. J. Desha of Cynthiana, Kentucky, accepted the position. Although he had no experience with the
enforcement of food and drug laws, he had earned a doctorate in
chemistry from Johns Hopkins University; he possessed a thorough
background in his discipline; and he came highly recommended both
personally and professionally. Less than a year later, Brown reported
to the governor that his work had been "eminently satisfactory."42
Desha remained with the department until 8 September 1912,
when he accepted a professorship in chemistry with the medical
college of the University of Tennessee. He was replaced by C. L. Bliss,
a graduate of Cornell University who had had many years of practical
experience as a chemist. Previously he had been employed by the
University of Michigan and had been involved with government
service in the Philippines. Another chemist, W. F. Purrington,
worked with Brown and Desha during 1909 on a temporary basis. 43
In 1910, Brown again asked the governor for aid in securing
additional appropriations. The most pressing need of his office at
that time, he claimed, was a proper force of inspectors with scientific
training, not political hacks. The next year he was able to hire two
men as inspectors at a salary of $1,200 each. 44 Before the end of 1911,
when the department was beset with political difficulties, it had grown
to a four-man, full-time staff with some temporary paid help and
several volunteers.
Although the actual number of paid employees remained inadequate to pedorm the responsibilities assigned to the department,
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volunteers helped to reduce the work load. In accordance with
authorization extended by the Board of Health, Brown commissioned
worthy citizens throughout the state as special agents to aid in enforcement of the Sanitary Food Law. Mrs. Max Bloomstein, Mrs. Porter
McFerrin, and Mrs. W. L. Arnold, active members of the Nashville
Housekeepers' Club, were the first appointees. Other agents included
Blaine Dudley and his assistants, W. L. Lyon, E. F. Corbett, and
W. P. Moody, all of whom were involved with market inspection in
Nashville; Dr. and Mrs. S. S. Crockett of Nashville; P. L. Shute, J. N.
Anderson, and Dr. B. G. Tucker, health officials of Davidson County;
G. W. Agee of Memphis; and Dr. Ben H. Brown of Chattanooga.
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These special agents voluntarily inspected places where food was
manufactured, stored, or sold and determined whether such locations
were sanitary. City and county authorities performed these duties in
addition to their regular obligations. Brown found this type of cooperation highly satisfactory, and he continued to appoint agents from
Shelby and Davidson counties and from the cities of Nashville and
Memphis. He originally adopted this policy after conferences with
municipal officials who requested coordination of state and local health
work.4 5
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Brown devoted most of his time and energy to his official duties,
but he also had strong loyalties to his profession. From 1908 to 1911 ~
as he established a firm foundation for his department, he maintained
his ties with professional organizations and earned a national reputation for himself as a food and drug official. In 1910, as a delegate of
the National Association of Official Agricultural Chemists, he attended
the Pharmacopoeia} Convention in Washington, D.C., which was
revising the United States Pharmacopoeia. The next year he presented
a paper, "The Need of a Professional Code of Ethics among Chemists," to the American Chemical Society meeting in Indianapolis. 46
The matter of professionalization and the image that chemists
had of themselves received careful attention from Brown. In September 1909 he wrote to his friend Dr. Wiley: "It seems to me that the
average commercial chemist comes nearer being a fool when the
matter of compensation is concerned than any other man I know of.
He does not seem to mind at all being placed on the plane of the shoe
factory operative who does piece work and is perfectly willing to let
the client set his fees so long as he is able to exist. It is very much to
be desired that some body like the British Society of Public Analysts
be organized in the United States." Wiley agreed that such a society
might be desirable, provided that the agency itself could be financially
independent and composed of men who would not issue false
certificates. 47
All of these professional concerns were subordinate to Brown's
affiliation with the Association of State and National Food and Dairy
Officials. From 1908 to 1911 he attended every annual convention.
Although he had established connections with the association as
early as 1904, it was not until 1909 that he became actively involved
in the internal political struggles that plagued it. Most of the disputes
centered on food standards and the use of preservatives. The problems
surfaced in Theodore Roosevelt's administration, resulting in Dr.
Wiley's fall from grace. Wiley himself dated his loss of favor from
1907, when the subject of using saccharin as a substitute for sugar
arose. Wiley told the president that saccharin was a threat to health;
Roosevelt answered angrily, "Anybody who says saccharin is injurious
is an idiot" -his doctor gave it to him every day. After this incident,
Roosevelt appointed the special Referee Board of Consulting Scien43
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tific Experts, who were in effect reviewing Wiley's work. Relations
between the president and the chief chemist never improved. 48
When the Association of State and National Food and Dairy
Departments met at Mackinac Island in August 1908, Brown heard
Edwin Fremont Ladd, food commissioner of North Dakota and
president of the association, attack Secretary of Agriculture James
Wilson for helping create the Referee Board. According to Ladd, the
board represented the manufacturing interests. The entire organization
joined the North Dakota delegate, going on record as regretting
Wilson's stand and opposing the addition of any chemical preservative to food. Wiley, who attended the meeting, failed to defend the
secretary as vigorously as he might have done, for he agreed with
the substance of the attack. After this his position continued to
deteriorate within the administration, and rumors circulated that he
would be asked to resign. 49 Delegates to subsequent conventions of
the association harbored the animosities of the pro-Wiley and antiWiley forces until the chief chemist resigned in 1912.
The convention at Denver in 1909 split over the benzoate-of-soda
question. Secretary Wilson, determined to defend his views, headed
the federal delegation but allowed Wiley to attend at government
expense. The chief chemist, however, did not consider himself an
official delegate. Nonetheless, he was busy behind the scenes, helping
to organize a committee to report on benzoate of soda. He also
operated through his friend Robert M. Allen to win the support of
doubtful state delegations. Local reporters noted the existence of two ·
distinct camps, warring for control of the convention. The Wilson
faction managed to elect one of its own men as president, but the
Wiley forces elected the vice-president, Lucius Polk Brown.110
The inspector from Tennessee had spoken against the use of
chemical preservatives in food, as he explained later to the governor:
"Believing that there was at least a doubt as to the healthfulness of
such preservatives in foods; that they permitted the use of unsanitary
methods of packing, and that such methods were opposed to the spirit
of existing law in Tennessee, I was not in favor of admitting these
materials to be used in foods." 51
Brown had followed the Wiley philosophy-namely that all food

44

THE SCIENTIST AS A SOUTHERN BUREAUCRAT

additives posed potential dangers to human health-since his appointment in 1908. Through correspondence and personal contact at
professional meetings, Brown and Wiley exchanged ideas, reviewed
convention activities, evaluated laws, and discussed standards. Closely
aligned professionally, the state inspector and the chief chemist
developed a warm friendship-enough so that Brown could write to
Mrs. Wiley that he would send her a dog, probably one of the Airedales he bred, if she could persuade her husband to agree. Brown
added, "I did not dare say it to him, but I may say it to you, that
his feeling with regard to dogs is the only blot that I have found on
an otherwise pedect character." He indulged in a pun, revealing
some of the frustrations of food and drug officials, when he suggested
that Wiley did not like dogs because he had experienced so much
hounding.112
The state inspector staunchly defended the views that he shared
with Wiley in other conventions that followed the meeting in Denver.
The organization remained fragmented when delegates gathered at
New Orleans from 29 November to 2 December 1910. Again a dispute
arose over the election of a president. Brown had the support of the
Wiley faction. When the delegates deadlocked, six men-three from
each faction-went into conference to try to come to an agreement.
This resulted in a promise by the anti-Wiley people that if another
man were chosen president, they would support Brown in 1911.
Charles D. Woods of Maine, one of the men involved, gave the
following account:
I went to this candidate with two others and said to him, "I
have betrayed you, you cannot be the President of this Association at this time, but it is agreed that you will be the
President at the next convention"; and this man hesitated a
moment and held out his hand and said, "It is all right,"
and this same man, when it came to the election of officers,
made a nominating speech .... If you haven't read it, you
should do so, as it shows the true character of the man. It
shows that he can sacrifice all personal feeling for the good
of the cause for which we stand. He accepted defeat that was
given him at the hands of his friends and placed in nomination his rival.
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With the Tennessee inspector willing to compromise, George L.
Flanders was elected president; Brown, first vice-president. 53
During the following year, Wiley's problems became more acute.
The quarrel within the administration erupted openly in 1911, when
Secretary Wilson charged that the chief chemist had acted irregularly
in 1907 when he had employed Dr. Henry H. Rushy as pharmacognosist. In a cabinet meeting that took place while Wiley was out
of town, Wilson called for his resignation. When the chemist learned
of his plight, he released the details of his story to the New York
Times. Many of his fellow citizens and his professional colleagues
bombarded President Taft, Secretary Wilson, and congressmen with
praise for him. The president, realizing the political inexpediency of
dismissing Wiley, exonerated him in September. 54
When the Association of State and National Food and Dairy
Inspectors met in Duluth during August, the controversy over Wiley
quickly became the dominant issue. Early indications were that the
anti-Wiley forces were not going to honor the commitment to elect
Brown as president, whereupon Woods reminded the convention of
the earlier agreement, although two other men involved said they
could not recall it. Nonetheless, Woods nominated Brown. The vote
that followed was close, with 49½ votes for Dr. William P. Cutler
of Missouri and 52 ½ for Brown. Robert M. Allen reported to Wiley
that the likelihood of a tie had been so great that Brown cast a vote
for himself because the Missouri commissioner would not forbid his
delegation to vote. When the election was assured, Cutler moved that
it be made unanimous. 55
Brown's victory received immediate attention in Tennessee.
The editor of the Nashvilie Tennessean and American called it "a
merited honor" and one that Brown would bear with credit to himself and his state. He concluded: "Dr. Brown is the right man in the
right place. His election was a Wiley victory, which means that
poisoned foods and unwholesome concoctions will have no protection
at his hands."56
By 1911, Brown had built a gradually expanding bureaucracy,
made strides in educating the public, begun enforcing the laws in
moderation, and risen to the highest office in a national organization
composed of his peers. The inspector had little time to enjoy his
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professional triumphs or the praise heaped on him by admirers,
however, for a struggle was shaping up that would require all the
stamina he could muster to sustain himself. Since his appointment
in 1908, the major political issue in the state had been prohibition.
Clashes between opposing forces had resulted in a split in the Democratic party, in a state that had been solidly Democratic since
Reconstruction. The result of the schism had been the election of a
Republican governor in 1910. Meanwhile, businessmen in Nashville
and Davidson County and the food and drug inspector had reached
only a temporary truce at best. When Brown's second term expired
in 1912 and the matter of reappointment had to be decided by
Governor Ben. W. Hooper, those who opposed the inspector hoped
to capitalize on the politics of the moment to rid themselves once
and for all of the leading consumer advocate and health official in
the state.
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For almost four years, Brown kept his department free of the bitter
partisan struggles brought on by prohibition. He was not as successful
in this respect during the latter days of 1911 and the first three months
of 1912. Those businessmen who opposed the work of the inspector
attempted to convince Republican Governor Ben W. Hooper that
Brown was a political liability, an incompetent, and an idealist. They
misjudged the governor and failed to realize the importance of the
public support that Brown had gained from 1908 to 1911. Still, the
inspector's opponents created a furor over his reappointment in 1912
which, for a few weeks, put the future of the Pure Food and Drug
Department in jeopardy.
As much as Brown the scientist would have liked to pursue his
objectives in a political vacuum, he was a state employee; and no
state employee, during the years he was in office, could have escaped
completely the tensions that threatened to shatter the Democratic
party. The impact of these serious divisions on the politics of the
state can only be assessed when it is taken into consideration that
this party had controlled state government since the termination of
Reconstruction. 1 Once Middle and West Tennessee had been released
from the home-grown radicalism of East Tennessee Republicans, the
possibility seemed slight that this party would ever regain the power
to dominate the state.
For a generation the Democratic party, which was composed of
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three distinct factions, settled into a routine of internal struggles,
relatively untroubled by the possibility of the rebirth of a strong
Republican party. The dominant faction, the old States' rights
Democrats, was led by Isham G. Harris, the governor who took the
state out of the Union in 1861. With their doctrine of secession in a
shambles, this group came to be especially apprehensive of the
ascendancy of federal power. The other older faction consisted of the
small-farmer element headed, in tum, by Andrew Jackson, Andrew
Johnson, and Robert Love Taylor. A third group, and the newest to
enter the Democratic party, included the old Whigs from Middle and
West Tennessee who had only with great reluctance turned secessionist. Actually this faction shared economic views with the East
Tennessee Republicans. They preferred industrial and business
development, whereas the other Democratic groups leaned almost
exclusively toward agriculture. 2
These factions, undisturbed by external political developments
until the prohibition movement began to have serious influence,
vied for control of the party and the state government. As early
as 1877, temperance elements had secured passage of the FourMile Law, a loosely written piece of legislation which outlawed
the retail sale of intoxicating beverages within four miles of any school
outside an incorporated town. Almost unnoticed at the time of
passage, this law became the instrument for drying up Tennessee.8
After advocates of temperance tried unsuccessfully to add a
prohibition amendment to the state constitution, they organized a
party in 1883, which gradually increased in size and influence. Over
the years, temperance leaders secured amendments to the Four-Mile
Law, until by 1907 they had seemingly dried up the rural areas and
the small towns. The prohibition issue soon led to a schism in the
state between rural and urban areas. City dwellers who had originally
favored local option viewed the threat of complete prohibition as
totally undesirable. A bill passed the legislature in 1907 providing
for the extension of the Four-Mile Law to cities of 150,000 if they
reincorporated after the proposal was enacted. Prohibitionist sentiment prevailed in Knoxville, one of the four largest cities, and
citizens voted two to one for recharter. Meanwhile, Nashville, Memphis, Chattanooga, and Lafollette had not succumbed. 4
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Prohibition in the cities became a dominant issue when the
crusade of the teetotalers interjected itself forcefully into Democratic
politics in 1908. Former Senator Edward Ward Carmack, backed by
prohibitionists, tried to win the Democratic nomination for governor
from incumbent Malcolm R. Patterson of Memphis, who was
favorable to local option but was an opponent of statewide prohibition.
Although Patterson triumphed in the primary and subsequently
returned to the governorship, state prohibitionists refused to accept
his victory as a popular rejection of prohibition.
After Carmack's defeat, he became editor of the Nashville
Tennessean and used his columns to crusade for prohibition and to
lambast his political opponents. Unfortunately for Carmack, but most
fortunately for the temperance spokesmen and teetotalers, the editor
ridiculed Duncan B. Cooper, one of Patterson's chief supporters, a
close friend, and an advisor. Cooper warned him that Nashville was
too small to hold the both of them. On 8 November 1908, Cooper,
accompanied by his son Robin, met Carmack by chance on Seventh
Avenue, then known as Vine Street. Bullets began to fly, and when
the smoke cleared, Carmack lay dead. Apparently he had fired the
first shot, but a bullet from Robin's gun had killed him. 5
Worth more to the prohibitionists dead than he had been alive,
the late editor became a martyr. In January 1909 the General Assembly
outlawed liquor in the state. Patterson vetoed the bill, but the legislature overrode him. After the Cooper-Carmack shooting, the governor's
political stock continued to decline, but his pardoning of Duncan
Cooper; who had been convicted of murdering Carmack, after the
state supreme court upheld the trial court's verdict, spelled the
political demise of Patterson and signaled a split in the Democratic
party. Democrats who were inclined toward prohibition broke away
from the Regular Democratic party. In the fall of 1910, Patterson
withdrew from the gubernatorial primary, hoping to heal the wound
precipitated by prohibition. He was too late to unite the party. The
Independent Democrats joined with the eager Republicans to form
the "Fusionist" movement and elected Ben W. Hooper, a Republican
from Newport, over the aging Senator Robert Love Taylor, a holdover
from the old small-farmer element and a recognized conciliator. 6
The election of Hooper marked the demise of the old three-faction
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Democratic party. Prohibition had altered the state's dominant
party and had brought about the election of the first Republican
governor since 1880.
These were the political conditions under which Brown worked.
With prohibition as the foremost consideration of state politicians,
other issues received only superficial attention. Given the webs of
kinship and political allegiance that existed in Middle Tennessee,
almost everyone took a side. Brown, himself a relative of the Coopers,
maintained a discreet silence on the liquor question.
Appointed in 1908 when the prohibition question rose to the
highest echelon of state government, Brown remained relatively
unaffected by the tumultuous political struggle until 1911. Nonetheless, politics remained an ever-present reality. The gentle reminder
by Patterson that he expected support from his appointees, the suggestion that the inspector find a job for a certain young man named
Fite, and a hint that hiring an elderly man, Tom Haynes, would be
good politics, to say nothing of Brown's dependence on the legislature
for operating funds-all kept him alerted to the true nature of his
position. As loyal to his promise as a politician could be, Patterson
left Brown free to run his department. He supported requests for
additional appropriations, and he reappointed Brown on 23 November
1909, even though the first term did not expire until 15 January 1910. 7
The inspector escaped the turnover of Patterson appointees when
Hooper became governor because his second term did not expire until
15 January 1912. Nonetheless, Brown, a Regular Democrat, felt
opposition building against him soon after Hooper was inaugurated.
Not necessarily fostered by the governor, the opposition flourished in
the political situation created by his success as a Republican candidate
in the gubernatorial election of 1910. The editors of the Nashville
Tennessean and American and the Nashville Banner, both progressive
journalists with prohibitionist sentiments, had heretofore ardently supported the inspector's work, but what seemed to him a pointed
editorial appeared in the Tennessean and American on 28 May 1911.
Declaring that 250,000 children under one year of age died annually
in the United States, a third of these from infected milk, the editor
placed the blame on the authorities who "fail of their duty in bringing
to account those who sell impure milk." He added: "Let us sharpen
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our wits and renew and increase our vigilance in giving proper care
and providing pure and wholesome food for the babies."
Viewing the editorial as criticism of his work, even though in
fact it may not have been, Brown responded almost immediately. In
a letter, he argued that most officials were dedicated to public health.
The real cause of infant mortality, according to the inspector, rested
with public apathy and the meager appropriations of state legislatures.
He placed the final blame on politicians: "Another and unfortunately
potent element of opposition to these measures for the public good
is 'peanut politics,' ... and, while partisan politicians fight, the babies
die." The editor accepted this explanation. At the end of June he
insisted that liberal appropriations should be made for the enforcement of pure food and drug laws, and he praised the inspector for
his accomplishments in spite of the limited funds at his disposal. 8
The most serious opposition came, not from an occasional editorial, but from the organized merchants in the Nashville-Davidson
County area. Disputes between the inspector and the businessmen
which had arisen from 1908 to 1910 became public by the end of
1911. When Brown declared an all-out war on those who dealt in
false weights and measures and instituted a grading system for
establishments selling food, his enemies decided that the time was
right to make their grievances known to the politicians.
In December 1911, Brown vigorously took up the work against
false weights and measures. He swore out warrants for the arrest of
twenty-five merchants. Most of the incriminating evidence had been
gleaned by an undercover agent who bought an item and asked to
weigh it on his personal scales, a practice that was distasteful to the
merchants. Those who violated the law were summoned to appear
before the pure food and drug inspector and explain their positions.
Most of them presumably did not know the difference between a
"wet" and "dry" measure. Some of the men blamed "country people"
for selling them illegal products. The editor of the Tennessean and
American chimed in that at last the time had come when the consumer
was going to have a square deal. 9
Although the merchants who were charged with violating the
common law against false weights and measures and with mislabeling
their products promised to cooperate in the future, the Retail Grocers
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and Merchants' Association agreed to meet at their hall in the Bruce
Building on 7 December 1911 for the purpose of deciding how to
cope with this new problem. M. T. Mallon, president of the organization, claimed that Brown was after the wrong men. Blaming farmers,
Mallon charged that they always insisted that their measures be
used in transactions with merchants. Mallon said that the businessmen
had no intention of opposing the new ruling, although a few hotheads
had suggested making a test case. After the meeting, Mallon notified
the local newspapers that his group had endorsed Brown and had
agreed to assist him in every way. 10
If the businessmen were not disturbed enough already, Brown
ended the year with another surprise. He established a grading system
of "excellent, good, fair, poor, or bad" for all places selling food. A
certificate bearing the grade had to be placed on permanent display
in all food-handling establishments. This system had been used in
Maine, Indiana, and Kansas, but no other southern state except
Louisiana made widespread use of it. Although it was intended to be
a positive innovation, Tennessee restaurant operators and grocers
considered it to be yet another method of harassment. 11
The adoption of grading, as well as the crusade against false
weights and measures, immediately preceded the drive to oust Brown
from office. While publicly promising to support these measures,
members of the Retail Grocers and Merchants' Association secretly
plotted to block his reappointment. Fully aware that Brown's term
was about to expire, they increased their criticism of him. The citizens
around Nashville and in other areas of the state began taking their
positions on the matter of reappointment in December 1911. The
pro-Brown group included local women's organizations, farmers, and
professional people. The opposition enlisted the members of the
local trade association. Between the two camps stood Lucius Polk
Brown, "the visionary and dreamer and incompetent" or the "Dr.
Wiley of Tennessee." With the end of his second term approaching,
he was caught in a cross fire of insults, accusations, and endorsements.
Businessmen cast Brown as a liability to Hooper. Enemies
charged that the inspector had never given a Republican a job, although D. J. Frazier, a subordinate inspector, had once campaigned
for the post of representative from Cumberland County on the
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Republican ticket. A Nashville newspaper, in defense of the inspector,
claimed that several of his appointees had voted for Hooper. In any
event, Brown had not voted for Hooper in 1910. He gave his support
to him, however, when he ran in 1912, although he was under the
general impression that it was too bad that the man was a Republican. 12
Alert to the political turmoil in the state, Brown had anticipated
the controversy surrounding his reappointment. Almost immediately
after his election to the presidency of the Association of State and
National Food and Dairy Inspectors, he began mobilizing his supporters. His old colleague, Dr. Wiley, an experienced warrior in political
feuds, drafted a letter to Governor Hooper in September, praising
the inspector and suggesting that he be reappointed. He gave it to
Brown unsealed and told him to use it as he thought best; Brown
mailed it to the governor.13
In late December, when the fight was on, Brown once again took
up the matter with Wiley. He suggested that the chief chemist might
speak to the governor on his behalf when Hooper visited Washington.
He revealed his personal opinion of the state executive to Wiley:
"Governor Hooper has made us a good Governor so far, has stood
for the right as nearly as possible, has not been swayed by machine
motives in his appointments or actions, and I think that I can work
effectively for the public interests with his administration." When
the governor went to the national capital during January, Wiley called
on him at the Willard Hotel. He found Hooper absent, but he left a
message that he had been there to pay his respects. Later, a friend of
Wiley's revealed to him Hooper's remarks on learning of his visit:
"I know what Dr. Wiley wants to see me about. It is about the
appointment of a food commissioner." 14
Hooper was aware of Brown's national reputation and the
possibility of adverse criticism of his administration if the veteran
inspector were not reappointed. He also understood the commercialagrarian schism in the state. At times, hostility between the agrarian
and commercial interests almost superseded the issue of reappointment as each group tried to shift the blame for false weights and
measures. Neither farmers nor storekeepers were as blameless as they
would have liked to appear, and farmers might never have concerned
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themselves with the reappointment issue had they not come under
attack from Brown's enemies.15
As the merchants became more vocal in their opposition to
reappointment, other supporters of Brown entered the fight. Two
women's organizations of Middle Tennessee were among the first
to express favorable opinions of the inspector. In December, members
of the home section of the Middle Tennessee Farmers' Association
adopted resolutions commending him. The Centennial Club of
Nashville, a group of homemakers numbering approximately five
hundred, endorsed Brown and asked for his reappointment. According
to an editorial in the Tennessean and American, the women spoke
"in unmistakable terms." 16
Although Brown's supporters included nonfarming groups, the
agrarian-commercial struggle persisted. One man wrote to a Nashville
newspaper, commenting that he would probably have to pay to get
his letter in print. Addressing Brown, the writer said that he was
obligated to express his appreciation because work "against the
universal dishonesty of the mercantile world" greatly benefited his
class. 17 F. 0. Beerman, who did not identify himself as a farmer or
as a merchant, succinctly expressed the opinion of the agrarians.
While congratulating the inspector for his efforts to protect the
consumers, especially those of the "ignorant and poorer classes,"
Beerman declared that it was nonsense for the public to blame the
farmers for short weights. He further asserted that merchants took
care of their interests first, without thought for the customer. "The
endeavor to push this proposition on the farmer is all buncombe," said
Beerman, "for any child 7 years old knows that in each case the
merchant takes care of himself." 18
Brown agreed that his purpose was to protect the small consumer,
adding:
In the work done up to date, it is manifest that it would be
an injustice to any one man or set of men to publish their
names, for the reason that everybody has been doing it. It
is a universal custom, and might bring undeserved odium
upon a well-meaning man. But parties in this state are now
warned what to expect, and hereafter not only prosecutions
will be brought, but publication will be made. Moreover, in
55

LUCIUS POLK BROWN

all cases which have heretofore come before us in which
guilty intent seems to exist, publication will be made. 19
Thomas P. Calhoun, a farmer of Davidson County, also replied
to charges that the farmers were to blame for incorrect measures.
Calhoun claimed that if a farmer refused to use the buyer's measure,
he would be told very quickly "to drive on with his load." Then he
scoffed at the idea of a man carrying his scales to weigh his products
or of a retailer accepting another measure than his own. To clinch his
arguments, he added, "As farmers, we have not complained against
Dr. Brown, so we are not the hit dog, for we have not howled." He
suggested that if farmers had ever imposed "on the poor retail
grocerymen, let them report us to Dr. Brown and have him make
it hot for us." Calhoun reaffirmed his support for the inspector and
the law when it was administered equally to businessmen and
farmers.20
On 4 January 1912 the strategy of the businessmen took on a
new dimension when they carried the case against Brown to Governor
Hooper. The delegation, comprising forty to fifty men, met the
governor behind locked doors because they did not want the public
to know who was against the inspector. One man declared that they
fought Brown, not for personal reasons, but because of "his incompetency." He said that the official was "impractical and visionary" and
ignorant of the weights and measures used by businessmen. Brown,
some contended, employed mere "boys" who might ruin a man's
reputation. Other merchants claimed that the grading system adopted
by Brown in late 1911 discriminated against the small businessmen
who could not afford to stock or furnish their stores as lavishly as
wealthier merchants. The meat dealers complained about the ruling
that their products be kept under glass, adding that if meat were kept
in a glass case, more clerks would be needed to remove it. The
dissident merchants further alleged that the pure food and drug
inspector had directed a whirlwind campaign to have himself reappointed. Governor Hooper thanked all of them for their opinions
and informed them that he had also been approached by Brown's
supporters.21
After the businessmen met with the governor, representatives
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of the medical and teaching professions added their voices to those
of farmers and housewives in support of Brown. The Nashville
Academy of Medicine and the Davidson County Medical Society
unanimously endorsed him and sent the resolutions to Hooper.
These groups usually avoided active support of candidates seeking
political offices, but because of the concern of the medical experts
with public health, they made an exception. 22
Another endorsement came from W. R. Webb, headmaster of
the Webb School at Bell Buckle. After calling attention to the changes
in food preparation from homes to factories, he announced his
belief that the general public, not just the citizens of Nashville, were
interested in the appointment of a pure food and drug inspector. He
admitted his ignorance of the validity of the charges made by the
grocers, but still considered the state blessed to have a man of the
caliber of Brown. He remarked on the similarity between this struggle
and the one that involved Dr. Harvey W. Wiley. He pointed out
that Wiley's influence and prestige had been enhanced. He added
that he thought the same would be true in Brown's case. Webb
assumed that Hooper would not make the mistake of removing an
efficient officer, especially in view of his interest in progressive
programs involving prisons, education, and agriculture. In conclusion,
the educator challenged the Nashville merchants to invite customers
to inspect their places of business. 23
Not a man to remain silent when under attack, Brown, in a letter
to Hooper, answered the charges of the Retail Grocers and Merchants'
Association. His office, he insisted, performed necessary functions.
Moreover, he had requested the cooperation of the merchants, but
many of them had failed to respond. He firmly denied that he had
discriminated against anyone. His publication of names was authorized
under the Pure Food and Drug Law of 1907. In answer to an assertion
made by some businessmen that he "never molested soft drink
stands," the inspector said that in 1911 he issued 48 orders for
changes to the owners of such stands in Nashville, 496 throughout the
state. This particular criticism may have been designed to persuade
the governor that Brown allowed the operators to sell liquor illegally,
a practice not unusual to soft-drink stands. The inspector himself
disliked these businesses and thought anyone a fool who would pay
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five cents for a bottle of carbonated water. Brown also defended his
legal right to establish a grading system. 24
The conflict between the agrarian and urban interests continued
in the midst of the reappointment controversy. The editor of the
Tennessean and American said that if grocers cheated farmers, then
a definite need existed for uniformity in weights and measures. John
Coode, a grocer, defended his associates by declaring that they were
not villains or "short weight artists." The unpleasant situation, he said,
could have been avoided if the legislators had made sufficient appropriations for the operation of the Pure Food and Drug Department.
He innocently added that adequate funds would have allowed Brown
to consult with experienced grocerymen. M. T. Mallon again hoisted
the banner of the businessmen by blaming farmers for providing them
with unsatisfactory goods. He staunchly denounced the rural people
who caused the grocers to be falsely accused. 25
The term of the pure food and drug inspector expired on 1 5
January 1912. Hooper had failed to act on the matter of reappointment by this date. The governor responded with a great deal of
political acumen by asking Brown to remain in office until a successor
could be named. This was an indication that he intended to appoint
a new man. Leaving Brown in the position, however, gave cause for
optimism among his supporters. By avoiding a formal commitment,
Hooper maintained a balance between the two groups and gave
tempers time to cool. 26
On 1 March 1912, a month and a half after the second term
expired, Hooper reappointed the veteran inspector. In his formal
announcement, the governor said that he had been elected on a lawenforcement platform, and Brown had distinguished himself by an
honest effort to enforce the law. He further praised his fairness and
his attempt to keep his department from becoming a political arena.
The governor subtly hinted that perhaps Brown had not been as
diplomatic and considerate as he might have been. Nevertheless, he
attributed these difficulties to the establishment of a new department.27 Reappointment of Brown by the Republican governor was
an important landmark for the department, raising it above partisanship.
If the press reflected general sentiments, then the governor's
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decision was a wise one. In East Tennessee the Knoxville Sentinel
and the Knoxville Daily Journal and Tribune carried stories of the
fight. The editor of the former wrote that opposition to reappointment
would be undesirable publicity for businessmen speaking out against
the inspector. The editor commented that Brown appeared to be
conscientiously enforcing the laws. The inspector enjoyed favorable
coverage by the Chattanooga Daily Times when he urged, during his
first year in office, that the mayor and councilmen appoint a municipal
pure food and drug inspector for that city. The Nashville Banner
and the Nashville Tennessean supported Brown from the time of
his initial appointment by Governor Patterson in 1908. Because of
insufficient funds, the inspector had left much of his work in Memphis
to the city health officials; but the Commercial-Appeal praised
Hooper when he announced the reappointment. 28
Undoubtedly, the governor gave considerable thought to the
matter before he revealed his decision. Although very active and
highly vocal, the Nashville Retail Grocers and Merchants' Association
constituted only a minority of voters in one well-defined area of the
state. They simply realized the possibilities for exploiting a rare
political situation to rid themselves of pure food and drug enforcement
by preventing the reappointment of a conscientious official. They
were numerically weak, and their arguments lacked validity. They
also left themselves open to criticism from both city and country
dwellers, presented an undesirable image, and seemed unwilling to
do everything possible to safeguard the consumers. Their confrontation with farmers proved unwise in a predominantly rural state where
many citizens still believed sincerely in the arcadian myth.
The weakness of the Nashville-Davidson County merchants'
position was complicated by the fact that they were not completely
united among themselves and that they certainly did not speak for all
businessmen in the state. Brown received a letter from C. T. Cheek
& Sons of Nashville, informing him that they had ordered the employees in all their stores to sell by weight and asking him to force
their competitors to do likewise. These businessmen aded: "It will
be quite hard for us to continue selling by weight unless you force
our competitors who are selling by measure to give the correct weight."
They suggested that Brown instruct his inspectors to test the weights
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of products where grocers sold by measure. Another group, the Board
of Directors of the Southern Poultry and Egg Shippers' Association,
adopted a resolution praising Brown which was forwarded to the
governor. 29 Support from such areas as these revealed the minority
position of the merchants who opposed the inspector.
As much as some businessmen would have liked to pit a realistic
professional politician against an idealistic scientist, Hooper and
Brown could not be cast in these roles. Even if Hooper had been
swayed by the rumors that Brown was a political liability because he
was a Regular Democrat who never gave a Republican a job, he was
in no position to take a partisan stance. No viable two-party system
existed in Tennessee at that time, and Hooper would never have
occupied the executive mansion had it not been for the intrusion of
prohibition into state politics, resulting in a schism within the
Democratic party. He was not a machine politician but more of a
gentlemanly reformer put into office by a fusion effort. With the
exception of his endorsement of prohibition, Hooper was similar to
his Democratic predecessor. Both were inclined toward moderate
reform. Both were also politicians-although Patterson was more of
a professional than Hooper-and hence opportunists; and probably
the truth of the matter was that except on the prohibition question,
both men occupied virtually the same position on the political
spectrum.
Whereas Patterson at one time had enjoyed the advantages of
a strong Democratic machine, Hooper had only the backing of
wayward Democrats and a weak Republican party, united temporarily
by the common bond of prohibition. To be reelected in 1912 he
needed the support of many of the very groups whose representatives
urged him to reappoint Brown. The number of scientists in Tennessee
was small. Therefore, the inspector could not rely exclusively on his
professional colleagues to exert enough influence to secure his reappointment. There were, however, enough professional people in
the state to make their voices heard. The governor could hardly have
ignored the endorsements of the medical societies or the arguments
put forth by the old educator "Sawney" Webb. An Independent
Democrat, Webb had served as chairman of a conference in 1905
which agreed to endorse any measure that would abolish saloons by
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extending the Four-Mile Law or by giving wards in "wet" cities the
right to prohibit liquor sales.30 When professionals joined with homemakers, farmers, and the state press in their support of Brown, his
reappointment was almost inevitable; for these were the types of
people who had originally installed Hooper in the governorship. The
anguish of this one episode, magnified many times by other small
controversies and added to the major issues, inspired Hooper to recall
in later years that his administration was "unquestionably the most
turbulent political period in the history of Tennessee, not excepting
even the era of Reconstruction." 31
As the storm over the reappointment subsided, friends of Brown's
began a campaign to have him named chief chemist of the United
States Department of Agriculture, the post formerly held by Dr.
Wiley. On 16 March 1912 the Washington Times carried a story
in which Brown was mentioned as a possible successor. The reporter
also gave the details of his association with the national pure food
and drug movement and of his administration in Tennessee. Several
prominent citizens joined the effort to win the post for Brown. Chancellor Kirkland of Vanderbilt University; P. P. Claxton, head of the
National Education Bureau; Hilary Howse, mayor of Nashville; and
the members of the Vanderbilt chapter of Beta Theta Pi sent letters
and telegrams to President William Howard Taft. Luke Lea and
others from the Tennessee congressional delegation also endorsed
Brown.32
In the meantime, Brown remained silent. He was in Hillsville,
Virginia, attending the funeral of his brother-in-law Judge Thornton
Massie, who had been murdered while presiding at the trial of the
Allen brothers, members of a moonshining clan. When the inspector
returned to Nashville, he expressed appreciation for the efforts of
those who sought his appointment as chief chemist. He indicated,
however, that he had no desire to hold that office. Although he
promised to write to Taft and explain his position, some Tennesseans,
among them a local traveling men's organization and members of the
Nashville press, continued to endorse him. Brown never took the
action seriously, but the newspapers kept the issue before the public
until December 1912, when Dr. Carl Alsberg was appointed. 33
After the excitement of reappointment subsided and the drive
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to secure a federal position for Brown had waned, the veteran inspector
returned to the pursuit of his old objectives. Enlarging the department, educating the public, and campaigning against businessmen
who sold illegal products occupied most of his time. He also maintained his association with the national pure food and drug movement.
In March he attended a meeting of the National Civic Federation
Committee in Washington, D.C., where prominent officials discussed
food and drug control in the United States. In July, as its president,
he addressed the Association of American Dairy, Food and Drug
Officials. In that speech, he assessed the progress made in stemming
the adulteration of food and drugs. Admitting that court actions had
gone against enforcement officials at all governmental levels, he
maintained a spirit of optimism: "The future of food and drugs
control work in the United States appears bright. Despite the great
amount of work still to be done, the public is so vitally interested in
the subject, and public enlightenment thereupon has been so much
advanced that public support should be more general in [the] future
and more freely rendered." 34 Brown understood well the importance
of public support. It had kept him in office in 1912.
Reappointment did not offer Brown tranquility. In addition to
making numerous inspections, writing reports, and delivering speeches,
he found himself in court as plaintiff and defendant. In November
1912 he was on the defensive. The Homeopathic Specific Medicine
Company sought an injunction to stop his interference with the sale
of its products. 33 The case was eventually dismissed when the company agreed to comply with existing laws.
The year 1912 marked the zenith of Brown's career as state pure
food and drug inspector. From meager beginnings in 1908, Brown
had secured considerable support for his position from the average
citizens, from newspapermen, and even from some businessmen.
The reappointment controversy revealed the attitudes of the population in the state shortly after the tum of the century. Representatives
of the teaching and medical professions especially were interested in
reform. Many of the farmers and businessmen shared an animosity for
each other that was out of proportion to their concern for correcting
the ills of society. Surprisingly enough, Brown maintained his composure as a public servant and his concern for the health of the people
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in the midst of a battle between forces that were not so dedicated
to social welfare. He had proved himself and his department in 1912.
From 191 3 to 1915 it became clear that instead of destroying or
weakening the department, the businessmen had succeeded only in
enhancing its reputation. Even with partisan struggles still under way,
the governor and the legislators seemed determined to raise the
department above their bickering. The Republicans and the divided
Democrats joined together in a nonpartisan spirit during the special
legislative session of 191 3 to double appropriations for pure food and
drug enforcement. Although the inspector continued to serve in
Tennessee for another three years, this period would prove anticlimactic when compared with the first two terms.

5-From Southern State to Northern City·
The Scienrist in Professional Transition

Between 1913 and 1915 Brown continued to enforce the Pure Food
and Drug Act of 1907 and related laws in much the same manner
as in the previous years. Appropriations increased substantially as the
General Assembly provided for employment of additional personnel
and more effective investigation. Opposition that had plagued the
department from its beginnings subsided tremendously, as did the
general political turmoil in Tennessee, evidenced by the reunification
of the Democrats to elect Tom C. Rye governor in 1914. Doubts
and suspicions on the part of lawmakers and citizens gave way to a
concern for improving the Pure Food and Drug Department, and
Hooper's reappointment of Brown to a fourth term in 1914 went
virtually unnoticed. Unfortunately for Tennessee, Brown resigned a
year later to assume a post in New York City. Before he left the
state, however, he had established a viable department and publicly
accepted procedures of operation.
The Fifty-eighth General Assembly, which convened in 1913,
gave Brown an opportunity to present his plans for the Pure Food
and Drug Department when the Assembly created a special commission to investigate the department's needs. Although both his duties
and his staff had increased sufficiently to justify his use of the title of
commissioner, he continued to have visions of an even-larger enforcement agency. Asking for no increase in his own salary, he requested
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funds to hire another chemist, three additional inspectors, a laboratory
assistant, and a porter. 1
During its first four years of existence, the Pure Food and Drug
Department had grown noticeably. By 1913, Brown directed the
work of two full-time inspectors, an assistant chemist, a few temporary
employees, and several volunteers, and he supervised the enforcement
of three major laws. The future of the department during the remainder of Brown's service was settled by the work of the General Assembly. The controversy of 1912 had strengthened his position with the
governor, and Hooper recommended to a joint session of the legislature
that the Pure Food and Drug Department be "increased in scope
and usefulness." In his message, Hooper lauded earlier accomplishments: "It is but just to state that no department of the State
government has struggled harder and against greater odds to enforce
the beneficial laws within its jurisdiction than this department." He
also suggested that the lawmakers read the report outlining the department's financial needs. 2
Political squabbling continued to haunt the General Assembly,
and this dampened the commissioner's hopes for substantial increases
in appropriations. Bills designed to ensure Regular Democratic control
of election machinery set off controversies that resulted in boycotts
of meetings by Independents to prevent the formation of a quorum.
Brown wrote to Dr. Wiley that political maneuvering prevented the
passage of food and drug legislation although public sentiment favored
progressive action. So little was accomplished during the regular term
that Governor Hooper called the legislators into a special session,
which was scheduled for 8 September.3
By September the failure of the legislature to act responsibly
threatened the effective enforcement of existing food and drug laws
and the Sanitary Hotel Act of 1911, which had been assigned to the
Pure Food and Drug Department. This measure required hotel
operators to install lights, fire exits, and extinguishers; to maintain
sanitary rooms and clean kitchens; and to provide individual towels,
sheets, and toilets. The Tennessee Travelers, an organization of
salesmen who had lobbied for the bill, exerted pressure to promote
adequate funding of the department. As a result of their efforts, the
reputation of the work already accomplished, and memories of the
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reappointment controversy, which had been fraught with arguments
based on the lack of funds, the legislature voted $25,860 annually for
the maintenance of the department over the next two years. In
contrast, the appropriations for 1911 and 1912 had totaled only
$11,200 per annum. 4
With the additional money the commissioner added a few more
employees than he had anticipated in earlier years, but extra responsibilities accompanied larger appropriations. In one of his "Weekly
Chats with Consumers," Brown wistfully traced the development of
his department from its frail infancy to its sprawling adolescence,
noting: "The Legislature of 1913 was liberal to the Department in
giving four additional field inspectors, and an office force of two
persons, but they were almost as liberal with duties." 5
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New legislation affecting the department in 1913 included a
series of bills to prevent false weights and measures, an act placing
all employees except the commissioner under civil-service regulations,
and an antinarcotics law. Since his first term, Brown had requested
action on standard weights and measures. In January 1913, S. W.
Stratton of the Bureau of Standards in Washington, D.C., advised
Governor Hooper that the Eighth Annual Conference on Weights
and Measures would be held from 14 to 17 May. He requested that
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the governor appoint a delegate. Before the meeting took place,
Hooper informed Stratton that Tennessee had no statute dealing
with standard weights and measures and therefore was in no position to
be represented effectively. The governor referred the matter to Brown.
Legislators came to view this situation with concern, and that same
year, Frank E. West of Knoxville and other representatives secured
the passage of three bills. The first made statutory the common-law
prohibition of the sale of short weights and measures; the second
created a state department of weights and measures; and the third
established standard weights and measures for Tennessee. 6
The governor appointed Brown to the position of superintendent
of weights and measures. After a year the commissioner reported
that 30 percent of the 2,939 weights and measures inspected were
inaccurate, and he estimated that 83 percent of the linear and 75
percent of the liquid measures were no better. To illustrate the unfair
burden on consumers, Brown suggested that if 550,000 families in
the state spent as much as $180 annually for groceries, a total of
$99 million, they lost at least $4,195,000 through false weights alone. 7
In addition to enacting weights and measures laws, the legislators
placed employees of the Pure Food and Drug Department under
civil-service regulations. This seemingly removed the positions from
the realm of political patronage. All applicants for inspection work
had to be tested. The examinations dealt with practical questions
related to the laws, spelling, arithmetic, penmanship, report writing,
and commercial geography as well as training, experience, and fitness.
A new employee remained on probation for six months. If he proved
unsatisfactory at the end of the trial period, he was informed in writing
of the reasons for the termination of his services. The power of the
governor to appoint the commissioner, however, could undermine
civil-service requirements. Some animosity arose because George
Draper, a pharmacist from Gainsboro who had been recommended by
Governor Hooper, received a temporary appointment without first
having to undergo the examination. Apparently the job was a favor
granted by Hooper to his friend W. W. Draper, the father of George
Draper. The younger Draper eventually underwent the perfunctory
test and thus retained his position. 8
As commissioner, Brown assumed responsibility for the conduct
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of several lesser officials. Attempting to keep his department in smooth
running order, he vacillated between benevolent paternalism and
harsh discipline. On 17 March 1915 he made the following entry
in his diary: "Had to can Von Sholly-being steadily insubordinate
and lack of teamwork. He seems to be utterly unfit for work of this
class by temperament and training-I understand his people are wellto-do, which explains a good deal of it." Von Sholly must have been
inept, for Brown usually displayed a forgiving nature. When Lewis
Titcomb, an inspector, reported expenses that seemed to be above
normal, Brown chastised him severely. He vowed to himself to
"make a man of the boy yet," and he soon reported that he had
"Titcomb straightened." 9
The old educational and enforcement objectives were still
pursued, but Brown delegated much of the responsibility for them
to his trusted subordinates. Public health education, which had been
fostered by the department since 1908, lost some of its personal touch
between 1913 and 1915, when it was redirected from the old lectures
before small audiences toward techniques that commanded the attention of large groups. The efforts during 1913 and 1914 were limited
almost solely to an exhibit dealing with adulterated food and drugs.
It appeared in Knoxville at the National Conservation Exposition.
Later, the commissioner, with the governor's approval, allowed the
Russell Sage Foundation to take it to Atlanta. The American Interchurch College returned the display to Nashville, and later it showed
up in Memphis sponsored by the Young Men's Christian Association. 10
Widespread newspaper coverage became more common than
lectures. In 1914, Brown issued frequent press releases, describing
such matters as the dangers of patent medicines, the importance of
public cooperation, and the development of the department since
1908. They appeared in the columns of weeklies throughout the
state. 11 The new appeal to mass audiences marked a maturation of the
department from its early days when the commissioner had taken to
the stump in major cities and minor burgs across Tennessee just to
secure enough support from taxpayers to perpetuate the office that
he occupied. Brown believed that he no longer needed to sell the idea
of pure food and drug control, and therefore he simply kept the
attention of the public focused on the work of the department.
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During his last years in the state, Brown moved to enforce the
Sanitary Hotel Law of 1911 more vigorously than before. Instituting
the old campaign technique, he announced in early October 1913
that within a ten-day period, the six inspectors would tour the state,
checking hotels for violations. In January 1914 he closed the McKenzie
Hotel of Nashville because of dangerous and unsanitary conditions.
Although the law had been in effect long enough for hotelmen to
comply, Brown and D. J. Frazier, an inspector, agreed to review the
property again after repairs had been made. Two members of the
Tennessee Travelers complained when the order was issued because
the lodging was conveniently located near the railway station.
Brown replied, "The boys secured the law and are demanding its
enforcement, so they must take their medicine." In March, Brown
shut down another hotel, the Arlington in Johnson City. During
1914 the officials inspected 435 facilities, some more than once,
issued 355 notices for corrections, and eventually awarded 247
certificates.12
Routine work occupied the staff, but the commissioner devoted
the remainder of his service in the state to enforcement of the new
Anti-Narcotics Act, which went into effect on 1 January 1914. His
concern with addiction grew out of his efforts to force correct labeling
of patent medicines and out of his contacts with drug users in
the pursuit of his duties. The legislature had charged the state
food and drug inspector with the responsibility for enforcement
of the Anti-Narcotics Act, but he shared the task of drawing up
guidelines with the secretary of the Board of Health. The law itself
limited the dispensing of cocaine and opium compounds to registered
physicians, dentists, and veterinary surgeons in the course of professional practice only; to registered pharmacists filling legitimate prescriptions; and to wholesale dealers who made distributions to the
appropriate people. All purchases and sales had to be recorded. 13
The striking feature of the law centered on the provision that
allowed addicts who registered as such to acquire a supply of narcotics.
The legislators had two reasons for including this section. First, they
believed that the state could not afford to build and maintain hospitals
for treating users. Therefore, to salve their consciences, they decided
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to minimize suffering by allowing habitues to procure drugs. Second,
they hoped to prevent an illegal traffic in such contraband. 14
Not all physicians had the understanding of and the concern for
humanity that were possessed by legislators, the commissioner, and
the secretary of the Board of Health. During March 1914 a detective
employed by the Pure Food and Drug Department arrested two
doctors, W. B. Hager and H.B. Hyde, and charged them with selling
and distributing prohibited drugs. He had gone to the offices of the
accused and had obtained prescriptions for an alleged friend. Issuing
such prescriptions violated the law. In the criminal court of Davidson
County, the doctors based their defense on the invalidity of the
legislation and on the manner in which evidence had been procured.
Judge A. B. Neil upheld the law and found the defendants guilty. Dr.
Hyde appealed the case to the state supreme court. In December,
Justice Samuel C. Williams, representing the eastern division, delivered the decision, which supported the verdict of the lower court. Dr.
Hager, meanwhile, continued to trouble the commissioner. The
doctor had an irritable disposition and had accosted Brown on numerous occasions. Once he swore out a warrant, charging Brown with
assault. The court imposed a fine on the commissioner "to insure
peace in the future between them." At the time, Chancellor J. B.
Newman, who presided, remarked illogically that he believed Brown
innocent. 15
In the spring of 1914 the commissioner carried the fight against
narcotics from Nashville to Memphis. Several physicians were indicted
in West Tennessee for selling dope. While in the city, Brown read
before the state medical society a paper entitled "The Drug Habit
in Tennessee from the Viewpoint of an Enforcing Official." He
estimated in 1914 that between 5,000 and 10,000 addicts could be
found in the state, with more women involved than men. He said
that the first goal in enforcing the law was to stop illegal sales by
physicians. 16
After the law had been in effect twelve months, 2,370 peopleblacks and whites, men and women of all ages-had registered as
addicts. Brown indicated that this figure probably did not include
even half of the drug users in the state. Of those who obtained
permits for prescriptions, 784 were male; 1,586, female. Women
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addicts outnumbered men by more than two to one, with the greatest
preponderance ranging in age from 25 to 44; men, 35 to 64- Not
over 10 percent of those registered were Negroes, although that race
composed about one-fourth of the total population. The commissioner explained that the average Negro tended to avoid contacts
with public officials.17
Brown believed that real and imaginary illnesses led to the use
of drugs. Women between the ages of 2 5 and 55 represented 63. 5
percent of all female addicts. Problems related to childbearing and
menopause probably caused them to seek relief through drugs. For
men also, he surmised, suffering from various illnesses-including
venereal diseases, which "accounted for no inconsiderable proportion
of the trouble"-contributed to addiction. He found also that addicts
were more common to West Tennessee than East Tennessee. The
former had a ratio of 1 addict to 928 people; the latter, 1 to 1,359.
Brown credited climate for this development. East Tennessee, he
said, had "a salubrious and rather bracing climate," whereas marshy
West Tennessee, lying between the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers,
fostered malaria, which caused considerable suffering among the
residents of that section.18
The commissioner's stand on narcotic control was tolerant for
the times in which he lived. The program launched in Tennessee
resembled the approach taken by Dr. Charles E. Terry in Jacksonville,
Florida. As city health officer, Terry established a drug clinic so that
habitual users could receive free narcotic prescriptions. This limited
the excessive profits of unscrupulous pharmacists; it also removed
the influence of the medical profession through its power of prescription. Terry and Brown both believed that physicians were largely
responsible for causing addiction. Neither was optimistic about private
sanitaria, which were associated in the public mind with moral
turpitude and the spread of vice and crime. 19
Even as the controversy over the treatment of addicts raged,
Brown voiced his findings on addiction in Tennessee, as well as his
personal opinions, at the 1914 convention of the American Public
Health Association; and he appealed for careful consideration of
the issues. If state institutions for drug users were not available, he
favored the policy adopted in Tennessee, where addicts received
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drugs legally. When he concluded his speech at the meeting in
Jacksonville, Florida, he pleaded "for an intelligent and scientific
study" of drug addiction. Commenting on the attitude of physicians
toward the subject, he said: "It is so new, and the mental position
of the large majority of the medical profession toward it has been of
such a nature, that it has not had from alienists and from men
specializing in allied fields the attention to which its importance
entitles it." In his final statement he reminded the association: "The
drug addict is a sick man both physically and mentally, and should
be studied and treated as a sick man and not as one always wilfully
delinquent." 20
Enforcement of the Anti-Narcotics Law presented Brown with
a new challenge, and court cases kept his last days as commissioner
filled with excitement. As both plaintiff and defendant, he ended his
service on the note of sensationalism that had characterized many
days of his administration. Occasionally, Brown encountered manufacturers of adulterated products who possessed a zealous belief in their
powers. Such was the case of John S. Akin, the general manager of
Vital Remedies Company of Houston, Texas, who became involved
in a suit during January 1915. Brown believed that Akin was "more
honest than the average patent-medicine man," but that he had
hypnotized himself into a faith in the medicine. "Vitalitas," the
product in question, was composed of a mixture of disintegrated clay
and shale-which had no apparent healing value. The case against
the company was eventually dismissed when Akin agreed to label his
product correctly. The suit, in which Brown was the defendant, grew
out of a quarrel with W. D. Walker, who had been arrested for
violations of the weights and measures statutes. The irate Walker
had Brown prosecuted for carrying a deadly weapon. The absurd
case never went to a jury. Under the laws of Tennessee, any officer
with police powers, while engaged in official duties, had the legal
right to carry a pistol. 21
The petty suits, political squabbles, and problems arising from
the creation of a new department had taken their toll on Brown's
health. He found the summer climate of Tennessee depressing, and
his frequent bouts with gastritis were undoubtedly brought on in part
by the strains of the job. In 1915 he was forty-eight years old, person-
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ally ambitious, and had a wife and four children to support. The
position he held offered very few, if any, opportunities for advancement. His salary had never risen above the $2,500 that he had received
from the first year of his service, although new responsibilities
continued to increase. He was state superintendent of weights and
measures, state hotel inspector, and pure food and drug commissioner;
and from his vantage point, it seemed that he was being drained of
all his energy and talent without adequate financial compensation.
Although he had never requested a raise for himself, Brown had every
right to expect one. Furthermore, the verbal commitment of politicians
to enforcement of statewide prohibition threatened to subvert the
real purpose for which his department had been created.22
Tennesseans had embarked upon the noble experiment of prohibition, and state officials could not afford politically to show a lack
of concern in dealing with enforcement of the liquor laws. Since
1909, when the General Assembly had attempted to banish alcoholic
beverages from the state with the so-called bone-dry law, additional
legislation had been passed to ensure the "teetotalism" of state residents. The Democrats, outwardly at least, accepted the situation and
launched an effort to reunite the party, which had split in 1909 over
the liquor issue. In 1914 they nominated Tom C. Rye of Paris, a
party regular who had been attorney general in the Thirteenth
Judicial District. Acclaimed as a candidate of the masses, especially
the rural people, he called for enforcement of the liquor laws and
disclaimed any connection with the liquor interests or city bosses.
Rye won the election for governor in November, defeating Republican
incumbent Ben W. Hooper. Democrats also gained control of the
General Assembly. 23
In a message to the legislature on 18 January 1915, Rye pleaded
for the passage of measures to halt the practices of illicit liquor dealers.
The lawmakers responded with three new laws, two of which involved
the Pure Food and Drug Department. The first of these dealt with
soft-drink stands, which were denied the right to sell any beverage
containing more than one-half of one percent alcohol by total weight.
Responsibility for enforcement fell on the pure food and drug commissioner. A second law affecting the department denied druggists
the right to dispense intoxicants without a valid prescription.24
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Because of the strengthening of the liquor laws, Brown found
his department charged with ferreting out alcoholic beverages in
drugstores and at soft-drink stands, with an implied responsibility of
raiding dives, alleys, barns, stables, private clubs, and homes. A
Regular Democrat and a dedicated food and drug advocate who on
special occasions sometimes celebrated with a drink, the commissioner
viewed these new obligations with disdain. The demands placed on
his department ran counter to his personal and professional beliefs.
He mustered enough interest, however, to receive praise from the East
Nashville Women's Christian Temperance Union for his work in
suppressing "the unlawful dope habit and the illegal selling of
whiskey" in their city.211 By 1915, conditions in Tennessee caused
Brown to look favorably on opportunities elsewhere. Such was his
state of mind when the New York City Department of Health announced a competitive examination to select a new director of the
Bureau of Food and Drugs.
As undesirable as New York City might have seemed for a
product of rural Tennessee, the position there held certain attractions
for Brown. Professionally, it offered more possibilities for advancement and financial compensation than the job in the South. Brown, as
well as most other health officials in the country, regarded the New
York City Department of Health as a model organization. Furthermore, the position of a bureau chief carried a salary of $5,000, twice
that of pure food and drug inspector in Tennessee. Also, the New
York office appeared to offer more security. Brown's retention of his
post in Tennessee rested with the discretion of the governor. Although
the employees in the department were hired on the basis of competitive civil-service examinations, the position of chief inspector depended on political appointment. For all of these reasons, Brown
applied for the job in New York and prepared to undergo the written
examination. 26
The commissioner's service to the state rapidly came to an end.
On 24 April 1915, Robert W . Belcher, secretary of the Municipal
Civil Service Commission of New York City; notified Brown that he
was among twelve men who possessed the experience and had passed
the written examination for the position of director in the Bureau of
Food and Drugs. Belcher also summoned him for an oral examina-

74

THE SCIENTIST IN PROFESSIONAL TRANSITION

tion in New York during early May. Brown was suffering from influenza and doubted whether he would be well enough to appear. Nevertheless, he recovered sufficiently to make the trip, and he left for
the North on 30 April. The examination consisted of hypothetical
questions related to the enforcement of pure food and drug laws. 27
When the Tennessean applied for the position in New York
City, he had reason to be optimistic. Along with considerable ability
as an administrator and scientist, he had influential friends and
relatives there. Even before the great trek of rural black and white
southerners to the northern cities occurred during the early decades
of the twentieth century, a few hardy souls had drifted northward in
search of economic and professional opportunities. One such individual
was William M. Polk, a son of Confederate General Leonidas Polk's
and a cousin of Brown's. A prominent physician, he occupied a seat
on the Medical Advisory Board of the New York City Department of
Health during 1915. It had been Polk who had encouraged Brown's
brother Ewell to practice medicine there. More than any other
family member, cousin Frank L. Polk, son of the physician, wielded
considerable influence in city politics. As corporation counsel and
personal friend of Mayor John Purroy Mitchel, he was in a position to
help Brown. Along with family support, Brown had an acquaintance
who served on the Civil Service Commission. A Miss Upshaw, the
daughter of A. B. Upshaw of Columbia and Nashville and the granddaughter of Houston Thomas of Maury County, took particular interest in his application. Frank Polk described her as "one of the right
hand men" on the commission.28
On 3 May, Brown learned that he had scored 90.60 percent, surpassing Marion B. McMillan, who was director of the Bureau of
Food and Drugs, and the highly respected Robert M. Allen, head of
the Food and Drug Division at the Kentucky Agricultural Experiment
Station. Shortly thereafter Brown was offered the job. When the time
actually came to make a decision on his future, he found himself in a
dilemma. The New York position seemed to hold enormous professional opportunities. Nonetheless, some risks were involved. As a
family man, he realized the problems inherent in uprooting his
children from their rural home and plopping them down in such a
metropolis as New York City. The family enjoyed a comfortable life
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on their twenty-five-acre farm at Franklin, a commuter village near
Nashville that provided its residents with the best of country and city
living. Brown, too, enjoyed the attachment to the soil, and he found
relaxation in growing vegetables, raising animals, and breeding Airedales. Therefore, instead of severing all ties with Tennessee, he
decided to ask Dr. R. E. Fort, president of the State Board of Health,
for a leave of absence, beginning 21 June, to give him time to make
a permanent decision. 29
As soon as the announcement was made that Brown had been
offered the New York position, he was swamped with congratulatory
telegrams and letters from ordinary citizens, club women, professional
people, and politicians throughout his native state. Tennesseans
received the news of his impending departure with mixed emotions.
Although most of his acquaintances were pleased with his success,
they were concerned about finding a qualified replacement. One
communication that Brown must have found especially gratifying,
given his concern for addicts, came from a drug user who expressed
his appreciation for the efforts that Brown had made on his behalf
and for others like him. 80
Having been granted the leave of absence, Brown left his family
in Tennessee and departed for New York toward the end of June.
On his way north he stopped in Washington, D.C., to discuss the
directorship with his friends at the United States Department of
Agriculture. Willard D. Bigelow, head of the food division, seemed
to think well of the opportunity; and Dr. Carl Alsberg, chief chemist,
looked even more enthusiastically on the offer. Brown, however, wrote
to his wife that he hoped "not to be stampeded."81
When Brown arrived in Gotham he took up residence at the
Chemists' Club, 52 East Forty-first Street, and occasionally spent
time at the home of his brother. At the Department of Health he was
well received by his colleagues and found the conditions "very fine."
He established a satisfactory working relationship with Dr. S. S.
Goldwater, the health commissioner. The assistant director . of the
bureau, a Swede named Ole Salthe, who was a veteran of eleven
years, pleased Brown very much. The new director concluded that
he had "made a hit" with those of his men whom he had met. He
wistfully commented, "There are 155 of them-so I haven't rriet them
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all, by any means-I hope I shall do so some day." He soon made
distinctions between his old position and the new one. "Of course I
am not the 'big man' as I was in Tennessee," Brown said, "but inasmuch as my Bureau is one of the most important in the Department,
and such of the public as are interested in the matter are watching this
somewhat unique experiment with some interest, I fancy people
won't forget our existence."32
By the end of June, Brown had decided to give up the position
in Tennessee. He informed Governor Rye of his plans while the
state executive was in New York on business. Brown, who kept his
wife posted on new developments, wrote to her: "I broke the 'sad
news' to him. I think the matter looked much less serious to him at
this distance. Don't say anything about it until he lets the matter
out." 33
Meanwhile, Governor Rye was faced with the responsibility of
finding a suitable replacement to serve out the term, which was
due to expire on 15 January 1916. Several state residents imagined
themselves to be qualified for the position, and they bombarded Rye
with applications and numerous recommendations, usually written by
personal friends and family. Under serious consideration for the post
were George Draper, a registered pharmacist from Gainsboro who
had been employed in the department for a while; W. H. Hollingshead of Nashville, a graduate of Vanderbilt University and an employee of the Pure Food and Drug Department, who was recommended by Brown; George C. Childress from Knoxville, also a
graduate pharmacist trained at Vanderbilt; and J. E. Justice of
Clarksville, a pharmacist who established headquarters at the Hotel
Hermitage in Nashville to conduct his campaign for the job. Justice,
too, had been graduated from Vanderbilt and had taught there for
six years before entering the retail drug business. 34
The leading contender for the vacant position was Harry L.
Eskew, something of a dark horse, who came to Tennessee in 1903
as the southern representative of Sharpe and Dohme, a pharmaceutical
company of Baltimore. A native of Ohio, he had received his education
in the public schools there and later had earned a degree in pharmacy
from the University of Cincinnati. In addition to being a member
of the Travelers Protective Association, Tennessee Travelers, and
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United Commercial Travelers, he was a prominent Mason and belonged to the Knights of Pythias. The members of the Nashville
Manufacturers' Association, the Commercial Club of Nashville, and
the Tennessee Pharmaceutical Association rallied to his support. 35
Traveling men of Nashville and other interested parties gathered
on Sunday, 11 July 1915, at the Tulane Hotel and boosted his campaign. Those present appointed a special committee to notify Governor Rye of their endorsement. Some confusion existed at the
rally because of a misunderstanding as to the purpose of the summons
by J. R. Bass and H.P. Fritz, presidents respectively of the Tennessee
division and the Nashville post of the Travelers Protective Association.
Fritz, contending that he had nothing against Eskew, stated that
participants had the power only to consider the advisability of making
recommendations. He later wrote to the governor, lamenting the
endorsement of Eskew by the "drummers." Referring to him as "an
eleventh-hour candidate," Fritz further asserted that Eskew was
merely a man who was being endorsed by close friends and was not a
competent chemist. He urged the appointment of someone who
possessed the virtues of former Commissioner Brown. One of the
traveling men, in his enthusiasm, forwarded a ridiculous statement
to Rye, declaring that if the traveling men's candidate were appointed,
"the Knights of the Grip" would be eternally grateful and from that
time forward would be tied to Rye with "strong golden cords of
sincere gratitude and appreciation."36
The "Firing Line," a section of the Sunday edition of the
NashviIIe Tennessean and American devoted to the activities of the
"drummers," contained an explanation of their interest in the appointment, along with more praise for Eskew. According to R. J. Cowan,
former grand counsellor of the United Commercial Travelers, the
traveling men's candidate was particularly well suited for the post
because of his many years of experience on the road, his education
as a chemist, and the fact that he was of the "very highest type of
manhood." Cowan claimed that the travelers shared a particular
concern because of their success in securing new laws and an increase
in appropriations for the Pure Food and Drug Department. The
United Commercial Travelers, the Travelers Protective Association,
the Tennessee Travelers, and the Nashville City Salesman's Associa-
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tion represented strong pressure groups in the state. Collectively they
had helped to obtain passage of the Sanitary Hotel Law of 1911 and
an allocation of more than $25,000 for the department in 1913. 37
Tennesseans in 1915 took the duties of the pure food and drug
commissioner seriously, and many were concerned with finding a
new one. An editorial in the Tennessean and American outlined
the difficulties involved. According to this statement, published
shortly before Governor Rye announced his choice, the position
demanded a man of high integrity who was an expert chemist possessing administrative ability. The appointee, furthermore, would not
find it necessary to do groundwork, for a suitable foundation had
been established by the first commissioner. 38
Governor Rye, apparently reacting to the pressure of the
"drummers," announced the appointment of Harry L. Eskew, not a
"chemist of established reputation and ability," as prescribed by law,
on Saturday, 24 July 1915, at 1:oo P.M. He expressed his pleasure
in making the choice and claimed that he had never had better
authority for appointing a man to office than in this instance. Thirty
minutes later, Eskew, wasting no time, appeared before Chancellor
J.B. Newman and was sworn into office. Brown, in New York, viewed
the selection of Eskew as "a politician's appointment." The governor,
he thought, had made his decision "with reference alone to the
enforcement of the liquor laws." The former commissioner added:
"He could have had all he wanted in Hollingshead."39
In spite of Rye's selection of a man who was not qualified for
the job under law and his failure to be influenced by the recommendation of the first inspector, Brown could reflect on his accomplishments
in Tennessee with some satisfaction. Appointed to the newly created
position of state pure food and drug inspector in 1908, he was assigned
the tremendous task of creating an enforcement agency. He soon
formulated objectives that called for development of a full-fledged
department that would be involved with public health education as
well as law enforcement. At the same time he pursued his own
professional interests. After more than seven years he had realized
virtually all of his early goals.
The one-man agency became a well-established department
within four years. When it was tested by the issue of reappointment
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in 1912, it sustained itself and emerged stronger than ever before. The
relative success achieved by Brown in his efforts to educate the public
and to enforce the laws fairly helped the department through the
crisis of 1912. While the commissioner himself was never quite satisfied with the size of his staff, he had succeeded in building a department that received favorable recognition from the people it served
and from the politicians who controlled its fate. Nurtured by Brown
from its infancy, the department survived his resignation but floundered under the direction of a new man who was not of the caliber of
the first inspector.
The pure food and drug work in Tennessee during the Progressive
era would have been of little consequence, in all likelihood, had it
not been for the character and ability of the man who directed it.
Living in a rural southern state that had limited financial resources
and was less than five decades removed from the trauma of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, Tennesseans of that period were very
fortunate to have the combination of scientific expertise and public
spiritedness to be found in Brown. His reputation was not limited
to his own state. The high esteem in which he was held by his
professional cohorts throughout the United States led them to elect
him to the presidency of the Association of State and National Food
and Dairy Inspectors in 1911. When he applied for the directorship
in New York City, he put himself in competition with many of the
country's foremost authorities, and he surpassed them all.
•The arresting feature of Brown's position in Tennessee was the
amount of freedom that he, as a scientist, possessed in formulating
policy. Virtually unrestrained except by the possibility of not being
reappointed after the expiration of each two-year term if he became a
political liability, he continued to expand his department and to take
on additional responsibilities that improved the stature of his department and increased his power. The political situation in the state
allowed him to create a surprisingly large bureaucracy, considering
that he served little more than seven years. No viable two-party system
had developed, and the split in the Democratic party that accompanied
prohibition left politics in flux. In the absence of a dominant bloc of
highly professionalized politicians seeking to expand their own
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sphere of influence and jealously eyeing newcomers in the government,
Brown enjoyed a great deal of flexibility.
When the commissioner resigned and accepted the directorship
in the North, he was about to enter a wholly different political
environment. The New York City Department of Health was well
established; the hierarchy of authority was fixed; and the big-city
professionals resented the presence of scientific reformers in jobs
that could be used for political patronage.

6-The Scientist
as a Northern Bureaucrat, 1915-17

With the move to New York, Brown loosened his ties with Tennessee
and entered the uncertain environment of the nation's greatest metropolis. Because of financial limitations, the preponderance of his work in
the South had been in the urban centers. The rural people, however,
constituting the majority of the population, produced most of what
they ate; in New York City, consumers, with the exception of a few
suburbanites who had backyard gardens, depended exclusively on
middlemen for their food supply. As director of the Bureau of Food
and Drugs, Brown addressed himself to controlling the quality of raw
products entering the city, those being processed, and the finished
items being sold in the marketplaces. His experience in the rural
South with its emerging cities could hardly have prepared him,
psychologically, professionally, or politically, for the situation he faced.
The population of New York numbered more than twice that
of the entire state of Tennessee, and its composition differed drastically. Tennessee possessed a population of 2,184,789 when the
census was taken in 1910. Whites accounted for 1,711,432; Negroes,
473,088; Indians, 216; Chinese, 43; and Japanese, 8; and the "all-other"
category took in 1 Hindu and 1 Korean. The overwhelming majority,
2,166,182, of the total residents were native born; only 18,607 were
of foreign birth. On the other hand, New York City had a total
population of 4,766,883. Of this number only 19.3 percent were
native white and of native parentage. Native whites of foreign or
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mixed parentage constituted 38.2 percent of the total, and foreignborn whites accounted for 40.4 percent. Negroes represented only 1.9
percent. Therefore, 78.6 percent of the total population of New York
City consisted of foreign-born whites or second-generation immigrants.1
The South, including Tennessee, had remained relatively free
from the influx of the "new" immigrants that began in the 1880s.
New York City, however, served as a port of entry for millions. A
large percentage of these uprooted masses filtered into the core areas
on the Lower East Side, found dwellings and jobs, and settled down
to a subhuman existence until fate intervened to carry them to a
heavenly reckoning. Others managed eventually to make a better life
for themselves beyond the worst tenement districts.
The presence of these hundreds of thousands of aliens helped to
make New York different from Brown's native state. Their numbers,
their relative helplessness upon arrival, and their quest for a better
life made them not only pawns of Tammany's great political machine
but also problems for the Department of Health. No public official
could remain unexposed to the influence of the Democratic organization for long. Brown, fortunate in this respect, moved to New York
when Tammany was out of power. The mayoral election of 191 7
would shatter the fragile dreams of many reformers, but for two years
the director of the Bureau of Food and Drugs gave all his attention
to the demands of his new job.
To acquaint himself with his responsibilities as director, Brown
ventured forth into the slums with some of his men. He was both
fascinated and horrified by what he observed. After one foray, he
wrote:
I went yesterday with some of my men into the congested
district-you ought to have seen it! In the Ghetto crowds
gathered in a second when we stopped-and push-cart dealers
with exposed foods took to their heels when we were a block
off. In Mott Street (Chinatown) I saw stuff I didn't know
existed-dried oysters-dried "sea-ears" (something like a
mussel )-and the like. In Little Italy and the Ghetto we saw
them selling new and strange foods I never heard of-such as
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squash-leaves and stems-and the squash-flowers seemed to
be placed to one side as a special tid-bit. 2
Despite the efforts to adjust himself to his new environment,
Brown found it difficult to commit himself to these exotic surroundings and the strange hoards of people. Even after he had resigned
from his position in Tennessee, he harbored misgivings about remaining in New York. In mid August he wrote to his wife that he had
heard through the departmental grapevine that Commissioner S. S.
Goldwater thought that he would make the best director there.
In the same letter he revealed his doubts, resulting perhaps from
nothing more serious than a bout with homesickness:
But even with this and apparently success in hand, I am of
late seriously wondering whether it will be worthwhile.
There is no doubt that it is a hard place to live, and to
bring up children in-and it is not American. The work is the
most interesting I ever tried, and there are a lot of fine
people here, but there are also a lot of the other kind. We
shall certainly feel very much like fishes out of water for a
while, and possibly we shall be longing for the country even
though we get a place in the suburbs. . . . What do you
think of my throwing it up and coming back home to make
out the best we can for a while? 3
Ambition had the upper hand with Brown, and toward the
end of the letter, which was filled with misgivings, he outlined opportunities for advancement. At that time, rumors circulated that Frank
Polk might run for mayor in 1917. Brown pointed out that his cousin
seemed "to be universally popular and trusted." He then changed
the subject from Polk to himself. If Goldwater should · resign, the
director noted, that did not necessarily mean that he would be
replaced by a physician. Continuing, he said:
Indeed, the position would appear to call more for good
business management than for profound knowledge of medical matters, and when a little of both is combined, the success
is reached that Goldwater is universally acknowledged to have
met with. But it also opens the possibility of a man who
has reached success as a manager, within the Department
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itself, getting to be either Deputy Commissioner or Commissioner-so you see there are possibilities in this line that I
did not calculate on when coming here! 4
Whatever doubts Brown had about the future he laid to rest.
He continued to search for a family dwelling in his off hours, and
on the job, he attempted to familiarize himself with the work of the
bureau. By 20 September his probation as a new employee had ended,
and with a sigh of relief, he boasted that "now only misconduct,
inefficiency, or resignation, can pry me loose from this job." Reflecting
on the trial period, he observed that it seemed "ridiculously easy"
and that "the City of New York has not had very much efficiency in
this position heretofore." 5
With his job status now somewhat secure, Brown settled into
a routine at the Bureau of Food and Drugs. He was not "the big
man" that he had been in Tennessee, but according to the director,
there was "almost as much to be done" as when he had become state
pure food and drug inspector. Moreover, the Department of Health
was a powerful organization with hundreds of employees under the
supervision of scientific experts.
The New York City Department of Health during the Progressive period traced its origins from the establishment of the Board
of Health there in 1866. The state legislature, responding to the
recommendations of a citizens' committee, passed a law that reorganized health administration in the port city. In effect the
legislature divided the state into two sanitary districts: the first being
the Metropolitan Sanitary District, which comprised the counties
of New York, Kings, Westchester, and Richmond and the towns
of Newton, Flushing, and Jamaica, located in the county of Queens;
the second being the remainder of New York State. Lawmakers
placed the administration of the Metropolitan Sanitary District in
the hands of a board of health, which was then made up of a
president, the commissioner of health, the commissioner of police,
and the health officer of the port, along with a few auxiliary officials.
Health administration for the remainder of New York State lagged
behind the metropolitan area until the 1880s, when the lawmakers
created a state board of health. 6
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The Metropolitan Board of Health, as an administrative unit,
changed very little for the next three decades; the scope of its work,
however, broadened, and the number of employees increased. From
an initial concern that was almost exclusively oriented toward dealing
with epidemics of cholera, smallpox, typhoid, and diphtheria, the
Board of Health came to have an interest in preventive medicine
and laboratory methods. As a department, Health took on even more
importance after the creation of Greater New York City. In 1898,
officials spent a considerable amount of time taking over the health
administration of the towns and villages that had recently been
incorporated. 7
Under the city charter of 1898 the Department of Health
occupied a unique position in government administration. Not only
was it exempt from practically all the health laws applying to the
remainder of the state, but also its board acted as a legislature, which
has been described as a "headless fourth branch" of city government.
Under powers that were delegated by the state legislature and the
city charter and were upheld by the courts, the board passed
ordinances, which were embodied in the city's Sanitary Code, on all
matters pertaining to public health. Therefore, the board represented
an obvious exception to the time-honored tradition of prohibiting the
delegation of legislative powers to administrative agencies. 8
When Brown went to New York, the Board of Health still
consisted of three members: the commissioner of health, the commissioner of police, and the health authority of the port. Two of
these members, therefore, occupied their seats as appointees of the
mayor. The third, a federal official, was somewhat removed from city
politics. Because of the manner in which two-thirds of the members
came to be a part of the Board of Health, that agency could be used
rather forcefully in political matters if a mayor or particular party
organization had the desire to do so. In any event, the efficiency of
the Department of Health, in large part, depended on the judiciousness of the prevailing political party.
From the standpoint of general organization and departmental
efficiency, the establishment of eight distinct bureaus between 1910
and 1914 seemed to be an improvement. They included: General
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Administration, Records, Sanitation, Child Hygiene, Infectious
Diseases, Food and Drugs, Hospitals, and Laboratories. During
1914, Commissioner Goldwater created one additional bureau, Public
Health Education. Goldwater himself noted three major objections
to the bureau plan. First, he observed that directors of the bureaus
were too far removed from field inspectors. Second, the individual
employee failed to grasp or apply the general principles of the
department, and the monotonous, repetitive nature of the work
inhibited mental and professional development. Third, various
bureaus sent out representatives to the same districts and often to
the same houses, which wasted time and annoyed citizens. Goldwater
questioned whether these disadvantages could be overcome or if the
bureau plan should be replaced by a system of local or district administration. In order to resolve the matter, he created an experimental
health district, headed by a single chief who represented all the bureaus
engaged in field work. The commissioner indicated that this experiment showed a great deal of promise. 9
The political nature of the Board of Health combined with the
commissioner's misgivings about the bureau plan to make a precarious
situation for such bureaucrats as Brown. Ironically, he thought that
he had escaped political troubles when he boarded a train for New
York, believing that the civil-service regulations provided a great
protective umbrella. When he realized, for example, that his pay
would be docked if he went back to Tennessee to arrange for his
family's move to New York, he wrote to his wife: "Of course in a
huge organism like this government, administered as it is on strictly
civil service lines, rules are necessary, and this is only one of the
rules, so you must not think it unreasonable-it is quite the contrary."10 If his opinion altered during his first two years in New York,
he had little time to reflect on the change.
Large sections of the Sanitary Code dealt with food and drug
standards. The code, however, outlined neither the specific responsibilities of the director of the Bureau of Food and Drugs nor those
of other directors of bureaus in the Department of Health. Although
these positions, the results of administrative shuffles, had civil-service
sanction, they were not included in the Sanitary Code. The responsi88
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bilities of the director of the Bureau of Food and Drugs, according
to a flow chart contained in the Annual Report for 1915, were to
inspect and supervise the production, manufacture, and sale of all
types of food and to examine chemically milk, water, food, and drugs.
Commissioner Goldwater had also assigned the laboratories to Brown.
The new director, his duties broad and hazy, tended to define
his responsibilities in much the same manner as he had during his
tenure as state food and drug commissioner. In Tennessee he had
concerned himself with four major objectives: increasing the size and
power of his department, educating the public, enforcing the laws,
and building a national reputation for himself. Although major
differences existed between the Tennessee position and the New York
situation, there were enough similarities to permit him to pursue his
old programs by modifying them to fit new contingencies. In Tennessee, Brown had created a new department and operated on meager
budgets; in New York he inherited a ready-made bureau within a
mature department of the city government. The Department of
Health had 3,059 employees in 1915, not including executive and
advisory personnel, and a budget of $3,322,426.09. 11
The origins of the Bureau of Food and Drugs within the
Department of Health stemmed from the 1880s, when the officials in
New York State as well as those in the largest city took an interest in
the deleterious substances contained in food and adopted regulatory
measures. The state legislature passed a pure food law in 1881. City
health officials during the same decade made some efforts to control
the milk supply there. When Ernest J. Lederle, acting chemist,
injected milk from diseased cows into guinea pigs, they died. According to Charles F. Bolduan, director of the Bureau of Public Health
Education, writing in 1916: "It is safe to say that this occurrence
strongly determined Doctor Lederle's subsequent great interest and
activity in the supervision of the milk supply. So far as the Board of
Health was concerned, we find it constantly taking a keen interest
in the milk supply and backing up the efforts of its administrative
officers."12
For many years the supervision of the municipal food supply had
been handled by the Sanitary Bureau. In 1912, however, Lederle,
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during his second term as commissioner of health, transferred the
work to the newly created Bureau of Food and Drugs. It then assumed
the functions of the old divisions of food and drug inspection, city
milk inspection, and sanitary inspection. This change eliminated
duplication of services. Under the former arrangement, a milk inspector, a food inspector, and a sanitary inspector might visit the
same premises on a given day. 13
With the centralization of the inspection force and the assignment of laboratories to the Bureau of Food and Drugs, the number
of employees came to 188 in 1915. Not awed by the size of his force,
Brown reacted to it as a bureaucrat seeking to sustain his private
stronghold. According to him, the bureau had a shortage of inspectors.
In 1916 he lamented that there were only 32 men assigned to milk control, whereas there should have been 140 or more. He also complained,
with justification, that only 3 inspectors made up the drug division.
Though the director had hopes of enlarging his staff, they came to
naught. Official reports indicated that his bureau made virtually no
additions during the period that he served. 14
BUREAU OF FOOD AND DRUGS, 1915

DIRECTOR

GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

F'OOD

MILK

MEAT

DRUG

LABORATORY

Since the bureau was already established and was employing
almost 200 people, Brown decided that it was absolutely necessary
that he become acquainted with them. His own success, in a sense,
depended on the character of his employees and the rapport that he
could establish with them. Soon after he arrived in the city, he made
a habit of going on inspection tours with his men. By August he
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observed: "I seem to be getting at my force of food-inspectors, whose
morale was in bad shape as a result of [the] previous Director's
mistakes and incompetence." Social events provided him with additional opportunities to meet his employees. On 31 July 1915 the
Food Inspectors' Association sponsored its first annual family outing
and picnic at Morningside Park. All such former gatherings had been
"stag." Brown attended and met most of the 175 inspectors. Later, on
5 February 1916, the food inspectors held a banquet in the Gothic
Room at Murray's, 228 West Forty-second Street. 15
Brown's interest in getting acquainted with his inspectors was
stimulated, in part, by his well-grounded suspicion that some of
them were accepting bribes from unethical food dealers. Early in
February 1916 the director revealed his misgivings to the new health
commissioner, Dr. Haven Emerson, formerly deputy commissioner,
who had assumed the position when Goldwater resigned. Emerson,
in turn, spoke to Mayor Mitchel. The mayor ordered the commissioner of accounts, Leonard M. Wallstein, to begin an investigation.
On 26 May, as a result of evidence collected by Wallstein, veterinarian
inspector Dr. Frederic W. Schoneweg, and special investigator William H. Boyle, Brown dismissed several meat inspectors who had
allegedly taken bribes from the operators of slaughterhouses. During
the same period the city obtained indictments against twelve dealers
on the charge of bribery, four of whom were convicted, and it
revoked permits for the operation of the businesses in question. 16
Unorthodox dealers had developed a sophisticated strategy over
the years. Lookouts signaled the approach of honest inspectors.
Employees then lowered undesirable meat into compartments covered
by trap doors. Corrupt officers presented no problems. Therefore,
when they appeared, dealers reversed the process: Good meat disappeared and foul meat came out of hiding. For twenty years or
more, authorities believed, the practice of bribing inspectors to pass
"sleepers"-unfit carcasses-had been a common practice. The money
ranged from $50 to $75 a week per man, depending on services rendered. Graft amounted to between $35,000 and $40,000 annually.
Schoneweg, posing as a new inspector, gleaned much of this information. When he took up his duties, one of the meat dealers told him:
"You ought to get wise." When he inquired further, the man
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informed him that it was possible "to make a little on the side."
Pressing for even more information, he was told: "Don't be foolish;
you know what I meant; everybody is getting it." 17
It was not surprising that inspectors succumbed to temptation,
for their annual salaries amounted to only $1,200 to $1 ,400. Many of
them had wives, children, and dependent relatives to support, and
they were hard put financially to keep up their responsibilities. The
low pay, coupled with the desire of some dealers to palm off inferior
goods in return for excess profits, created a natural breeding ground
for corruption. Then, too, the chances of being caught seemed slim
because the field inspectors were isolated from the central administration.18
Along with a reliable staff, Brown needed a receptive public.
In Tennessee, Brown single-handedly had launched a program of
public health education; in New York, the Bureau of Public Health
Education covered this work. The director of that bureau issued
publications, planned exhibits and lectures, showed moving pictures,
and maintained the departmental library. Nonetheless, other bureau
chiefs cooperated closely with him. In July 1915, Brown hastily put
together information on food and drug control for release to the
press. Some articles dealing with the fish business soon appeared.
Alfred W. McCann of the Globe took an avid interest in the new
bureau director and predicted that he would save the citizens a great
deal of money "if the city fathers will give him the men necessary to
keep up the pace." The Herald gave a similar but less verbose coverage.
These beginnings seemed promising to Brown, who remarked: "I
think that with proper handling here we can get some interest in
the papers, for the people seem to take the same interest in pure
food work here as elsewhere, and the publicity bureau of the Department is anxious for all the stuff we can give them." 19
Brown took advantage of opportunities to inform the public.
From 26 December 1915 to 2 January 1916 the Bureau of Food
and Drugs and the Bureau of Public Health Education, in conjunction
with the Emerson Society of the University Settlement House,
sponsored a pure food show. On 27 December the director himself
delivered a lecture, "Supervising the Food of Five Million People."
In November 1916 the bureau set up an exhibit at the Twenty-second
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Regimental Armory as part of a food show sponsored by the New
York Retail Grocers' Association. An inspector who was on hand
for the occasion explained the methods of inspection, pointed out
the waste of food involved in poor handling and shipping, and
showed some samples of adulterated food. 20
Brown thought it only fair that businessmen be provided with
information about regulations and that they be given ample time
to conform to standards before they were subjected to prosecution.
He, therefore, set out to win over legitimate dealers. The Jews, as
an ethnic group, presented a challenge, and Brown seemed determined
to win their acceptance. "The only way to handle the Jews," he said,
"is to get their confidence." He explained that he found this to be
imperative:
As there are 1,250,000 of them in our total population of
5,500,000, they must be handled. So I have already gone to a
meeting with one set of push-cart men and expect to go to
others. I have also come into contact with, and apparently
have the confidence of, the Jews at the head of their social
uplift work here, very bright, smart, straight men-and I
have begun a little study of the problem-People to whom I
have talked say this is the only way of handling these people
-it's the way I have always handled any people.21
Brown felt confident by August 1915 that he was gaining the cooperation of his "Yiddish friends."
Other businessmen were not neglected, for efforts to maintain
good relations with them as well as with the general public were
constant. In October 1915 the Bureau of Food and Drugs scheduled
a meeting of restaurateurs. Discussion followed the lectures .of Brown
and his staff. Owners showed genuine interest and commended the
bureau for its efforts. A few suggested that stricter enforcement and
more drastic action might be desirable in some cases. During December, representatives from the bureau conferred with meat and fish
dealers. On 14 February 1917, Brown delivered a lecture at a
banquet of the New York Wholesale Grocers' Association on
"Functions of a State in Food Control." The same day, Assistant
Director Ole Salthe met with the Confectioners and Ice Cream
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Manufacturers of New Yorlc State and spoke on "The Relation of the
Department of Health to Confectioners and Ice Cream Manufacturers." On 14 April, at the Department of Health, the assistant
director and staff members presented a program for eighty students
from Cornell University on food conditions in general and on poultry
and eggs in particular. 22
Educational activities attracted interest and publicity, but the
bureau gained the most attention when it cast a searchlight on
wrongdoers and brought them to justice. Enforcement, after all, was
the major function of this branch of the Health Department. Under
Brown's direction, it did not shirk its responsibilities. Investigators
kept up a steady program of inspection, but this aspect of the work
went virtually unnoticed except in annual reports which the experts
wrote for each other. The public was titillated more by sensationalism
than by monotonous routine. Brown took his old campaign technique,
which had been perfected in his native state, out of mothballs, breathed
new life into it, and stirred the imaginations of cosmopolitan New
Yorkers.
With slight alteration, the campaign, as a weapon against illegal
practices, functioned well in New York City. In Tennessee, Brown
generally waged campaigns during the summer within a limited
period of time in a given city or town. In this gigantic port city a
campaign was almost constantly under way against some group of
food dealers. Frequently the bureau put several in motion at the same
time. The overwhelming number of violations by food handlerswhether wholesalers, retailers, restaurateurs, or pushcart vendorskept the inspection staff overworked. The campaign technique itself
retained its former characteristics-sensationalism, careful scrutiny by
a number of health officials, and well-publicized arrests and
prosecutions.
The complexity of problems presented by the nefarious dealers
in New York led Brown to take up "the raid" as a part of his grand
strategy. The principal difference in "the raid" and ''the campaign"
centered on the objectives. The campaign, announced in advance,
allowed those who were subjected to it a chance to alter any practices
that were in violation of the law or the Sanitary Code before inspectors
appeared. The raid, on the other hand, required great secrecy and
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careful planning after the bureau had learned of violators who
wantonly endangered public health. According to Brown, it was
"often necessary to make regular raids on certain industries." In such
a raid during October 1915, "fifty-six men were detailed to cover
food-handling establishments, especially with reference to the use of
rotten eggs." As a result the inspectors uncovered fifty violations of
the Sanitary Code and condemned about eleven hundred pounds of
unfit food that they found in bakeries. 23
As a novice, Brown gingerly tested public opinion. In July 1915
he began a minor campaign to protect "Summer widowers," being
one himself, who were compelled to eat in restaurants because their
families were out of the city on vacation. He ordered inspectors to
concentrate their work on restaurants in residential districts, checking
to see that food was properly handled and prepared.24 After two
months on the job, Brown announced that he had familiarized himself
with local conditions and was prepared to direct a vigorous campaign
to improve the food supply. He indicated, however, that special consideration would be given to small businessmen:
Inasmuch as some of the regulations are highly scientific and
technical, first offenders, particularly smaller dealers, will
be handled with some measure of leniency. After a first
warning, however, the bureau will proceed relentlessly
against keepers of unclean stores, sellers of unfit foods and
other violators of regulations. The bureau will be much more
severe in its handling of the larger dealers, who are in a better
position to familiarize themselves with the law. 25
The fish business came under close scrutiny within a month of
the warning, and the legendary Fulton Market, through which 90
percent of the supply of the city passed, was not overlooked. Prior to
Brown's appointment, "the ordinary fish shipping box was used for
the display of fish, foul river water was used for washing purposes,
and floors were filthy, and conditions in general bad." During 1915
the situation improved. The director reported that "hearty co-operation was received from the fish dealers themselves." "Old employees,"
he said, stated that the market was in "better condition than for
forty years." 26
Fish dealers as a group were not lacking in imagination. Health
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Department inspectors discovered plain codfish that had been dyed
to resemble Alaskan salmon. A New York newspaper gave the following account:
The codfish were acquiring the glow of sunset in boxes down
in cold storage under the Manhattan arches of the Brooklyn
Bridge when an inspector of the Health Department routed
them out and looked them over with care. On the boxes was
the label, "Alaskan Salmon," but inside there were denizens
of the Cape Cod neighborhood in various shades of reds and
pinks. The top layers of fish were red through and through,
then there were layers of a feeble solferino, and last of all
layers as white as the flesh of any cod that ever dozed along
the coast. 27
The process involved soaking the fish in pyroligneous acid and
then sousing them in Zanzibar red. Plied by energetic hucksters as
salmon, the incarnadined cod sold at forty cents a pound instead of
ten cents, the going rate for the plain variety.
Raids and campaigns remained common throughout Brown's
years in New York, persistently attracting attention to the bureau.
A new grading program gained a great deal of publicity during 1916.
At the end of May the director announced that he was ordering
inspectors, beginning in June, to investigate the conditions in every
hotel and restaurant in the city. The survey included not only the
premises where food was stored, prepared, and served but also the
personal cleanliness of cooks, waiters, and kitchen assistants. As soon
as the routine had been completed, owners received a card that
showed a rating of good, fair, or bad. In order to obtain the highest
grade, a facility had to comply with a list of fifty conditions, twenty-six
of which were compulsory. If any one of the twenty-six requirements
was not met, the business received a grade of fair or bad. 28
Although grading was an innovation in New York City, the
practice had been established by Brown in Tennessee during 1911.
In the big city it stimulated a flurry of excitement. Brown did not
require proprietors to display grading cards, but he encouraged patrons
to ask to see them and then to eat with assurance or go elsewhere in
pursuit of sanitary food. The Times commented that such a policy
seemed rather absurd at first thought: "Telling just when the inspec-
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tors are coming, and what merits they will reward and what faults they
will penalize, is, of course, no way to bring sinners to punishment or
to drag exciting scandals into the sight of a shocked and interested
public. Having been duly warned, the proprietors of these places
will take good care to have everything all right betimes, and if anything hasn't been all right in the past, proof of that fact will be
difficult or impossible." The editor praised the wisdom of the health
officials and noted, "They are quite justified in thinking that it is
not the previous condition of these kitchens that really counts, but
their present and future condition. To accomplish that better end
the board is using an excellent method." 29
Initial inspections revealed the need for "a pure food revival,"
but the restaurant keepers responded well to criticism of their
methods. Interestingly enough, a Bowery saloon that served free
lunches was the first of its type to receive a "good" rating. "Why do
you give away large quantities of bread to these poor men?" one of
the inspectors asked the Irish proprietor. "My mother died not long
ago," was the noble answer, "and in her will she begged me to give
soup, meat, and bread to any man who came in my place of business,
provided, of course, that he felt hungry. My back room is a club
dining room. Come, look!" 30 Odds were that the owner of the saloon
marshaled the homeless men whom he allowed to sleep in the place
into a troop of voters for Tammany politicians or one of the ward
bosses. Another inspection on a morning following a cold winter
night might have revealed surroundings that were not quite so
sanitary.
Inspectors graded between four and five hundred restaurants
by the end of July. Brown reported that this work had been severely
curtailed because his staff had been assisting in efforts to check the
poliomyelitis epidemic. These initial inspections showed, however,
that restaurants in the city were not measuring up well to requirements. The public seemed ready to panic, and Dr. Bolduan soon
issued statements designed to allay fears. 31
The grading experiment during the summer of 1916 raised the
possibility of placing food-handling establishments under a permit
plan. The final decision rested with Mayor Mitchel and Commissioner
Wallstein. On 30 January 1917 the Board of Health, with the mayor's
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consent, amended the Sanitary Code, thereby requiring every eating
place in New York City to obtain permission from the commissioner
of health to stay in business. The provision took effect immediately.
By the end of March nearly fifteen thousand proprietors had made
application. 32
Alerting the public to hidden dangers in food remained an
objective of the Department of Health. Experts there realized that
economic considerations tended to receive highest priority from
businessmen. If customers understood the risks involved, dealers
might be forced to conform to standards or lose trade. The director
of the bureau had this in mind when he began a campaign against
exposed food. Each year this unsanitary practice resulted in the
condemnation of thousands of pounds of edibles that had been
contaminated by flies, dust, and dirt. Dealers at city markets, the
pushcart vendors, and the operators of sidewalk stands shared
responsibility for this problem. 33
Brown had a penchant for waging war on flies. With a little
imagination it was possible to conjure up horrible visions by considering conditions to be found in most large cities. Lawrence Veiller, a
leading authority on housing in New York, had once made the
following observation on an alley located in the tenement districts:
"Piles of manure, those pest factories which breed uncontrolled the
typhoid fly by myriads, frequently overflow into it. Uncollected
garbage, in the hot summer months, lies there in decaying heaps.
Surface water, slops, wash-tub emptyings, leakage from privies and
from stables cover the surface with slime. Old paper, tin cans, rubbish
and refuse of every kind are everywhere; huge rats, living and dead,
add to the general horror." 34 Only a short flight separated the flies
in the alley from the pushcarts, which operated almost exclusively in
the tenement districts. Such organizations as the New York Association for Improving Conditions of the Poor had tried to educate the
vendors. The average operator, however, made no move to adopt
procedures recommended by reformers, which included the expense
of covering the carts with glass. Generally scorned, the itinerant
peddlers, numbering at least ten thousand, sold food one day and
might well be pushing "shoe strings or underwear" the next. On the
East Side alone, according to Brown, twenty-seven streets were
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devoted to pushcart markets. These little conveyances caused a neverending headache for inspectors who repeatedly examined them, issued
warnings, and sometimes prosecuted the operators. 35
Exposure of food to filth at the city markets also presented
problems. In 1877, William H. Rideing, a journalist, had noted that
there were ten public markets in New York, not one of them worthy
of the amount of business it received. While conditions at the markets
had been bad, the approaches to them had been worse. On wet days,
so he had written, streets were "sloughs of despair," "ankle-deep in
mud." Old vegetable scroungers made frequent rounds, foraging in
garbage. The very poor could be seen "poring over a festering heap of
decayed stalks and leaves, and raking over each morsel with fixed
hungry care." 36 By 1915, changes had been implemented in some
of the markets, but they still were far from being free of problems.
Washington Market, which had been reconstructed by the city, had
become a model of its kind. West Washington Market likewise had
undergone pronounced alterations. Brown discovered that the "careless method of covering meat in transit with unclean horse blankets"
had been discontinued entirely, refrigerators had been cleaned, and
vehicles carrying meat had been rigidly inspected. 37
In spite of general improvements of city markets over the years,
they remained habitats for hoards of flies. This problem at Washington
Market received the attention of a special conference of city officials
on 24 July 1916. Brown and others thought that screening offered no
solution because of the large area of floor space and the volume of
business conducted. They decided, as an alternative, to install fans
and to keep food on the counters to a minimum. Mrs. F. C. Hogdon,
chairman of the Jefferson Market Committee, fired off a letter to
the editor of the Times. She pointed out that during the previous
summer her committee had installed fly traps at the Jefferson
Market which were catching flies in "quantities." She suggested that
if the doors and windows were screened, the market would be virtually
free of the pesky insects. Whatever the advantages of screening, the
issue was laid to rest, at least for the time being. 38
The campaigns and raids that were conducted during 1915 and
1916 involved rather staggering numbers of inspections as well as
the destruction of millions of pounds of unwholesome products. The
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total of inspections for 1915 was 730,149; figures are not available for
1916. During 1915 the bureau condemned 18,479,275 pounds of food;
in 1916, 12,074,081. Prosecutions were also forthcoming as indicated
in the accompanying table. Figures for 1916 showed an increase in new
1915

Prosecutions

New arrests ................................................. ......... ..
4,381
Number fined ...... ..................................................
3,133
Sentences suspended ........... ...................................
1,402
Amount of fines .. ............................................... ..... $33,221
Prison sentences ............... .....................................
14

6,223

4,79 2
1,158
$44,4° 2
15

arrests, fines, and amount of fines collected. Perhaps this indicated
more diligence on the part of inspectors as the result of a tougher
policy toward violators. On the other hand, the figures also revealed
that lawbreakers found security in the immense area of Greater New
York that inspectors had to cover and they risked fines or jail sentences
in spite of the stricter attitudes of the Bureau of Food and Drugs.39
The bureau had responsibility for the control of drugs as well
as food. From 1915 to 1917, however, the latter took priority over
the former in spite of the director's personal interest in drug-related
problems. This might be attributed to the size of the drug division,
which included a field force of three inspectors in 1917. The responsibility for drug control in the whole city rested with this limited staff;
nonetheless, a few convictions had been forthcoming. Efforts of this
division to force patent-medicine manufacturers to register with the
Department of Health, however, did not go well. The dealers took
a test case before the courts to determine the constitutionality of
this section of the Sanitary Code. In the appellate division of the
state supreme court, the justices ruled unanimously that "since the
ordinance had not been ratified by the state legislature it was open
to attack on the ground of unreasonableness." The Department of
Health carried the case to the court of appeals, but it remained
unsettled as late as August 1918. 40
With the entry of the United States into World War I, food
control itself took a back seat to food conservation. Supplying allied
armies and civilian populations helped to drain American stockpiles.
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Food conservation was the phrase of the day-not food control.
Patriotic Americans felt called upon to do their bit as the activities
of Herbert Hoover's federal food administration picked up momentum. New Yorkers considered causes of food waste, and they formed
committees; suburbanites grew backyard gardens; ministers preached
the gospel of conservation to their congregations; and Camp Fire
Girls distributed "household tags" to housewives who pledged themselves to saving food. Meanwhile, Director Brown commented
testily that it would be better to stop wasting food than to grow
victory gardens. "There is 10 per cent less garbage than New Yorkers
threw out two years ago, but," Brown added, "an appalling amount
is wasted even now, particularly by more prosperous families." 41
Mayor Mitchel, a zealous supporter of the war effort, announced
the formation of the New York City Food Aid Committee for the
purpose of ascertaining the difficulties and needs of citizens there.
Perhaps more of a patriotic trapping than a functional organization,
the executive committee included George W. Perkins, chairman of
the Mayor's Food Committee; Miss Mabel Kittredge, chairman of
the Women's Food Committee of the Mayor's Defense Committee;
William G. Willcox, one of Brown's neighbors on Staten Island, who
was president of the Board of Education; and Brown. The mayor also
selected forty-six women to serve as district organizers. 42
In addition to serving on the New York City Food Aid Committee, Brown geared the work of his inspectors to conservation.
During 1917 they made a conscious effort to salvage partially spoiled
food shipments. In suitable instances these goods were turned over
to charitable organizations for canning. Brown himself published
several articles related to conservation, most of which were printed
in professional journals, and he delivered papers and lectures on the
subject to diverse audiences. He constantly urged shippers to be
careful in packing fragile items, and he asked consumers to avoid
waste. 43
Along with the routine responsibilities and patriotic obligations,
Brown maintained his contacts with professional organizations and
produced a steady stream of scientific publications. Already recognized
as one of the country's leading experts on food sanitation as well as
public health and agricultural chemistry, he was well established
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professionally. He regularly attended annual meetings of the American
Public Health Association. When in September 1915 the association
held its convention at Rochester, New York, the director presented
two papers before the general session, one on the grading of milk and
the other oo the narcotics problem. He also established contacts
with other health authorities in New York State. The next year,
Brown followed the association to Cincinnati. In 1917 he served as
chairman of the food and drug section when the group met in
Washington, D.C. Food organizations that were more singular in
purpose than the American Public Health Association had the active
support of the director. During 1916 he attended a meeting in
Philadelphia of health officials from surrounding cities and states. Out
of this conclave, with the cooperation of federal officials, the Central
Atlantic Food Officials' Association was born. While assisting in
the creation of this new society, Brown occasionally appeared at
the meetings of the Association of American Dairy, Food and Drug
Officials. 44
Brown continued to think of himself as a professional chemist
as well as an expert on food and drug control. In November 1915 he
joined his peers in Washington, D.C., for a meeting of the Association
of Official Agricultural Chemists. When the American Chemical
Society held its second annual exposition at Grand Central Palace in
September 1916, he delivered a paper on the chemistry of milk before
the food section of the organization. He and another chemist,
Clarence V. Ekroth of the Department of Health, also collaborated
during 1917 on two articles dealing with the inspection of milk in
New York City which appeared in the Journal of Industrial and

Engineering Chemistry.' 5
From 1915 to 1917 the transplanted Tennessean adjusted well
to the metropolis. Once Brown had accustomed himself to his new
environment and had gained a reasonably firm control over his
employees, he turned to a propaganda program that was designed to
win the support of businessmen and ordinary citizens for his work.
There were many unorthodox dealers, aided to some degree by
unscrupulous inspectors, who remained beyond the pale of his
admirers. Against these, Brown used the old campaign technique
that he had carried north from Tennessee. When the situation
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warranted, he and his inspectors raided establishments that were
willfully endangering public health. Grading, too, had been one of his
innovations in the South. His adoption of this course of action in
New York City paved the way for a restaurant permit plan. By 1917,
food conservation superseded food control and occupied a considerable amount of his time.
The director did not enjoy the same degree of flexibility in
New York as in Tennessee. In the South he had created and enlarged
his department and had determined policy; in the North the hierarchy
was fixed. He could not enlarge his staff significantly, and standards
were outlined in the Sanitary Code. To a limited extent, he determined policy, but all of his work came under the review of the
commissioner of health. Brown was above all else a professional. He
reveled in the company of the other experts, most of whom, like
himself, occupied their positions because of their scores on competitive
civil-service examinations. The Department of Health represented a
utopia for these scientists, a haven from political trials and tribulations.
The term of reform Mayor John P. Mitchel came to an end early in
1918, and the idealistic world of these health experts was shattered.
According to the dicta of Tammany Hall, government was the
business of politicians. A new mayor, in 1918, set out to rid the city
of this strange breed of scientific experts who had invaded the sphere
of professional politicians.

7-The Scienrist
and Urban Politics, 1918:
Tammany Hall versus the Experts

When 1918 opened in New York City, a battle shaped up between
two distinct, sophisticated groups of professionals-the health experts
and the politicians. Since the creation of Greater New York City,
reformers had fought the Democratic organization for municipal
offices because they believed that their own political control of the
city was indispensable to the realization of genuinely constructive
changes. Both Tammany Hall and the good-government forces
courted the naturalized immigrants and second-generation voters.
Neither power bloc was able to maintain control of city politics.
Weakened by reform campaigns, the machine leaders had become
increasingly suspicious of the appearance of any power conglomerates
in the city. Therefore, the professional politicians viewed the healthdepartment experts as a threat. By May 1918 the jobs of many
scientists were in jeopardy, but Lucius Polk Brown became the special
target of the forces led by Mayor John F. Hylan. Before Brown was
put to the personal test, however, a major power struggle developed
between Tammany politicians and health experts.
After 1898 the Department of Health had become increasingly
powerful. The board's authority to draft sanitary regulations having
the force of law, the creation of the bureau plan of administration,
and the adherence of the health establishment to civil-service regulations infringed on Tammany's domain; practical Democratic politicians regarded government as their personal sphere. During the
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four years that reformer John P. Mitchel had occupied the mayor's
chair, scientific bureaucrats at the Department of Health had entrenched themselves. Therefore, when John Hylan, the Tammanybacked candidate, won the mayoral election of 1917, he launched
an attack against the experts that did not end until he had undermined the bureau plan and had obtained the resignation of a number
of the administrators, replacing them with his own men. Tammany,
however, had not reckoned with the possibility that the experts
were capable of launching a strong counteroffensive. The politicians
probably expected the scientists to wilt at the first sign of opposition.
If this were, indeed, the case, they were sadly mistaken.
The future of both sets of professionals for the next four years
hinged on the outcome of the mayoral election of 1917. Ironically,
the nonpartisan aspects of the Mitchel administration, which had
freed the experts from political tribulations, were the very weaknesses
that led to Mitchel's defeat. John Purroy Mitchel had provided
reform elements in New York City with a rare interlude for their
social experiments. From 1914 to 1918, individuals of diverse
socioeconomic classes, ethnic backgrounds, and religions, united by
patriotism and nationalism, had crusaded for civic improvement. The
reform coalition, therefore, attracted newly arrived immigrants, who
were anxious for American acceptance, as well as native-born
patricians. 1
The cement that bound immigrants and patricians was not
durable enough, however, to withstand a strong party fight. During
his years in office, Mayor Mitchel created a nonpartisan administration
that was conducive to Progressive experiments. The Boston Transcript,
hailing him as "A Courageous American Mayor," noted that he had
put into office, or had accompanied into office, a number of "practical
idealists."2 This paradoxical description of Progressive reformers applied especially to those who were ensconced in the Department of
Health. Idealistic in their visions for a better world, they were amazingly practical in many of the strategies that they used to obtain
results. While enjoying the security afforded them as scientists by
the Mitchel administration, some of them nonetheless realized that
a defeat for Mitchel in 1917 could eliminate their positions and
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undermine the bureaucratic structure that they had fashioned for
themselves.
Looking for a way to perpetuate this scientific elitism, Deputy
Commissioner Haven Emerson urged in 1915 that the "cherished
privilege" of New York City mayors to appoint the commissioner
of health be discontinued. He insisted on an alteration of policy and
law that would make the position permanent. Speaking before the
Sixth New York City Conference of Charities and Corrections, he
praised the Mitchel administration for its support of public health
work: "Thanks to the blessing of non-partisan city administration we
can be assured of freedom from political interference with official
health work at present. This is not, however, a sufficient safeguard, for
nothing less than a Commissioner of Health, assured of suitable
compensation and permanent employment, freed from the risk or
certainty of replacement with each change of city administration, will
permit of that confidence." 3 S. S. Goldwater, who served for a time
as commissioner of health under Mitchel, concurred with Emerson's
opinion that the department had remained free of political interference. 4
Even though politics had remained a secondary element, the
health commissioners gave Mitchel their support. Emerson, on one
occasion, forwarded Mitchel a copy of a speech that he was planning
to deliver at Carnegie Hall. He suggested to the mayor that if he
wished for him "to take another angle," he should inform him no
later than the morning of the day on which the speech was to be
given. 5 Unfortunately, the experts at the Department of Health
had no guarantee that this type of political-bureaucratic relationship
could be sustained. Emerson's suggestion that the position of the
commissioner be made permanent had gained no legal ground.
Therefore, the health bureaucrats found themselves in a precarious
position; they could take solace only in the faint hope that Mitchel
would be reelected.
In scientific terms, for every action there is always an equal and
opposite reaction. The implications of Newton's Third Law could
well be applied to Mitchel's career. His meteoric rise to political
stardom was followed by an equally meteoric plummet to earth,
figuratively and literally. The ascent began when Mitchel agreed,
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during George McClellan's tenure as mayor, to serve as an aid to
the corporation counsel who was then investigating the municipal
corruption that involved borough president John F. Ahearn of
Manhattan. Making use of the experience and acquaintances from
this position and of that which came with his service as commissioner
of accounts, Mitchel, who was then about thirty, became a candidate
for president of the Board of Aldermen in 1909. Backed by a
combination of Republicans, the Citizens Union, and the Committee
of One Hundred, he placed himself above his inherited ties to the
Democratic party. When Mayor William J. Gaynor was attacked by
a would-be assassin in 1910, Mitchel, as president of the Board of
Aldermen, became acting mayor for a time. In 1913 he accepted
a federal appointment to be Collector of the Port of New York.
This did not last long, however, for in the same year, after much
difficulty, he became the compromise candidate of the Fusionists,
supplanting George McAneny and Charles S. Whitman. He eventually received the endorsement of the Independents, the Republicans,
and political gadfly William Randolph Hearst. 6
On election day 191 3, Mitchel defeated the Tammany candidate,
Edward E. McCally, by 121,000, piling up the largest number of
votes since the creation of Greater New York. This freakish victory
was brought on by a number of factors. Mayor Gaynor had died,
depriving Tammany of a candidate who had some support from
reformers; their candidate was virtually unknown; and the governor,
Tammany-backed William Sulzer, had been impeached, further
tarnishing the image of the city's political machine. This election
marked the high point of Mitchel's career. 7
Having ridden to victory without benefit of a party organization,
the new mayor had little appreciation for political niceties. Indeed,
so scornful was he of the usual vote-getting tactics that he soon
alienated many old supporters. He made the following unwise
remark when asked by a friendly reporter to comment on a charge
made by his opponents that he had socially prominent friends: "Is
that an issue? Most of my friends are not in that group. Some are.
As to them, I hardly know how to answer, unless-unless I tell them
if they don't like my friends they can go to hell." 8 Such comments
clearly demonstrated the arrogance that typified his public image.
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Not only did the Mitchel administration lack a charismatic
politician, but also its record failed to show any dynamic improvement
over those of its predecessors. Edwin R. Lewinson, one of Mitchel's
biographers, delivered the following verdict: "The Mitchel Administration was beset by many of the pitfalls which hampered other
reform administrations of the period. It was honest and well-meaning,
but it accomplished little and it failed to win popular support."
Gustavus Myers had taken a different tack in campaign propaganda
published during the election year. He called the Mitchel administration "one of wholesome tendencies and accomplishments." He added :
"It is not contended that evils have entirely disappeared, but at any
rate the base, ignoble practices and the repellant incompetence of
past 'boss' rule have been much supplanted by improved methods,
expert judgment, technical experience, a higher tone, and good spirit."9
Americans have never been particularly impressed by expertise
and high-toned politics. New Yorkers were no exception. By 1917
the citizens of Gotham wanted a change. A mayor without oratorical
skills and machine-making abilities could not play on the heartstrings
of a fickle people. William L. Chenery, in an article for the Atlantic
Monthly in 1924, made the following assessment: "The people of
New York do not expect too much of politics. Time and again, they
have revolted against Tammany's wickedness only to find that a
Whig, a Reformer, a Republican, or a Coalitionist was not more to
their taste." While Mitchel refused to provide showmanship for the
New Yorkers, Tammany did not. According to Chenery,
Tammany Hall has never been radical, but espouses popular
causes. Moreover, since the early decades of the nineteenth
century it has been the professed friend of aliens in a city
constantly being resettled by immigrants. It has had singularly attractive social and charitable features and its leaders,
from one generation to another, have understood the average
man. The "human equation" has had few mysteries for them.
Most important of all, Tammany has made a business of
politics. 10
The brains of Tammany, Grand Sachem Charles Francis Murphy,
set out to find a satisfactory party solution to the "human equation"
in 1917. Murphy, without a doubt, was one of the unique bosses in
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American history-the politician's politician, but also open-minded
to reform. As boss, he was, according to some observers, "a sort of
king or thane," "the embodiment of the tribe." During his rule, city
government improved, and Tammany became less disreputable. One
journalist explained the change this way: "This is largely because
Murphy's conception of the tribe grew with the years-it had come
to include Jews and even Protestants. It had expanded to include the
State." Described by contemporaries as "a relaying point between
the people and officialdom," he kept his ear attuned to the tempos
of the times. Because reform occupied several beats, he paid it some
attention. 11
When Murphy searched for a candidate in 1917, he took
several factors into account. First, William Randolph Hearst had
parted company with Mitchel, apparently over appointments. His
presses could be put to good use for Tammany. Second, the politics
of the moment seemed to demand a Brooklyn man for the candidacy.
Since the creation of Greater New York, Tammany had sought to
cross the bridge and take over the Brooklyn Democratic organization.
Until 1909, Boss Patrick McCarren had prevented the absorption of
his machine by Tammany. He died that year, however, and John
Henry McCooey was elected chairman of the Kings County Democratic Executive Committee. A Brooklyn man as candidate for mayor
would appease both McCooey and Hearst and would tie the
Brooklyn machine more firmly to Tammany. Third, a man who was
free from the direct taint of Tammany Hall and bossism would possess
considerable advantage over one who was identified exclusively with
the Manhattan machine. 12
A compromise candidate finally emerged to satisfy . all the
political demands of the moment. Alfred E. Smith apparently wanted
the nomination, but Murphy persuaded him to await the gubernatorial
year of 1918. Smith accepted this argument but refused to acquiesce
in a Hearst candidacy. Therefore, Murphy, Smith, Big Tom Foleyas a Smith supporter and leader of the Lower East Side district-and
Hearst decided that John F. Hylan would be a desirable candidate. He
was not associated with Murphy; they had not met prior to his
selection. As a Brooklynite and a friend of Hearst's, he pleased Boss
McCooey. Before Hylan received the nomination, Murphy talked the
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the choice over with his Brooklyn counterpart. According to one
account, the following exchange took place:
Murphy reportedly met with "Uncle John" McCooey, the
pudgy little boss of Brooklyn, and asked him: "Is Hylan a
man we can trust and do business with?"
"He certainly is," Uncle John replied. "Do you want to
meet him?"
"No," said Murphy, "I want you to ram him down my
throat." 13
"Red Mike" Hylan, an agreeable six-foot red-head, could have
been the principal character in a Horatio Alger story. Portrayed as the
barefoot boy from the Catskills, he had the makings of an American
folk hero. At the tender age of nineteen, he had left the mountain
farm, gone to New York City, and landed a job on the Brooklyn
Elevated Railroad. Working on the elevated by day and studying law
at night, he eventually passed the bar examinations. Dabbling in
local Democratic politics led to his candidacy for a judgeship in the
municipal court during 1905. He lost the election, but Mayor McClellan made him a magistrate. By 1914 he had become a county
judge through appointment. His subsequent election to that post in
1915 by a large majority brought him to the attention of Murphy
and McCooey. When a reporter asked how he had gotten into politics,
Hylan answered promptly: "I walked in." He possessed only average
intelligence, but the Democratic machine did not need a genius.
His complacency and subservience suited Tammany.14
Meanwhile, after much soul-searching, Mitchel decided that he
would seek reelection. Ironically, he became a victim of one of the
good-government reforms-the direct primary. With no hope of
any support from the Democratic party, he decided to enter the
Republican primary. In a close election that involved irregularities
and a recount, he lost to William M. Bennett. By this time, Mitchel
had not even the shreds of a connection with any party organization,
but he entered the election as an Independent, supported by reform
elements. With three candidates already in the field-Hylan, Bennett,
and Mitchel-the Socialists nominated one of their outstanding
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leaders, Morris Hillquit, who hoped to capitalize on antiwar sentiment.15
Prospects for Mitchel were not good; no better were the chances
that the reformers he had placed in the municipal establishment
would survive his defeat. As a mouthpiece of Tammany, Hylan made
clear to the experts what they could expect if the Democrats triumphed
in the November election. As early as September he spoke out against
charitable foundations, which he labeled a menace to the city, to
schools, and to health. Attacking the "aristocracy of experts," he
associated them with the Nietzschean "Superman" concept. Health
Commissioner Haven Emerson received particular attention as a
pawn of the foundations. Hylan singled out for criticism Emerson's
advice during the poliomyelitis epidemic of 1916. The health
commissioner had urged people to get their children out of town.
Quite correctly, Hylan pointed out that tenement dwellers were in
no position to act on such advice. 16 If the health experts realized
their vulnerability, they had no choice except to support Mitchel;
Tammany Hall certainly offered them no recourse. Instead of a retreat
for scientists, the Department of Health was viewed by Tammany
as a reservoir of jobs for loyal party workers.
Election day 191 7 proved to be a dreary one for reformers.
Mitchel, who had been swept into office by the largest majority since
1897, went out under a Hylan avalanche which exceeded his vote of
four years earlier. W. M. Houghton of the Tribune rendered a
fitting analysis of the Mitchel disaster. He said that the mayor was
defeated "because the good citizens of this town swallowed what
Hearst said about him, that he was a frivolous tango-dancer, that he
was a social climber and snob, that he was a friend of the 'plunderbund,' a little brother of the rich, an arrogant ally of Rockefeller." 17
Smarting from this humiliating defeat, Mitchel, always a strong
supporter of the war effort, enlisted in the Air Corps. Already dead
politically, he completed his demise when he fell out of an airborne
single-seater training plane.
The New York City press had generally favored Mitchel's
candidacy. When it became apparent that Tammany had returned
to power, the newspapers were not enthusiastic about the prospects
for an administration headed by Hylan. An editorial in the \Vorld
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lamented: "Tammany has come back to power. By the irony of fate
it has come back to power under the most unfit, incompetent candidate for Mayor that it has nominated since consolidation." The
Globe took comfort in the fact that Hearst would gain little, adding,
"Tammany hasn't often done all the fighting when it has won, but
it has always got all the booty." The Post editorial grieved: "What
cuts deepest is the thought that all the fine work done under the
Mitchel administration during the four years past seems to have
been trampled upon by the city." Hearst's American chided the other
newspapers for changing their attitude toward Hylan after the
election, although it hardly seemed that they had done so, and
promised that Hylan would justify his wife's faith-that the city
would be proud of him. 18
As soon as the fog that accompanied the election returns lifted
from the heads of reformers, they began to wonder what action
Hylan would take. When the mayor-elect hinted that the victory
he had won might have been a mandate to cut city expenditures, the
Times pragmatically suggested that the civil service might keep some
jobs out of Tammany's clutches. Hylan soon attacked the Bureau of
Municipal Research, charging that it was practically maintained by
the Rockefellers and those who were in sympathy with them. His
initiative apparently startled Tammany Hall. Charles Francis Murphy
returned from a vacation to talk with Hylan. 19
Stark realities of the November election soon settled down
on reformers in New York. Professor Charles-Edward A. Winslow of
Yale University, an ardent advocate of public health reform, challenged the New York Women's City Club to protect the Department
of Health: "We have the best municipal Health Department in the
world, and what has the Women's City Club done to see that it will
be continued? We have a new Mayor-have you been to ask him if
he is going to put as good a man in the Health Board as Haven
Emerson? If you have not, as a City Club you should have done so.
You may be sure that there have already been many people to ask
about getting the position."20 The warning came none too soon.
The new administration had already taken steps to oppose the
selection of thirty district health officers whose salaries had not been
included in the city budget of 1918. Charles I. Stengel, who managed
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Hylan's campaign in Brooklyn, appeared before the Civil Service
Commission and protested their drawing up a list of eligible
candidates. 21
The choice of a commissioner of health began to rest heavily
on the minds of reform-oriented New Yorkers. In an editorial, the
Times reminded Hylan that his appointment should be above all the
considerations of party politics and still farther above the thought
of "patronage" or "the organization." Whatever conspiracy might be
afoot, the Citizens Union, led by William Jay Schieffelin, trained a
suspicious eye on the Hylan administration and waited to see whether
to support it or to fight it. 22
Hylan announced the name of his new commissioner of health
on 15 January. Dr. J. Lewis Amster-who was president of the Bronx
County Medical Society, a loyal worker for the Democrats, and one
of Murphy's cronies-received the appointment. No immediate
repercussions followed. In early April, however, Hylan launched the
first phase of his assault on the Department of Health. He sent
Amster a letter telling him to remove seven of the bureau directors.
Apparently the mayor chose to recognize the legitimacy of only the
old Bureau of Sanitary Inspection and the Bureau of Registry and
Statistics; both had gone out of existence with the reorganization that
had taken place in the Department of Health between 1910 and
1914. An unwilling party, Amster, who was not sure of the desirability
of such a move, suggested that Hylan have the Civil Service Commission and the commissioner of accounts, David Hirschfield, investigate
the legality of the creation of the new bureaus. Then, he promised,
after the findings were submitted to the corporation counsel, to act
according to the legal opinion.28
This action marked the beginning of a major power struggle
between two highly organized groups whose interests conflicted.
Public health had become a matter for scientifically trained experts;
politics represented the domain of another group of professionals.
The New York City Department of Health occupied a branch of
municipal government, and from a professional political perspective,
the jobs it provided should have been available for patronage. The
scientists who had entered municipal government as health reformers,
however, believed that their sphere should be protected by civil-service
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regulations from the recurring political storms of passing administrations. Politicians and scientists, unwilling to compromise without a
fight, drew their lines and summoned their warriors. Distinctions
between the two groups blurred, however, in the heat of battle.
At times it became difficult to separate the professional scientist from
the professional politician. Furthermore, fissures developed in what
had appeared to be united fronts. Scientists, it seemed, could be aspiring politicians as well, and politicians were not always united in
purpose, especially in a metropolis where problems of borough
sovereignty beset machine politics.
Under the guise of legality, the probe to eradicate the directorships began on 9 April. James E. MacBride, the Tammany chairman
of the Civil Service Commission, made no secret of his opinion that
the bureau system was "manifestly improper." He promised to
recommend that it be discontinued. Among the first witnesses to be
called were Commissioner Amster; Lucius Polk Brown; Dr. Frank
Krause, sanitary superintendent; Dr. William F. Guilfoy, registrar of
the Bureau of Vital Statistics; and Dr. Louis Harris, director of the
Bureau of Preventable Diseases. 24
For the most part, individuals like Brown, who were recognized
as experts in the field of public health, headed these bureaus. They
included: Dr. S. Josephine Baker of the Bureau of Child Hygiene;
Bolduan, Public Health Education; Harris, Preventable Diseases;
Guilfoy, Vital Statistics; Krause, Sanitary Bureau; Dr. William H.
Park, Bureau of Laboratories; and Dr. Robert J. Wilson, Bureau of
Hospitals. Of this group, Brown was the most recent employee of
the Department of Health. The others were veterans of many years,
some having been employed in the 1890s. The newest director in
the department, recently appointed by Hylan to the Bureau of General
Investigation, was Dr. Frank J. Monaghan, the mayor's personal
physician.211
To attack the legitimacy of the bureaus seemed, on the surface,
to be a master stroke by Hylan, for this strategy helped to conceal the
more ominous side of the matter. The bureau plan of administration
had been debated within the Department of Health itself, but Hylan
made it appear that the experts were jeopardizing efficient health
administration merely to perpetuate their own establishment. Former
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Commissioner Goldwater in 1914 had noted the weaknesses of the
bureau plan. To deal with major difficulties, he established Health
District Number 1 on an experimental basis and soon reported that
it had much to commend itself. Chamberlain Bruere summarized the
advantages of the experiment in a report, "New York City's Administrative Progress-1914-1916." This district arrangement apparently
made the health administration somewhat more flexible than the
bureau plan alone; it also afforded a more personal approach. 26
Tammany officials, dragged along by the momentum of political
bungling, set out to use the Department of Health's own experiment
to eliminate the bureau plan. Attempting to cast the experts as
impersonal scientists operating in a sterile world aloof from the
problems of the masses, they pitted themselves as the champions of
the citizens. This strategy, however, failed to hide their sinister
objectives. The abolition of the bureau plan would naturally result in
the elimination of many civil-service classifications. The need would
then arise for new civil-service positions under new classifications.
This meant new jobs to be filled by new appointees-Tammany
appointees. In an editorial, the Times incisively cut through the
cloudy morass of explanations: "Back of all this solemn feinting lies,
presumably, the immortal Tammany doubt: Is it legal for anybody
not a Tammany devotee to hold office under the City Charter?"27
The opinion of the Times seemed justified, especially in light of
the veil of secrecy that had been cast over the proceedings of the
Civil Service Commission. When representatives of several civic organizations arrived at the Municipal Building to sit in on the hearings,
they were turned away because, according to MacBride, the hearings
represented a "private inquiry" and only those who had been "invited"
could attend. Invitations went only to witnesses. If reform groups
had any illusions about what the Hylan administration was up to,
such secrecy alerted them to the political realities. They began
mobilizing for the siege. The New York City Woman Suffrage party
responded quickly, called on the mayo~, and asked him to reconsider
any interest that he might have in abolishing the Bureau of Child
Hygiene. The Women's Municipal League also condemned the
investigation. In a public statement the members pointed out that
the city would surely lose the services of trained experts if the citizens
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did not rise up in indignant protest. They also argued that the bureaus
were not "fads and frills" of the Mitchel administration but had
originated in the days of Mayors Gaynor and McClellan. 28
Still attempting to maintain a precarious balance between Hylan
and the reformers, Amster persuaded the physicians of the city to
await the outcome of the investigation before taking action. Reports
had it that if the bureaus were deemed illegal, the mayor would'
order them abolished and would divide the work among the assistant
sanitary superintendents of the five boroughs. On 13 April, representatives of the medical societies, disregarding Amster's arguments, joined
those from labor organizations, social agencies, and the Bar Association
to discuss the advisability of instituting a taxpayers' suit to compel
the Civil Service Commission to produce all records and papers
connected with the hearings. Attending were such prominent citizens
as Dr. Lee K. Frankel, chairman of the Committee of Twenty-one;
J. H. Larson, secretary of the New York Milk Committee; and
Ernest Bohm, secretary of the Central Federated Union. This
meeting came on the same day that MacBride added a new dimension
to the secret inquiry. What had been an investigation of the legitimacy of the seven bureaus that were not specifically mentioned in
the charter suddenly became a search for graft in the Department of

Health.29
Reformers grew increasingly concerned over the plight of the
bureaus. On 15 April the presidents of the New York medical societies
joined with Dr. Abraham Jacobi, "the dean of the medical profession,"
in a public statement to citizens. They pointed out the dangers involved in tampering with the health administration. At the same
time, Dr. Lee K. Frankel made repeated and unsuccessful efforts to
see the mayor. The suspicious silence emanating from the Hylan
camp led the New York State Consumers' League, the Cooper Union
Forum, and the New York Child Labor Committee to add their
strength to those who opposed Hylan. 80
As the struggle intensified, outsiders contributed to the general
confusion. Representatives of the American Public Health Association
and the American Medical Association wrote to Hylan, telling him
that it would be a calamity to abolish the Bureau of Public Health
Education. Charles V. Chapin, the noted health authority in Provi116
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dence, Rhode Island, sent the mayor a similar warning. The federal
government also took a dim view of Hylan's investigation. As a port
of entry, New York was so important that the government officials saw
this as a possible threat to national security, particularly during wartime. On 28 April the surgeon general, Rupert Blue, sent Hylan a
telegram, urging him not to curtail activities of the Bureau of Public
Health Education. 31
Working conditions at the Department of Health itself became
difficult. Dr. William H. Park, director of the Bureau of Laboratories,
urged that any reorganization be made speedily because it was hard
for employees to function in such an uncertain situation. Meanwhile
Commissioner Amster expressed his concern that the efficiency of
the department was being impaired. He also announced that none
of the bureaus would be "curtailed" while he was in office and that
if they were, he planned to resign. Termination of his services was
soon forthcoming. On 29 April, Amster submitted his resignation
after an unsuccessful interview with Hylan. He had warned the mayor
that if the chaos continued, the federal government would surely
intervene, and the mayor had replied: "I do not give a dam for
these Federal Governmental letters or letters from other people who
are interested in public health education. As long as I am Mayor of the
City of New York the Health Department will be run as I see fit."
The former commissioner reported later that the mayor had demanded
that he remove Goldwater and Jacobi from the Medical Advisory
Council. Jacobi was the father-in-law of George McAneny of the
Times, who had opposed Hylan politically. Goldwater, it seemed,
was guilty of being a "highbrow" and a "holdover" from the previous
administration. When the letter of resignation reached Hylan, he
responded angrily: "I have just received by messenger your resignation as Commissioner of the Department of Health. It gives me
great pleasure to accept the same." He also charged Amster with
lack of executive ability in allowing graft and special interests to
influence his department. The mayor assured Amster that his resignation would not alter policy.32
The mayor now had a full-fledged rebellion on his hands. With
the resignation of his own appointee, a friend of Murphy's, on his
desk, he faced a united group of scientists who were supported by
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major reform organizations in New York City, to say nothing of
interested outsiders, including federal officials. The motley crew of
supporters that Hylan mustered had no such claims to prestige. They
included political hangers-on and letter writers who, for the most
part, chose to remain anonymous. On 19 April the mayor received
a communication signed Taxpayer. The unidentified author urged
Hylan not to let the socialists, reformers, politicians, and medical
profession interfere with his "timely efforts to reorganize the Department of Health." The writer called the department "a nest for
breeding socialists, etc., and making Directors, Chiefs of Divisions,
Supervisors, etc., and endless red tape." Another anonymous letter
to Amster's successor denounced the department's pretensions of
saving lives while supporting birth control, an interesting argument
in a city overflowing with prolific Catholics and Jews. 33
Faced with the gauche independence of Hylan, Tammany may
have gotten more than it had bargained for in the new mayor. No
doubt the tribesmen would enjoy any sweet morsels of patronage
that Hylan could throw their way if he were successful in uprooting
the experts from the Department of Health. Boss Murphy, however,
had a reputation for circumspection. Having once commented that
public health was above politics, he certainly had no desire to be
connected with well-publicized scandals and intrigues. Nonetheless,
when the mayor attacked the Department of Health, Tammany Hall
could not escape involvement. The clumsiness with which Hylan
and his grasping lieges pawed at the department could only be scorned
by such sophisticates as Alfred E. Smith and Boss Murphy.
The outraged demands by the civic, labor, and medical organizations did not go unnoticed by leading Democrats at Tammany Hall.
Smith, president of the Board of Aldermen, returned from a vacation
during the health crisis. When he was asked by reporters if he would
look into the investigation by the mayor, he laughingly replied that
all he had time to do was to shake hands. Rumor had it that prominent
Democrats were concerned, nonetheless, about the repercussions. On
20 April, Smith visited MacBride, and soon a report was issued that
the hearings henceforth would be open to the public. Smith also
revealed that the preliminary report recommended the abolition of
the Bureau of Public Health Education because it was "useless." Dr.
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S. S. Goldwater, who had organized the bureau, immediately offered
the opinion that such action would be a mistake. 34
The grand sachem viewed the situation as serious enough to
warrant his return from a vacation. Murphy arrived in New York at
the end of April-after spending several weeks at French Lick Springs,
Indiana-just in time to learn of Amster's resignation. Murphy told
reporters that he was "perfectly satisfied" with the Hylan administration. When asked how he felt about efforts by District Attorney
Edward Swann to clean up New York City, however, he snapped:
"There is nothing to clean up here. If Mr. Swann thinks the town is
not clean he ought to get busy and go out and find the unclean
spots." 35
The resignation of Amster and the return of Murphy marked
the end of the first phase of the political war on the health experts.
Actually, Hylan, at this point, had not gained much ground. The
investigation had brought on reams of undesirable publicity for
Tammany; the efficiency of the Department of Health had been
impaired; and the Bureau of Child Hygiene had its budget cut by
$105,000 after MacBride misrepresented one of Dr. Baker's reports.
Dr. Bolduan of Public Health Education, choosing to leave rather
than fight, submitted his resignation in early May. Another bureau,
Food and Drugs, had been mentioned by MacBride in connection
with graft. As the second phase of the attack began, corruption in the
bureaus, not their legitimacy, became the main target. Maligned by
MacBride, the director of the Bureau of Food and Drugs took up the
challenge. A gentleman from the South, Brown considered the
accusations to be an attack on his personal honor.36
The second phase began with the appointment of a new health
commissioner and the exaggerated emphasis on corruption. As soon
as Amster resigned, the mayor appointed Royal S. Copeland to the
post. The new commissioner, an ophthalmologist, fell into the
category of an "expert." Some strange quirk caused his medical mind
to bend toward politics. Dr. Frank Crane, writing for a city newspaper,
called the mayor's appointment a suspicious one. He added: "Copeland is no politician, understands not the devious art of getting
elected, and is just a plain, efficient medical man, with dangerous
symptoms of being an expert, even a highbrow." Crane misjudged

LUCIUS POLK BROWN

Copeland. Outwardly he might have been a physician, but inside him
there beat the heart of a politician who had gained previous experience
as mayor of Ann Arbor, Michigan, from 1901 to 1903.37
When Copeland assumed his new post at the Department of
Health, he received several letters from well-wishers. One such
individual outlined the reasons that Amster had failed. He mentioned
the opposition of the former commissioner to the borough plan of
administration and his relationship with the directors. Amster,
described as "the spineless man," allegedly met on the day of his
appointment with the directors and gave all of them cigars; the writer
did not except Dr. Baker. The correspondent did not have a particularly high regard for any of the directors but Park. He called Brown
"a fossil" and Bolduan "a joke," and he argued that Harris received
too much pay. As for Dr. Baker, she was a friend of Haven Emerson's. 38
The preliminaries of the second phase of the war on experts
soon ended, and the real action began. MacBride wrote to Copeland
on 30 April, singling out Lucius Polk Brown for attack. He charged
that Brown had shown favoritism toward the Borden Milk Company
and William J. Schieffelin & Company, a drug firm with origins in
the eighteenth century. He insisted that Leonard M. Wallstein, the
paid agent of Schieffelin's Citizens Union, was one of the chief
organizers of propaganda to block his investigation. He further alleged
that Brown had advocated the passage of a bill by the state legislature
that would lower the standard of milk-all this in addition to allowing
corruption to flourish in his bureau. MacBride grossly exaggerated
the extensiveness of graft. The district attorney managed to obtain
indictments against only three employees: Harold J. Keen, T. Spencer
Duignan, and Alexander Leibe were charged with bribery and extortion. This, however, certainly did not mean that the director had
knowingly allowed corruption to exist.39
Brown, Wallstein, and Schieffelin issued denials by the next day.
Wallstein, who responded first, expressed the sentiments of them all:
"MacBride's vile mouthings do not merit a reply. He apparently fails
to recognize the distinction between the tolerance which the public
shows to demagogic addresses of this sort, which they expect from
people of his kind in the course of a campaign, and what should be
the serious utterances of an individual, however unfitted, who holds
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an important office." Agnes De Lima and Mrs. Edward S. Van Zile,
secretary and director, respectively, of the Women's Municipal
League, protested the "inaccuracies" of the summary of the testimony
given by MacBride. Hylan, meanwhile, urged Copeland to pursue a
"fearless" investigation. 40
On 1 May, just after Copeland took over at the Department of
Health, the following demoralizing order from the mayor appeared
in the Staff News: "All complaints of a criminal nature coming to
your department about employees in the City government, signed or
unsigned, are to be forwarded to the Police Commissioner at Police
Headquarters, so that detectives may be assigned and the violators
of the law brought to the bar of justice. All complaints not of a
criminal nature, bearing upon the administrative affairs of the department, must be investigated by the respective Department head." 41
The next day, with the compliance of Hylan, Copeland, who had
never met Brown, suspended him. He claimed that if the director
had not replied to charges against him, he would not have been
punished. The commissioner promised Brown his "day in court,"
with the opportunity to make explanations. In order that he not be
distracted from his duties while preparing for the hearing, Copeland
relieved Brown, without pay, until the Board of Health could act
on the matter. Meanwhile, former Commissioner Amster revealed
that Hylan had insisted earlier that he suspend Brown. The assistant
district attorney, however, thought this inadvisable because of the
useful information being provided by the director. Several bureau
heads came under fire, but no others were suspended. Copeland
indicated that he might take over the Public Health Education from
Bolduan and possibly even the Division of Industrial Hygiene of the
Bureau of Preventable Diseases. 42
Once Brown had been suspended, he had no doubt that Hylan
and Copeland were after his scalp. He promptly hired one of the
most prominent lawyers in the city, George Gordon Battle, and began
the preparation of a defense. With the reform elements already up
in arms because of the attack on the bureau plan, Brown and Battle
had little difficulty obtaining the support of the "Mitchelites." To be
on the safe side, however, Dr. Carl E. McCombs of the Bureau of
Municipal Research, then headed by Charles A. Beard, drafted a
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form letter to be sent to prominent social and civic leaders. Outlining
the accomplishments of the deposed director, he asked for their
support. 43
The preparation of a defense ran into snags. Copeland did
not present Brown with a list of specific charges until 28 May. The
document received by the director accused him of "neglect of duty,
inefficiency, and incompetency." Eleven printed pages in length, it
contained only one specification with nine subheads, much of which
was repetitive. Essentially Copeland blamed Brown for delegating
responsibilities to subordinates; failing to suggest amendments to
the Sanitary Code; supporting a bill in the state legislature that
would have lowered the quality of milk sold in the city; attending
professional conventions, which absented him from New York City;
and devoting time to personal activities while on the job. All of this
alleged misconduct had occurred prior to the time when Copeland
became commissioner. 44
Faced with these hazy charges, Brown and Battle concentrated
on gathering endorsements from acquaintances of the director while
drafting a response to each of the complaints. His supporters included
not only the Mitchelites but also practically every major health and
medical organization in New York and some at the national level,
along with food and drug experts throughout the country. An amazingly tight-knit group, these professionals rallied to the aid of their
peer. The New York Academy of Sciences and the New York section
of the American Chemical Society came out in his defense on 10
May. The AMA Journal lashed out at the Hylan administration on
2 5 May, after having earlier expressed its low opinion of the "private
inquiry." Brown himself remained in communication with Dr.
Arthur J. Cramp of the Propaganda Department of the AMA. He
also kept the American Public Health Association informed of new
developments. 411
Several experts on food and drug control at the state and federal
level rose to Brown's defense. Among these were his old friends Harvey
W. Wiley and W. D. Bigelow; George H. Adams, chief inspector of
the Eastern District for the Department of Agriculture; and Dr.
William C. Woodward, district health officer of Washington, D.C.
From the states the following added their praise: Charles D. Howard,
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the state analyst at Concord, New Hampshire; Robert M. Allen, then
living in New York City but formerly head of the Food and Drug
Division of the Kentucky Agricultural Experiment Station; and William M. Allen, state food and oil chemist of North Carolina. 46
Friends in Tennessee also expressed support for Brown. H. H.
Klein, deputy commissioner of accounts, had drawn the southerners
into the turmoil when he wrote to Dr. Perry Bromberg of Nashville
on 7 May, asking him to reveal whether it was true that Brown had
left the state under a cloud. Bromberg replied that indeed this was
not true-that as a matter of record, he had left much to the regret
of civic organizations, medical societies, and elected officials. The
Nashville physician added that although he did not know what
circumstances had prompted the removal of Brown from office in
New York, the general feeling in Tennessee was that the director was
the victim of political intrigue. 47
After this incident, Brown asked Tennessee Governor Tom C.
Rye for an endorsement, which was immediately forthcoming. Rye
noted: "Your unimpeachable record in the office in Tennessee at
a time of political distraction is one of the well known facts of recent
political history." The secretary of the Tennessee Board of Health,
Dr. Olin West, also sent a letter to aid Brown, as did Dr. S. S.
Crockett, who had worked to secure the passage of food and drug
legislation in the state. The troubled director wrote to his brother
Percy at the end of June, asking him to secure the signatures of
prominent citizens in Nashville on his behalf. C. R. Frazier, a friend
of Brown's at the Nashville Tennessean and American, wrote to the
director that he could have gotten the names of "practically every man
in the city of Nashville if time had permitted." The Tennessean and
American kept state residents posted on the situation until it was
finally resolved. 48
Moves by the Hylan administration indicated that it was hard
put to trump up credible charges against Brown. The letter to Bromberg represented a desperate move. Furthermore, the delay in registering complaints against Brown suggested confusion. When charges
were finally released at the end of May, they were not directed toward
graft and corruption as initially indicated. The administration also
fumbled with the matter of a public hearing. When Copeland released
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the charges, he informed Brown that he would be granted only a
hearing instead of a public trial and that he would not be allowed
to call witnesses. The commissioner set the date for 2 June at the
exhibition hall of the Department of Health, 1 39 Centre Street. 49
The Board of Health consisted of three members, but Copeland
was the medium through which the Hylan administration worked.
Richard Enright, the police commissioner and a Hylan appointee,
remained almost a nonentity on the board. Dr. Leland Cofer, health
officer of the Port of New York and the only man on the board who
was untainted by Hylanism, took issue with the decision to give Brown
only a hearing. He explained: "I believe in a thorough and open
investigation and the rendering of a nonpartisan decision. My mind
is entirely open on the matter. The question of the kind of trial Dr.
Brown was to receive was never brought up at a meeting of the
Board of Health where I was present." 50
Presenting formal charges on 28 May and scheduling the hearing
for 2 June gave Brown little time to prepare formal responses. This
ploy, however, backfired. The director requested an extension of
time, and Copeland, under attack by the press, changed the date to
10 June and promised that the hearing would be open to all interested
parties. Legally, Copeland was required to give Brown nothing more
than a hearing. The director, however, demanded a public trial and
the right to call witnesses. Under municipal guidelines, Copeland
could have granted his request. On 10 June, Brown sent a scathing
eleven-page typewritten letter to Copeland, questioning his motives.
He charged that after his suspension there "ensued a ransacking of
department records, and an inquisition of department employees,
continuous from that time to this, for the purpose either of supplying
a support for Commissioner MacBride's charges, or of furnishing
ground for others." Brown added: "This inquisition forced a new
abandonment; for Commissioner MacBride's charges were void of
proof; they were confuted, rather than supported, by the proof at
hand; and I felt secure upon your unqualified promise that public
and tested proof alone would be accepted in support of those or any
charges which might be produced against me." 61
The director denounced Copeland for having retracted his
promise that witnesses could be called and all charges publicly aired.
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"The proof upon which you act is unknown to me," Brown wrote.
"I can only surmise it, as it has not been imparted or identified to me.
It is not to be tested by me. I may not know whether it is irresponsible
back-stairs gossip, or the malice of an unscrupulous enemy, or the
self-interest of a prospective successor." Brown argued that strict
compliance with provisions of the City Charter afforded him nothing
more than "a barren ceremonial." He pointed out to Copeland that
the procedure for the hearing was not his exclusive privilege and
informed him that he had sent copies of this particular letter to the
other two members of the Board of Health. Under fire, the commissioner of health had again rescheduled the hearing, this time to 5
July, whereupon he left town for a vacation. 52
When the hearing was finally held on 5 July, Dr. Copeland, who
was responsible for conducting the session, appeared in his characteristic bright plumage, set off by a vest with white piping. The more
somber Brown and his lawyer submitted a comprehensive brief, carefully responding to every known accusation. The director argued that
he had carefully supervised his personnel and that the delegation of
authority to trusted subordinates was a mark of a good administrator.
To the charge that he had failed to suggest revisions for the Sanitary
Code, Brown responded that this was "deliberate" because of his
personal belief, which was "well known to and not disapproved" by
his superiors. He pointed out that it had been the policy of state
food administrators to write definitions and standards, using them as
a guide, not as hard and fast rules. He added that adoption of standards by small governmental units without federal compliance only
complicated trade. Brown admitted that he had supported the Wicks
bill, which would have legalized a blending of milk and butterfat, but
he claimed that he had become involved because Commissioner
Amster requested that he do so. Brown believed that changing the
standards might result in lower prices without endangering public
health. He confirmed that he had attended numerous professional
meetings with the encouragement of his superiors. He categorically
denied the allegation that he had used his office hours and staff for
personal work. Along with responses to all known charges against him,
the brief contained numerous letters endorsing his work. 5 3
The hearing ended with Copeland expressing admiration for
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the professional accomplishments of Brown, a hint that the board
was about to reinstate him. Another month dragged on, however,
without any word as to his fate. Finally, on 10 August, the board
announced its decision that the director was to be reinstated and
suggested that the blame for his poor administrative record may
have rested with his former superiors. They reprimanded him for the
methods that he had used in the administration of his bureau,
distorting much of the material that he had offered as a defense, and
gave instructions for his future conduct. Brown soon responded to
the public statement of the board: "There are so many inaccuracies,
and some of the conclusions drawn seem to me so much without
adequate foundation, that I should not feel that I were just to myself,
if I did not enter a respectful rejoinder to it, and I therefore request
leave to file this reply." He added that "due regard for disciplinary
requirements" prevented him from making a statement to the press.
Among the inaccuracies that he recognized was the contention that
his failure to draft standards had resulted in the loss of court suits.
The cases cited by the board to support its opinion had been initiated
prior to his appointment. He also denied having said that adulterated
food had little effect on public health, a claim made by the board. 114
During the hot summer months, interest in the war between
the politicians and the health experts lagged. When Brown was
reinstated, the press in general took little note of the event. The
American seemed pleased with the decision, especially because of the
blame assigned to former commissioners of health for Brown's alleged
dereliction of duty, but the Tribune expressed emphatically the opinion of most of the newspapers: "The last chapter in the Hylan fiasco
which started with the mayor's drive on the Health Department
last spring was closed yesterday, when Dr. Lucius Polk Brown, was
reinstated unanimously by the Board of Health."llll
Brown himself had realized that he was merely a pawn in a
power play. When Alice Lakey, president of the Village Improvement
Association, had written him a flowery premature congratulatory
letter just after the hearing, the director revealed that he had no
illusions about the situation. Miss Lakey gushingly penned the
following message: "It is interesting to note how the aspect of the
whole affair has altered since it became apparent that you were a man
126
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of National reputation, with hosts of important men standing ready
to vouch for you. The miserable clique that fought you d_id not know
that they were putting their necks in jeopardy." Brown replied:
"Most people seem to have already made up their minds in the
matter, so that the action the Board may take will have little effect
on the situation in one way-but I trust they will have intelligence
enough to find a good way out of it for both of us." 56
The Board of Health did find "a good way out of it" for Brown
and themselves. They failed to disavow charges that Copeland had
made against him, but they absolved the director of most of the
responsibility by placing the blame for his actions on former commissioners-Goldwater, Emerson, and Amster. Copeland had represented
the interests of Tammany well. He had stepped into the job of
commissioner after the machine was under heavy attack because of
the blundering of Hylan and had saved Smith, Murphy, and others
from further embarrassment. He received his reward when Smith
balked on a deal made between Murphy and McCooey to back Hearst
for the United States Senate in 1922. Murphy may not have been
particularly interested in a Hearst candidacy, but outwardly he maintained a neutral position rather than split his party. Eventually, Hearst,
in the face of opposition from Smith, agreed to step down if he
could name the candidate-Dr. Royal S. Copeland. Smith concurred,
and he and Copeland went on to victory in the fall. Copeland
emerged from the struggle of 1918 as a master politician. He had
not alienated Tammany, Hearst, or Hylan, the inept sidekick of the
newspaperman. 57
Copeland came out of the struggle in better condition than
anyone else. By autumn 1918 the turmoil had subsided, and opponents looked over the field of battle and counted their casualties.
Reformers and the experts at the Department of Health had won the
battle of the directorships-the bureaus survived-but they had lost
the war. The Department of Health had been ravaged by politics.
Indeed, so affected was it by the fury of the fight, that the Annual
Report of 1917 did not appear in print until August of the following
year-and this breakdown was among a group of experts who excelled
in writing reports.
The Mitchelites had their reforms devastated before their very
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eyes. The experts, through their resignations, and the reformers,
through their division into splinter groups supporting this bureau or
that, had played into the hands of politicians. Furthermore, the results
of their failure to secure civil-service status for the post of commissioner became evident. It was through that office that the professional
politicians played havoc with the department. The reformers had
built a "model" organization, but they had been unable to complete
the protective wall around it. Worst of all for them, they realized
their folly. A decade after Tammany had tried to purge the New York
City Department of Health, Charles-Edward A. Winslow, who had
served as a harbinger of danger in 1918, aptly described the tragedy:
"Ten years ago it was beyond question that New York City had the
best municipal health department in the world. In 1918 came a
change, and for the first time in thirty years the blight of political
influence fell upon the splendid social machinery." 58
Reformers and professional scientists had bowed to the show of
force by professional politicians. Government, in New York City at
least, still remained almost exclusively in the domain of politicians,
primarily because of the myopia of reformers. Nonetheless, inroads
had been made in government that caused the politicians a great deal
of difficulty. The Brown hearing had demonstrated the problem of
removing a competent public servant protected by civil-service regulations if he chose to fight rather than resign.
The two opposing power blocs had struggled for control of health
administration. In the long run, neither side gained much. The
bureaus, significantly weakened, survived as vestiges of reform
ascendancy. Nonetheless, the old efficiency had been destroyed, and
politics permeated the department. In September, Copeland announced a plan that gave the boroughs a measure of influence in
health matters. He named Frank J. Monaghan as the new sanitary
superintendent, and he appointed five assistants at the borough level.
The directors of the bureaus were forced to confer with the sanitary
superintendent on all controversial matters; the commissioner served
as final arbiter. The Citizens Union accepted this move as a symbolic
victory. They tended to see preservation of the bureaus as an end in
itself. This strategy, however, rendered the directors nothing more
than figureheads. Permitting politics to infiltrate, the plan was thus
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incorporated into the general health administration. Hylan, with no
obvious embarrassment, campaigned in later years on the basis of
administrative competence and health achievements. His propagandists proclaimed, "A is for Administration-the best New York has
ever had," and "H is for Health and Hospitals." 59
The professional politicians also took some losses. Copeland
served them as a willing tool, but serving willingly did not necessarily
mean serving well. He held the office of commissioner of health until
he was elected to the Senate. When he resigned, Frank Monaghan
assumed the post-a promotion made easier by his previous elevation
to the office of deputy commissioner. As head of the Department of
Health, Monaghan allowed corruption and graft to envelop the
establishment. The decline was brought home to New Yorkers when
James J. Walker defeated Hylan in the Democratic primary of 1925
and became mayor. During Walker's administration, the new commissioner of health, Louis I. Harris, the former director of the Bureau
of Preventable Diseases, uncovered the profusion of corruption that
Monaghan had fostered, an abundance of which permeated the
Bureau of Food and Drugs. 60
Revelations tended to confirm what some citizens had always
thought about politicians-that they were corrupt and not to be
trusted but that they occasionally offered a welcome relief as replacements for the "highbrows." The surviving reformers, scientific experts,
and Mitchelites were avenged by the evidence that was unearthed by
Harris and his associates. The Department of Health had become a
tool of politicians, and as such, it was an instrument of patronage and
a ready-made source of corrupt profit-just as the experts and reformers had warned when they stood like shivering Cassandras before
the Hylan onslaught of 1918.
The power blocs survived the war intact, but a number of
individuals fell by the wayside. James E. MacBride, the obnoxious
chairman of the Civil Service Commission, stepped down on 7 June
under pressure to do so from his own camp because of the wrath
that he had caused to be heaped upon them. Two health commissioners, Haven Emerson and J. Lewis Amster, did not survive the Hylan
purge. Former commissioner S. S. Goldwater, a holdover from the
Mitchel administration, resigned his seat on the Medical Advisory
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Board. Directors, it seemed, were also expendable. Dr. Charles F.
Bolduan resigned from the Bureau of Public Health Education in
May. Dr. F. B. Krause, sanitary superintendent, lasted until August.
The final bureau to come under siege during this war was Preventable
Diseases, headed by Harris. In January 1919, Copeland set out to
remove the Division of Industrial Hygiene from his direction.
Although reformers had suffered heavy casualties, they, along with
labor and civic leaders, rose up in such fury that the commissioner
let the matter drop. Lucius Polk Brown held the unique distinction
of being the only director to be vindicated of charges leveled against
him by the Hylan administration. 61
Brown had nothing to lose from a public investigation; a
private inquiry he feared. He chose to fight Hylan and Copeland
through the press. He met the plot to remove him head-on and won.
Successfully defending his honor, he had no delusions about the
implications. The character of the individual expert had been subverted when the directors became the pawns in a power play. Brown
and the others were held up to public ridicule, demoralized, and
deprived of any real authority. They could no longer take pride in
their association with the New York City Department of Health.
Brown was a victim of the war on experts. Too stubborn to resign, he
looked to the military for a way out.
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8-The Exit of a Scientist:
From Public Service
to Private Citizenship, 1918-35

The New York health controversy of 1918 altered the life of Lucius
Polk Brown. Although it did not lessen his interest in service to his
country or his concern for public health, it diminished his enthusiasm
for his career as a food and drug control official. A short stint with
the military and a brief, unsuccessful return to New York City
represented his only significant gestures toward public service. From
1918 until his death in 1935, Brown expressed his opinions, for the
most part, as a private citizen. During this period he occupied himself
with farming and enjoyed the tranquility of his family. Occasionally,
however, the old flashes of reformism and liberalism surfaced, leading
him to speak out on various issues.
The pure food and drug movement lost some of its momentum
during the 1920s. At the federal level, officials struggled to keep up
the fight, armed with the old law of 1906, which had long failed to
cope with changing conditions.1 In Tennessee and New York City
the effort languished. Brown lived to witness the first battles over
proposed food, drug, and cosmetic legislation during the New Deal,
a measure sponsored by his old adversary, Senator Royal S. Copeland.
This was more than a decade away from the immediate problem he
faced in 1918-how to make a graceful exit from an unpleasant
situation. The war, for him, served as a timely excuse.
World War I was a milestone of the Progressive era. Its effect
on individuals and particular groups of reformers, however, varied.
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Historians have found the impact of the war to be almost as perplexing
and fascinating as Progressivism itself. Vernon L. Parrington rendered
the following epitaph: "Then the war intervened and the green
fields shriveled in an afternoon. With the cynicism that came with
post-war days the democratic liberalism of 1917 was thrown away
like an empty whiskey-flask." Allen F. Davis perceived of the war as
a boost for social workers who participated in one of the many phases
of Progressivism. "The war," according to him, "came as a great shock
to the social workers; at first it seemed to spell the end of social reform.
Yet gradually, to their own surprise, many of them came to view the
war, despite its horror and its danger, as a stimulus to their promotion
of social justice in America." Davis also pointed out that the war
seemed to put an end to dissension among social workers and allowed
them to delude "themselves into thinking that the social experiments
and social action of the war years would lead to even greater accomplishments in the reconstruction years ahead." 2
Instead of killing reformism or promoting it, however, the war
provided an excuse for some liberals to divorce themselves from
crusades that had already lost momentum. Historians since the 1950s
have found it fashionable to search for class origins and economic
motivations of the Progressives, but in their scholarly arguments, they
have not cast aside the fervent patroitism and nationalism that
characterized this generation of liberals. 3 Parrington aptly described
them as "a school dedicated to the ideals of the Enlightenment and
bent on carrying through the unfulfilled program of democracy." 4
When the United States became involved in the European war,
some Progressives found that their patriotism permitted them to exit
gracefully from the reform scene. This is not to impJy that their
patriotism was a ruse, but it did prove a useful attribute for some
disillusioned domestic crusaders.
From the moment that the Progressives injected their ideas into
the American political cauldron at the local level, they fought
continuous battles in a philosophical and ideological conflict that
eventually spread from the cities and states through the nation. By
1917, when the United States entered a foreign war, the steam had
gone out of some of the reform efforts. The same patriotism that had
helped to spur internal reform allowed some Progressives to retreat
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honorably from their collapsing skirmish lines. The First World War
provided such men as Lucius Polk Brown and John Purroy Mitchel,
his one-time administrative superior, a graceful exit. When duty
called, no patriotic American could refuse its summons.
Essentially these were the sentiments that Brown expressed when
he requested a leave of absence from his position in New York City.
He wrote to Copeland:
I have been offered a commission as Captain in the Foods
and Nutrition Division of the Sanitary Corps, Surgeon
General's Office, United States Army. You are doubtless informed fully as to the important functions of this division
in the sustenance of the army. I am reliably informed that
the need for men is great and I know that the supply of men
qualified for this work is not very large. Under these circumstances I must regard this request as a call to serve and I
could not with self-respect disregard it. I, therefore, apply for
a leave of absence without pay for the term of the war. 5
After Hylan launched his war on experts, Brown had begun
looking for new employment. Before his fate at the Department of
Health had been decided, he considered two alternatives, private
business and military service. On 20 July 1918, Major John F. Murlin
of the Army Sanitary Corps asked if he were free to consider a commission with assignment to the Division of Food and Nutrition.
Brown replied that before he could give Murlin a definite answer, he
needed to settle two matters: first, an agreement with a private concern for work after the city controversy was resolved, and naturally,
the second, his situation with the New York City Department of
Health. The next day, Major Casper W. Miller of the Medical
Reserve Corps, who had spoken with the director in New York,
informed him that the surgeon general felt he could justifiably hold
open a position for a man as experienced as Brown for at least a
month.6
Soon after Brown had been reinstated, he notified the Office of
the Surgeon General. Murlin congratulated Brown on his victory
and urged him to settle his private affairs as soon as possible so that
he could report to Camp Greenleaf, Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia. Brown
needed no encouragement to sever his ties with the Department of
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Health. Rumors were already circulating by the end of August that
Commissioner Royal S. Copeland planned to change the administration of the department. His scheme called for depriving directors of
most of their authority and transferring power to the sanitary superintendent and his borough assistants. By this time the director was
most anxious to speed up his commission. As he told Major Murlin:
Since I wrote you, certain things have come to my knowledge
which, metaphorically speaking, make the prognosis, so far
as the Health Department is concerned, very uncertain, not
only for me but for other Directors. It therefore appears that
it is desirable for me to sever my connection with that body
as early as is decent. I therefore hope that I can get to you
some time during the month of September. Obviously, however, I do not wish to leave them until the matter of my
connection with your Division is definitely settled, so that I
am doing all I can to help you push it. 7
On 30 September, Copeland granted Brown a formal leave
of absence. A New York newspaper carried a note on the financial
sacrifice involved. As captain in the Sanitary Corps, he would receive
only $2,400 a year. This salary, less than half that of the director,
possessed the security that the other one lacked. Although the army
provided Brown with the way out of a difficult situation, military
service, nonetheless, was a family tradition; and the captain's son,
Marine Lieutenant Campbell Brown, a career man, had sailed for
France during the summer with the famous Thirteenth Regiment,
commanded by Colonel Smedley D. Butler. When Brown accepted
the commission, he arranged for his wife and three daughters to return
to Tennessee. 8
Brown belonged to the first generation of American . health
experts, exclusive of physicians, to make a significant contribution in
a military conflict. The United States Army in World War I, to a
greater extent than any American army before it, had the knowledge
and ability to maintain high health standards. Whereas health and
sanitation concerns had been something of a fad in the SpanishAmerican War, they became matters for paramount consideration
twenty years later. This alteration can be attributed to the "new"
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public health movement that transpired in the United States after
the turn of the twentieth century. 9
By the end of the Progressive era, health reformers assumed
responsibility for the protection of the individual from dangers
beyond his control. They believed that by safeguarding the individual,
society, as a whole, stood to reap the benefits. Into a realm that previously had been the exclusive domain of physicians, there now
ventured social workers, nurses, muckrakers, concerned citizens, and
scientists. With so many types of people participating in the effort,
the perspective on health became much broader during the Progressive
period. No longer was public health viewed as the mere absence of
disease. On 24 October 1916, in a paper presented to the American
Public Health Association, W. C. Rucker, assistant surgeon general
of the United States Public Health Service, pointed to the need for
broad vision. He called for a public health policy embracing "the
political economy of disease, and far reaching as human nature, since
after all, human nature is the groundwork from which arises the public
health." Four years later, Charles-Edward A. Winslow, a professor of
public health at the Yale School of Medicine, defined the "new"
public health. He stressed "the science and the art of preventing
disease, prolonging life, and promoting physical health and efficiency
through organized community efforts."10
This new spirit in America inspired the following comment in
a publication prepared by the Surgeon General's Office during World
War I:
Any account of advances made in military sanitation in our
Army during the period between the Spanish-American War
and the World War would be very incomplete if no reference
were made to the development of the sanitary conscience of
the Army in the meantime. With the American public as a
whole, from which, of course, our World War Army cameand this also doubtless proved of considerable assistance in
protecting the health of the troops-the same process had
been going on. 11
An interest in the purity of food as well as its nutritional value
had been one of the many facets of the "new" public health movement. This aspect of civilian reform had its parallel in the military.
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Origins of a food and nutrition sector can be traced to August 1917;
officially, however, the Office of Food and Nutrition dated from 4
September. By 1918 it had found its way into the Surgeon General's
Office, under the Division of Sanitation. It was also known as the
Food and Nutrition Division of the Sanitary Corps, and after the
armistice, it was called the Food and Nutrition Section of the Sanitation Division. 12
On 20 September 191 7 a conference had taken place at the headquarters of the United States Food Administration in Washington,
D.C. Those in attendance-the surgeon general, the quartermaster
general, a representative from the British army, the director of the
federal food administration, and several experts-dealt with problems
related to the food supply of the army. The most significant suggestion
entertained by this group called for nutritional surveys of military
camps. The secretary of war approved the idea on 16 October, and the
adjutant general implemented it on 26 October.13
In addition to making sanitary surveys, the food and nutrition
officers, who were being recruited as rapidly as possible, had responsibility for determining the nutritional value of food and the quality
of the rations, for inspecting mess halls, and for halting food waste.
The latter problem required careful attention because the army came
under harsh censure from sacrificing civilians throughout the country
when even a trace of wastefulness could be found. Angry citizens
from the Pacific Coast to the piney woods of Georgia fired off a
barrage of letters to newspaper editors and public officials. Some
complained that the portions served were so large that the soldiers
left food on their plates, which had to be thrown away. Others pointed
out that cooks always prepared the same amounts, even when the
enlisted men had weekend passes. Officers were scorned for their
customary extravagances. An editorial from the Hamilton County
(Georgia) Herald, criticizing waste at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia,
echoed sentiments similar to those elsewhere in the country:
A Negro cook for one of the companies sat upon the street
car on Saturday night last. He told his fellow negro passengers a story about how much was thrown out that night at
supper.
He stated that he had orders to prepare supper for 1 70
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men in the mess he cooked for. When supper came but eight
sat down to eat it. Potatoes enough, wheat bread enough,
salmon croquettes enough, white beans and an entire box
of prunes which had been cooked together with pastry was
all THROWN INTO THE SLOP PAILS. 14
Such accusations had some validity. Suffice it to say that the food
administration and the army made an effort to cope with these
criticisms.
At first the staff of the Food and Nutrition Division came from
the faculties of medical schools, university laboratories, agricultural
experiment stations, and state and municipal food control authorities.
These individuals required only a brief course of training in army
procedure, in the conduct of nutritional surveys, and in the inspection
of large quantities of food. Officers commissioned in the division
reported directly to Washington, D.C., where they were subjected to
a series of lectures and practical demonstrations. The Bureau of
Chemistry and food officials from the District of Columbia cooperated
with the army in this venture. Later, on 7 March 1918, a special
course for nutrition officers was established at Camp Greenleaf.
Instruction there suffered from one major handicap, the lack of
laboratory facilities. 1 ~
Reports indicated that the Food and Drug Division attained a
strength of 116 men by the end of the war, including 1 lieutenant
colonel, 8 majors, 35 captains, 36 first lieutenants, and 36 second
lieutenants. As rapidly as possible, these men were sent to the training
camps. When officers became available, each base of more than 10,000
men received a designated expert, sometimes assisted by enlisted
personnel. Even before it became known that nutrition officers were
being readied for service, commanders of training camps recognized
the need for their expertise and requested that such men be assigned
to their posts. After February 1918, even the American Expeditionary
Forces employed the services of the division-36 specialists boarded
ships for Europe during 1918, 6 in March, 20 in June and July, and
10 in November. 16
Shortly after the armistice the army began discharging such
personnel, but some officers remained on duty at debarkation stations.
Brown was in training at Camp Greenleaf when the fighting ceased,
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and he spent the duration of his service inside the country. After his
initial indoctrination, he received orders for Camp Bowie, Texas. He
remained in Texas from December 1918 to April 1919, spent a short
period at Post Field Aviation Camp, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Ellington Field at Houston, Texas, whereupon he was transferred to the
debarkation point at Hoboken. He stayed in New Jersey until he was
discharged on 19 July 1919. Even then, his connection with the
military remained in effect until he resigned his commisson as
captain in the Officers' Reserve Corps in 1924.17
When Brown had left New York for Camp Greenleaf, he turned
in his badge as "Director of Bureau" and probably had no intention
of returning to his job. After his discharge from active duty, however,
he decided to avail himself of the salary until he could find more
satisfying employment. When he again took up his duties as director
in late July, he and Commissioner Copeland began an exchange of
argumentative notes on subjects ranging from such major problems
as the enforcement hierarchy to such petty ones as the location of
offices. The root of their differences centered on the decentralization
of the Bureau of Food and Drugs. The authority that had once rested
with the directors had been dissipated throughout the boroughs
among the assistant sanitary superintendents. Blame for failures to
enforce the sanitary code effectively could ·still be thrust on men who
headed the bureaus. Brown resented being placed in such a predicament, but he received no sympathy from the commissioner.
When the director complained that his drug division had been
weakened, Copeland responded: "I am sorry that there has to creep
into so many of your official communications some plaintive note
relative to 'what is left' of your Bureau. It seems to be very difficult
for you to understand that nothing has been taken from your Bureau,
and the sooner you appreciate this fact, the more comfortably you
will pursue your ordinary duties." 18 He elaborated on this theme in
another communication written on the same day: "I trust I have
made clear to you in unmistakable language, that you have the responsibility of your Bureau, and that you have back of you the full
authority of the Commissioner of Health to enforce every reasonable
regulation. The summer season is over now, vacations must be forgotten, and every Director is expected to functionate to the benefit
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of society." The commissioner added that Brown should forget "all
gossip" and confine himself "to conditions as they actually exist."19
Along with their disagreements over decentralization of authority,
Brown and Copeland also clashed over changes in personnel. In July
1919, Copeland had designated Ole Salthe, formerly assistant director
of the Bureau of Food and Drugs, the supervising chief food inspector
and head of the Division of General Reference and had assigned him
to duty in his own office. When Brown questioned the legitimacy of
such a move under Salthe's civil-service title and when Brown balked
at signing the payroll roster, Copeland lashed out: "It is very plain
to me that Mr. Salthe is serving the Department efficiently and successfully and is working within his civil service title." Copeland had
a much better relationship with Salthe than with Brown. After he
went to the Senate, Salthe became his chief legislative assistant. 20
Contrary to assurances by Copeland, Brown no longer had
authority to direct his bureau. The commissioner repeatedly reminded
the director of his power, for the written record, but held up communications from the borough chiefs concerning hearings on matters
for which Brown was responsible. Obviously such a situation could not
long endure. Beginning in October, Brown requested leaves of absence
without pay, which kept him away from the department through
December 1920.21
The disputes between Copeland and Brown deprived the Department of Health of valuable expertise that could have been put to
good use in the drug-addiction program implemented in New York
City during 1919. It shared the major attributes of the plan that
Brown had developed in Tennessee. Beginning on 7 July, under the
Public Health Law of New York State, every person in New York
City who was addicted to cocaine or its derivatives had to register
with an agent of the State Department of Narcotic Drug Control
before he could secure a prescription for such drugs. Walter R.
Herrick, commissioner of the Department of Narcotic Control,
designated the commissioner of the municipal Department of Health
as the official agent. Copeland estimated that the city might have as
many as 200,000 addicts. During 1919, however, only 6,579 addicts
registered-5,047 males and 1,532 females. The peak age period for
both sexes was 21 to 30. Whites accounted for 5,778 of the total;
1
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blacks, 796; and Orientals, 5. New York City authorities also experimented with a clinical approach to the treatment of heroin addicts,
but they decided by 1920 to close the treatment service and to
institutionalize the serious cases. 22
With Brown out of the city during most of 1920, Copeland
and the legal authorities there seemed to take delight in ordering him
to appear for trials. The matter of corruption in the bureau, which
had arisen in 1918, carried over to 1920. Two inspectors, T. Spencer
Duignan and Harold W. J. Keen, had been indicted by a grand jury
on 2 May 1918. Their cases remained before the court until 1920,
and Brown was subpoenaed repeatedly. They both went free when
Judge Rosalsky dismissed the indictment against Duignan on 15
March and found Keen not guilty on the same day. 23
The ridiculous status of Brown with the Department of Health
did neither him nor the board any credit. Apparently the director
chose to maintain his tenuous relationship out of sheer obstinacy, and
the commissioner had no valid excuse for denying him a leave of
absence. Finally, after a year of this on-again, off-again employment,
Brown submitted his resignation on 27 December 1920, effective 31
December. 24
The experience of Brown as a food and drug control official had
been a disillusioning one. When he had left Tennessee, he had the
satisfaction of knowing that he had established a viable department
which had public support. When he left New York City, he had
the distinct impression that the authority of his bureau had been
undermined. Even worse, during his absence from his native state,
the Tennessee department had declined under the supervision of a
man with less ability, being reduced principally to the duty of enforcing
state liquor laws and serving as a mouthpiece for the federal food
administration. When Harry L. Eskew, his successor, resigned as
commissioner, Governor A. H. Roberts appointed George Draper
to .the post. Draper had worked with the department when Brown
was the commissioner but had not impressed his superior. When the
announcement was made, Brown, who may have had hopes of returning to that office in Tennessee, denounced the appointment because
Draper was a pharmacist, not "a chemist of established reputation
and ability," as the law specified he should be.25
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Worse still, the federal food and drug law had proved to be a
disappointment. In 1906, when it was passed, lobbyists for the bill
had generally considered it to be no more than a foundation, although
later, Harvey W. Wiley seemed to view it as a perfect piece of
legislation. Even Brown, as president of the Association of American
Dairy, Food and Drug Officials during 1912, took a dim view of
enforcement under the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. "It must
be said that the United States courts," he noted, "have succeeded in
taking a large proportion of the teeth out of the Federal food and
drugs act of June 30, 1906." On the other hand, at that time, he
remained optimistic about the cooperation between states and municipalities. In 1914 some reformers went so far as to call the federal law
a farce and nothing more than an honest-label law. By the 1920s
federal officials were beset with problems that could not be solved
by execution of the old law. 26
Several prominent first-generation food and drug experts had
resigned their positions and receded into the background of American
life by the 1920s. Harvey W. Wiley, Robert M. Allen, and Lucius
Polk Brown represented prime examples. The political fights, the
lost arguments, and their own ambition had drained them of the
old stamina. The decisions of these individuals and other reformers
to resign from public offices that they had helped to create left the
country with a legacy of expanding bureaucracies, headed by people
who were often placed in high positions at the whim of politicians.
Therefore, one of the most undesirable by-products of Progressivism
was that bureaucracies remained which could be manipulated by
politicians and managed by their inept and incompetent appointees.
Designed to implement reforms, these structures could also provide
a secure nest for patronage seekers. This danger manifested itself
particularly in Tennessee during the tenure of Brown's successor.
Eskew, who was not legally qualified for the position, failed to maintain the integrity of the department and failed to ensure its detachment
from the enforcement of prohibition laws. Furthermore, Progressive
laws, including the federal pure food and drug act, were, out of
political necessity, short-term compromise measures; reformers had
expected to strengthen them in the future. With the resignation of
those who had crusaded for the initial legislation, the further weak-
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ening of the laws by judicial decisions, and the ensuing antiregulatory
attitude of the 1920s, even the efforts of capable administrators were
thwarted.
When Brown resigned from the directorship in New York City,
he returned to his farm at Brook Hill, near Franklin, Tennessee; acted
as custodian of some cotton land that his family owned in Bolivar
County, Mississippi; and looked for another salaried job. Between
1920 and 1923 he became a promotion agent of the Merrell-Soule
Company of Syracuse, New York. Early in the century, Merrell-Soule
had purchased a patent from Robert Stauf of Posen, Germany, for
dessicating blood and milk, and in 1905 the company pedected the
patent. During 1917, Brown had considered the idea an interesting
one and had written articles on the advantages of dehydration as a
method for preserving food. While he was with this firm, he helped
to develop a dried-milk product called Klim, milk spelled backwards. The substance to be reconstituted had to be mixed with water
and beaten vigorously. As a result of this venture, the Brown family
had quantities of Klim on hand. 27
When Brown tired of this enterprise, he again returned to
farming. His mother had died, and he and his brother Percy, the only
surviving children, had inherited Ewell Farm. They sold the estate,
but the purchaser was unable to pay for it. The brothers repossessed
the farm and sold it at auction, whereupon Lucius bought tracts
totaling more than two hundred acres. He moved his family in
November 1923 to the land where his relatives had lived even prior
to the Civil War. 28
Before Brown committed himself entirely to the agrarian life,
he made one last effort to find a place for himself in the business
world. This resulted in his employment as administrator general of
the American Dairy Products Company in Havana, Cuba, for approximately a year and a half. This connection ended, however, when his
superiors urged him to bribe health officials in Cuba. In righteous
indignation he declared that "he had never taken a bribe and he never
expected to give one," whereupon he made a swift departure for the
mainland and rejoined his family in Tennessee.29
Fifty-eight years old in 1925, Brown devoted the last ten years
of his life to his farm and his family. Public service and business
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ventures, by this time, held few if any attractions for him. Since
1908 his life had been a full one, with many activities that sometimes
separated him from his children. Even during his many absences,
however, he had been a loving father who took time to write personal
tender notes to each of his children. He found the leisure to accompany them on long conversational walks and extended camping trips.
According to one of his daughters, Brown seemed "a rather severe and
serious man" but one who had "a good sense of humor." She had a
great respect for his intelligence and recalled that he took time to
answer questions about "nature, religion, eternity, almost anything
you wanted to talk about." 30
Father to three lively girls, husband to an intelligent woman,
and son of a strong-willed southern lady, Brown favored political
and economic opportunities for females. He had supported female
suffrage long before it was a reality, and he advocated professional and
vocational training for young women. At a time when most of his
blue-blood relatives thought finishing schools more suitable for girls
than four-year colleges, he encouraged his daughters to continue their
education. All three earned degrees from the University of Tennessee
during the late 1920s. Impatient with southerners who boasted of
their ancestry, he advised his children: "Don't be a professional
descendant; be an ancestor yourself." 31
A devoted family man, Brown nonetheless was too complex a
personality to refuse an invitation to a White House Conference on
Child Health and Protection that was called by President Herbert
Hoover in 1929. Such conclaves as this temporarily brought the old
liberals back into the limelight. When specialists gathered in Washington to share their ideas, Brown discussed the methods for controlling animal diseases that are transmitted to humans through
milk, especially tuberculosis and undulant fever. He did not attend
all the sessions, but his name appeared on a list of participants during
July 1930, along with such well-known figures as Grace and Edith
Abbott, S. Josephine Baker, Sophonisba Breckinridge, Ernest W.
Burgess, Frances Perkins, Lawrence Veiller, Lillian Wald, Harvey
Zorbaugh, and Haven Emerson. Seeing his former associates from
New York-Wald, Emerson, and Baker-probably led Brown to
reflect on the Hylan disaster, which still rested uneasily on his mind. 32
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The New York health controversy had proved a godsend for Royal
S. Copeland. As commissioner of health, Copeland gained the respect
of the Tammany organization and used that position as a stepping
stone to the United States Senate. A compromise candidate, he went
to Washington in 1923 and held office until his death in 1938. Perhaps, he even entertained ideas of winning the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1932. At any rate, he hardened toward
the actual nominee, and on inauguration day, his entire staff remained
on the job. In 1933, Senator Copeland sponsored a new food, drug,
and cosmetics bill. All the old arguments reappeared as reformers and
their opponents girded themselves for a fight. By 1934 the Copeland
measure had been weakened considerably. Oswald Garrison Villard,
of the liberal Nation, revealed that the opposition was putting pressure
on newspaper editors, columnists, and cartoonists to help defeat the
bill, and he questioned Copeland's support of the altered proposal.
Villard warned:
As a physician sincerely interested in protecting the public
health and the public pocket-book, Senator Copeland-who
has publicly approved the emasculated bill-must know that
this bill is badly damaged. As a politician, he should be informed that if he fails to denounce the emasculation of his
bill on the floor of the Senate, he will hear from his constituency on next election day. And he had better not try appealing to them on radio time sponsored by patent-medicine
manufacturers. 33
Brown, meanwhile, followed the Copeland bill with considerable
interest. He wrote to Villard after the editorial appeared, apparently
denouncing the senator, for Villard expressed interest in securing
copies of correspondence between Brown and Copeland. James Rorty
of Wesport, Connecticut, a friend of Villard's and a contributor to
the Nation, was at that time doing research for a book on Copeland.
Brown put together a file on the New York controversy and offered
it to Rorty. Brown obviously desired to have his record cleared, but
he expressed himself mildly when he wrote to Villard: "Dr. Copeland's tinkering with the Health Department I believe set back its
development very materially, and destroyed much good already
accomplished." In a letter to Rorty, Brown minced no words:
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All circumstances connected with Copeland's assumption of
the Health post in New York indicated a set attack by the
patent medicine crowd, since they centered their fire on
Bolduan, publicity director, and myself-who joined the
N.Y. force as much for the apparent opportunity to enforce
the New York ordinances as for any other single reason.
Well, I gave 'em all the H--- I could while I was there and
before I went there, and I'm proud of it. Incidentally, I must
take my hat off to Copeland as the slickest bird in the
game. 34
While memories of the New York controversy continued to
haunt Brown, he also had financial difficulties. During the agricultural
depression of the 1920s he had overextended his farming operations,
taking out mortgages to buy more equipment and new foundation
stock. His tendency to overestimate his business abilities may have
stemmed from the days of his youth, when Ewell Farm had been run
on a more lavish scale. His economic situation was easing, however,
after Franklin D. Roosevelt became president and Congress began to
grind out relief measures for farmers. 35
Whatever advantages Brown enjoyed from the relief efforts of
the New Deal, he was neither swept up in the Roosevelt hysteria nor
particularly enamored with the Democratic party. He read attentively
the proposal of Mark Granite for a United Liberal party, and he gave
Granite the following assessment of the political mood of the South:
"As to the matter of the Liberal Party, I fear that at present in the
South, there is, except locally, no Democratic nor Republican Partyit's a Roosevelt Party." "Hell and high water," he observed, "have no
terrors for these folks if only Roosevelt will lead them." 36
Politics still intrigued Brown, pure food and drugs interested
him, and anxieties over old reform campaigns haunted him. He
would not live to see the end of Roosevelt's first term or the eventual
passage of the Copeland bill in 1938. His last years were filled with
serious health problems, including chronic indigestion, mental depression, and coronary ailments. On 4 April 1935, Brown, sixty-eight
years old, died of a heart attack, which had occurred the day before.
At the time of the seizure, he was working on a series of articles for
the Columbia Herald, a local newspaper. 87
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The period from 1918 to 1935 had been anticlimactic for Brown
when compared to his other adult years. Smarting from the humiliation that he had suffered in 1918 and genuinely wanting to serve his
country, he had turned to the military as the way out of a deplorable
situation. His brief return to New York City only confirmed what
he had feared. The bureaus over which scientific experts had once
proudly presided had been riddled by petty politics and had been
deprived of authority. Only hollow structures remained to be filled
by patronage seekers. As an honorable man, he could not accept the
changes that he observed. Brown turned from public service to private
business and agriculture. Farming had always been a pleasant sideline
for him; the country, a refuge from the tempestuousness of the offices
he had held. As a full-time venture it offered no satisfactory outlet
for the civic obligations that he felt. The reunion of reformers that
Herbert Hoover summoned at the end of the 1920s gave him and
other old first-generation liberals of the twentieth century a chance to
surface before they were supplanted by a new vintage-in the 1930s.

9-Lucius Polk Brown
and Progressive Food and Drug Control:
Historical Perspectives
Fated for a public career during those tempestuous decades when the
United States swayed under the weight of modern social forces and
then carried them over into the twentieth century, Lucius Polk Brown
was both a product of his times and a molder of them. A southerner,
Brown divested himself of the trappings of an old regionalism and
donned the cloak of nationalism; cast in the agricultural-experimentstation pattern, he perceived of problems that transcended rural
America; a professional chemist, he sought a career in public service;
and a social reformer, he operated in bureaucratic structures. He was
a member of a "new middle class," one of many socially conscious,
dedicated professionals who sought order out of chaos through
efficiency, continuity, rationality, and smooth-running governmental
bureaucracies.
Brown the reformer operated in the microcosmic domain of
pure food and drug control. He joined other professionals to ferret
out adulterated and misbranded products, seek honest labeling, and
determine standards of purity. His sphere, however, was not a sterile
one inhabited only by scientific experts. Politicians, businessmen, and
other social reformers infringed on it and complicated his work.
Health reformers, including food and drug experts, attempted to
order their society through bureaucratic structures that were guarded
by civil-service regulations and the powerful momentum of selfperpetuating establishments.
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The career of Lucius Polk Brown in Progressive food and drug
control at the state and municipal levels from 1908 to 1920 has
afforded an opportunity for assessing this aspect of reform in a rural
southern state and a huge northern metropolis. Such work carried
with it some small successes, which in tum were diminished by the
larger failures . The successes and the failures, too, developed within
the framework of the bureaucracies that the crusaders created in
order to implement change. The work of these particular Progressives
must be measured within this context.
The relative ease with which Brown developed the Pure Food
and Drug Department in Tennessee between 1908 and 1915, cultivated public opinion, and influenced state lawmakers could be
attributed to the simplicity of the society in which he operated. By
contrast, his inability to enlarge the Bureau of Food and Drugs in
New York City, his limited influence in molding public opinion, and
his vulnerability in the political fight of 1918 rested with the
complexity of the environment in which he functioned. Whereas
Tennessee had a rather homogeneous society, a one-party system for
the most part, and an absence of well-defined power blocs, New York
City encompassed a decidedly heterogeneous society; a permanent
two-party system, which was often complicated by contesting Socialists
and reformers; and highly developed power blocs that represented
major interest groups, including professional politicians and scientists.
The levels of sophistication attained by northern and southern
society influenced the possibilities for bureaucratic expansion and
flexibility. In the South, very few restrictions were placed on Brown
as a bureaucrat. Beginning with a one-man department in 1908, he
increased the number of employees substantially to include two
additional chemists, six inspectors, a stenographer, a porter, some
temporary help, and local health officials who cooperated voluntarily.
This rather amazing growth was made possible in a number of ways.
First, the inspector managed, through valid arguments, to convince
the general public, the press, and politicians that a definite need
existed to enlarge his department in scope and usefulness. Second, he
made his department a catchall for duties that did not logically fall
into the domain of some other state agency. Although he complained
about new responsibilities, including enforcement of a hotel law and
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weights and measures statutes in addition to the food and drug acts,
acceptance of these duties allowed him to enlarge his department-a
reality that he recognized.
Typical of bureaucrats in general, Brown never thought that
his staff was adequate in size. In all likelihood, in this particular
instance, his observations were valid. Every official report included
renewed pleas for additional appropriations and more employees.
Only with great reluctance did the state legislators loosen the purse
strings. Nonetheless, in the great American tradition of political
compromise, each time they met they found it possible to grant the
inspector a small portion of what he wanted. Gradually, he built a
viable department, one that was capable of sustaining and perpetuating itself when it came under fire in 1912.
The situation in New York City differed significantly. Brown
was not "the big man" that he had been in Tennessee. He was only
a cog in a machine, one that was already built and functioning. \Vhen
he became a northern bureaucrat, he entered a more rigid system. In
spite of his complaints that his bureau was not adequately staffed,
he made no headway. Furthermore, he had less flexibility as an
individual. In Tennessee he determined the needs for additional
legislation, set standards, and formulated policy. He theoretically
needed the approval of the Board of Health, but its members readily
accepted his ideas. His retention of office rested directly with the
governor. In the North he inherited a ready-made, fairly static bureau;
his policy was already determined in large part by the municipal
Sanitary Code; and he answered to the commissioner of health, a
political appointee who depended on the favor of the mayor.
The quality of work conducted by the bureaucracies, North and
South, hinged in part on the nature of the individual who directed
them. Brown was an innovative person who was receptive to new
ideas and willing to experiment. This helped to explain why he
accepted the directorship in New York City. The job also seemed to
be an improvement for him as a professional; he believed erroneously
that the civil-service system in New York would free him from hassles
over reappointment. The salary, too, was twice what he had received
in Tennesssee, and the staff that he had at his disposal in the North
dwarfed the one in the South. Interestingly enough, the inspectors
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in New York City received about the same pay as those in Tennessee,
which hardly allowed them to keep pace with the cost of living in
such a metropolis. Therefore, they were amazingly susceptible to
bribery. This presented an administrative problem for the director.
In Tennessee he maintained a firm paternalistic contol over his small
force; in New York City the number of employees and the size of the
city isolated his subordinates from his personal supervision.
The programs that Brown administered in Tennessee and New
Yark City were shaped by his national vision. He attempted, in both
environments, to correlate his work with other municipal, state, and
federal officials. His affiliation with the national association of food
and drug officials and similar professional organizations; his connections with such individuals as Harvey W. Wiley, Robert M. Allen,
Willard D. Bigelow, and Carl Alsberg; and his acquaintance with
social reformers operating in other spheres-all shaped his philosophy.
His department in Tennessee profited from these relationships; such
state politicians as Governors Patterson and Hooper did not resent
a letter from Wiley, a suggestion from a federal official on weights
and measures, or the professional affiliations of Brown. The Tennessee
Pure Food and Drug Law of 1907 called for "a chemist of established
reputation and ability," and the state legislature was reacting to congressional leadership when it passed the measure.
Acting contrary to the odium of States' rights, under which
southern states labored after secession, Tennessee politicians, in the
instance of health reform, were more responsive to federal directives
than their New York counterparts. The New York City Department
of Health enjoyed a unique kind of sovereignty because of state laws,
and some machine politicians resented any activity that could be
interpreted as state or federal interference. As a state official in
Tennessee, Brown enjoyed a satisfactory working relationship with
local and federal authorities; as a city official in New York, such opportunities were not always available. The tendency of New Yorkers to
guard their autonomy in governmental matters, the size of the city,
and the rivalry between boroughs complicated their relations with the
state and federal government.
As for the practices that Brown sought to eliminate, the
metropolitan New Yorkers had no monopoly on techniques for
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adulteration of food and drugs. Their country cousins and fellow
urbanites in Tennessee were equally imaginative. The principal difference in the problems that Brown found in the two different
environments was the greater magnitude caused by the situation
in the tenement districts and the size and composition of the population. Furthermore, the work that had been conducted in the North
prior to his employment there did not exceed in quality that of the
same type in the South. When Brown assumed his duties in New
Yark, he instituted the grading system, which he had established in
Tennessee years earlier. His work in the South with drug addicts
during 1914 and 1915 was strides ahead of that being done in New
York City at the same time.
The success of Brown as a law-enforcement officer is difficult to
evaluate. All the Progrssive campaigns were fraught with problems.
The pure food and drug crusade was no exception. Real accomplishment rested on public acceptance and pressure from private citizens
and interest groups. Initial concern for campaigns and raids against
food and drug adulterators, on the part of citizens, usually lagged
after the publicity accompanying them had subsided. Furthermore,
Brown and others of his caliber were willing to accept the word of
the dealers that they would conform; they prosecuted only as a last
resort. Reformers, considering themselves men of honor, were too
willing to acknowledge this trait in others. The campaign and the
raid had influence only as long as the threat prevailed that dealers
were under surveillance and could again be subjected to adverse publicity and prosecutions.
The short-term successes of the food and drug control experts in
setting standards, prosecuting those who violated the laws, and winning .
public support represented manifestations of the larger problem that
plagued · the entire Progressive generation. Their greatest failure
centered on the creation of hollow bureaucracies that were subject to
political influence and incompetence. The microcosmic world of the
pure food and drug workers illustrated this well. In Tennessee,
society was not nearly so sophisticated as in New York City; the power
blocs that Brown encountered in the North had no comparable
counterparts in his home state. The only major opposition that he
faced came in the latter part of 1911 and early 1912, when business-
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men in Nashville and Davidson County mounted an unsuccessful
campaign to prevent his reappointment. In this they did not enjoy
the support of any political faction, in spite of the fact that they tried
to cast the inspector, a Regular Democrat, as a political liability to
Republican Governor Ben W. Hooper. The state executive, a
Republican elected as a consequence of a fusion effort brought on by
a split in the Democratic party over prohibition, refused to fall for
their strategy. More of a gentlemanly reformer than a professional
politician, he placed public service ahead of party loyalty.
The efforts of Brown in the South, therefore, benefited from the
simplicity of his society. Because of the relative absence of interest
groups and power elites, a positive program had greater chances for
widespread acceptance. The unsuccessful effort of the businessmen
of Nashville and Davidson County illustrate this point. Although
this particular group opposed the inspector, they were unable to
prevent his reappointment. The groups that supported Brown represented a grass-roots outpouring of support rather than a particular,
highly organized power bloc motivated solely by a desire to keep him
in office.
By way of contrast, two distinct, fairly well-matched groupsscientists and politicians-battled over the New York City Department
of Health in 1918. The scientists had the support of a highly articulate
hodgepodge of reformers, perhaps as much of a disadvantage as an
advantage given their willingness to be content with the mere salvation of bureaus and given their efforts to save one bureau or another,
not all of them collectively. As a consequence of the complexity of
the environment, neither politicians nor scientists could obtain all
of their objectives. Therefore, individuals fell by the wayside, and
the efficiency of the Department of Health deteriorated. Even Lucius
Polk Brown, who chose to fight rather than resign, became lost in
the confusion around him.
The matter of professional loyalties influenced the whole episode
of 1918. The truly professional politicians maintained allegiance to
the machine. Even Boss Charles Francis Murphy and president of the
Board of Aldermen Alfred E. Smith, who scorned such bungling
and probably tempered the strategy of the mayor, put machine goals
before service to the public, perhaps believing that they could serve
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the people best in this manner. As for the scientists, they, too,
maintained their cohesion as professionals. Their respective societies
rallied, and individuals rose to the occasion. Such experts as Royal
S. Copeland and J. Lewis Amster were enigmas. Amster, for a while,
accepted the leadership of Hylan but finally turned on him; Copeland
served Hylan willingly.
The success that the New York City politicians had in undermining the Department of Health rested on the very nature of
American politics at this point. When reformers brought pressure to
bear, politicians were not strong enough to block the passage of
legislation creating civil-service positions and jobs for idealists who
were dedicated to constructive change, but neither were the Progressives strong enough to safeguard completely the bureaucracies
that they created. They were not able to deprive politicians of their
right to make appointments. This was true both in the rural South
and in the urban North.
Although positions in the Pure Food and Drug Department in
Tennessee were placed under civil-service regulations, the post of
commissioner remained subject to appointment. The governor, therefore, had the power to influence and alter the choice of employees
within the department because of the control that he exercised over
the commissioner. After Brown left the state, Governor Rye ignored
the law and appointed a man who was not qualified for the position;
his successor, Governor Roberts, behaved likewise. In New York City,
most vacancies in the Department of Health were filled by individuals
who excelled on competitive examinations. The Board of Health,
however, consisted of three members, two of whom were appointed
by the mayor. Thus, the reform bureaucracies were open to infiltration
by politicians.
Brown and reformers like him acted in good faith. They tried
to make their world a better one. Attacking social abuses, they looked
for ways to safeguard their achievements. Bureaucratic governmental
machinery was the product of their rational minds. The first generation
of twentieth-century American liberals, including food and drug
reformers, failed to establish their ideal society because they could
not break the influence of professional politicians. Not revolutionary,
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but sane and paradoxically conservative, they were victimized by
aspects of the very institutions that they revered.

Bibliographical Note

The primary purpose of this book has been to provide a comparative study of
scientific achievement and frustration at the state and municipal levels via
the career of Lucius Polk Brown in Progressive food and drug control; research
efforts have been directed toward unearthing materials having a bearing on the
man as a scientist and as a Progressive reformer in Tennessee and New York
City. Complete citations appear in the notes. The following, therefore, is a
brief discussion of the sources that proved most useful.
MANUSCRIPTS

Because of the nature of this study, the papers of Lucius Polk Brown were of
paramount importance. Unfortunately, these materials were not to be found
in one large, indexed collection. The most valuable papers, those dealing with
food and drug control in New York City and Tennessee, were in the possession
of Susan Brown Lyon, Brown's oldest daughter, who resides at Murfreesboro,
Tennessee. Because of his political tribulations in New York City, Brown
himself had been concerned with the preservation of these records, believing
that someday they might be of historical significance. When I first began to
do research on this project in 1968, I sifted through those papers related to
the Tennessee period and suggested that certain items be turned over to the
Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville; Mrs. Lyon followed my
suggestion. When .I was completing this manuscript, the papers had not yet
been indexed. Other Brown papers are in the possession of his daughter
Lucia Brown Brownell, of Birmingham, Alabama. These include some newspaper clippings dealing with the New York work and a limited amount of
correspondence for the period 1920 to 1935. A small Lucius Polk Brown
Collection is housed at the James D. Hoskins Library, University of Tennessee,
Knoxville. Most of these materials, however, relate to the agricultural activities
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of George Campbell Brown, Lucius Polk Brown's father, at Ewell Farm during
the latter part of the nineteenth century.
Materials of an official nature, annual reports of the Tennessee Pure Food
and Drug Inspector, correspondence related to the department, and papers
dealing with Brown's employment as state chemist can be found in the
Tennessee governors' papers, located at the Tennessee State Library and
Archives. These include the papers of Governors James B. Frazier, Malcolm R.
Patterson, Ben W. Hooper, and Tom C . Rye. Brown's articles and reports
crop up in the Biennial Report of the State Board of Health from fanuary 1909
to fanuary 1911. Unfortunately, the reports were not published during four
years of his administration in Tennessee. Also, his official message to a state
agricultural convention appears in the Biennial Report of the Department of
Agriculture, 1909-1910.
The massive collection of Harvey W. Wiley Papers, in the Library of
Congress, Manuscripts Division, includes letters between Brown and Wiley and
Wiley and other state food and drug officials. Coupled with the Proceedings of
the Association of State and National Food and Dairy Departments for the
annual conventions, they revealed the political activities of the national association of food and drug inspectors and the common problems of this rather
tight-knit group.
A number of collections were consulted in an effort to come to terms with
conditions as Brown found them in New York City. The materials located at
the Haven Emerson Public Health Library were by far the most important to
this study. The annual reports, bulletins, and newsletters provided a running
account of the official activities of the Department of Health and the Bureau
of Food and Drugs. Also, the archives there contained such invaluable resources
as the CoIIected Works of Haven Emerson, Charles Bolduan's Over a Century
of Health Administration in New York City, and departmental memoranda.
The politics affecting public health work in New York City receive lengthy
treatment in this study. Those materials useful in understanding the prevailing
climate were: the Citizens Union Papers, Lillian D. Wald Papers, and Edwin
P. Kilroe Collection of Tammaniana, all housed at Columbia University's
Butler Library. The scrapbooks in the Kilroe Collection were of inestimable
value. Also, the public and private papers of mayors were enlightening. These
include the public papers of Mayors John Purroy Mitchel and John F. Hylan,
located at the Municipal Archives and Records Center in New York City,
and the private papers of John Purroy Mitchel at the Library of Congress. The
papers of Health Commissioner Royal S. Co_P,eland, in the Michigan Historical
Collections, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, represented a large collection,
very little of which dealt with Copeland's tenure as health commissioner. A
few letters, however, shed considerable light on the controversy of 1918 and the
views of those who opposed the health experts.
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INTERVIEWS

Because the papers of Lucius Polk Brown were not voluminous and because
they represented only the highlights of his career, it is doubtful that this study
could have been accomplished without the cooperation of Brown's children.
I talked at length informally with Susan Brown Lyon and Colonel Campbell
Brown on several different occasions. I recorded their formal statements.
These talks, formal and informal, in 1968 and 1973, provided many insights
that would otherwise have gone unnoticed.
Two other individuals whose recollections aided me considerably were:
Thomas Ripley Bryant, retired director of extenson work at the Kentucky
Agricultural Experiment Station in Lexington, and Mrs. Llewellyn H. King of
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, one-time private secretary to Senator Royal S.
Copeland. Mr. Bryant had been with the Agricultural Experiment Station in
Kentucky in its early days and was familiar with the type of chemical analysis
undertaken there; he had also been acquainted with a number of the first
generation of food and drug control officials. Mrs. King was in poor physical
condition, although she was quite alert mentally. I spoke with her by telephone
concerning Copeland. She offered recollections about his personal habits and
opinions.
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Some government publications have been mentioned in connection with annual
reports; others that were helpful to the study are mentioned below. The Tennessee House and Senate Tournals provided information on the introduction of
food and drug bills, their fate, the official vote, and how individual legislators
stood on the issues. Debates were not included. The annual reports of the
Tennessee Agricultural Experiment Station for 1889 and 1890 contained
material on Brown's work as acting chemist. Annual reports of the United
States Department of War for 1918 and 1919 and the United States Army,
Surgeon General, study entitled The Medical Department of the United States
in the World War included useful background information on the Food
Division of the United States Army Sanitation Corps.
NEWSPAPERS

An intensive search through Tennessee and New York City newspapers proved
quite rewarding in terms of facts yielded dealing with Brown's career from 1908
t9 1915 in Tennessee and 1915 to 1920 in New York City. Newspapers ate
cited throughout the notes, but the Nashville Tennessean, the Nashville Tennessean and American, the Nashville Banner, the New York Times, and the
New York Herald deserve particular recognition.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
BOOKS AND ARTICLES

The books and articles that influenced this work number in the hundreds,
and those of direct bearing receive their much-deserved attention in the notes.
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5; as professional scientist, 6-7, 8,
11, 13, 23, 43, 48, 102, 103; as
bureaucrat, 6, 90, 103, 149; family
background of, 8-<); education of,
9-10, 11-12; as acting chemist at
Tennessee Agricultural Experiment
Station, 10, 16; marriages and personal life of, 12, 1 34, 14 3, 14 5; his
interest in government work, 12-13;
and national organization of food
and drug officials, 12, 4 3; follows
legislative action on Marr bill, 21;
seeks appointment as Tennessee
food and drug inspector, 22; appointed by Patterson, 22; establishes
Tennessee Food and Drug Department, 2 5-26, 28; educates the public, 29, 30, 38-41; objectives of, as
food and drug inspector, 32; recommends Sanitary Food Law, 33;
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named an official of United States
Bureau of Weights and Measures,
33; uses campaign technique in
Tennessee, 33-37; seeks additional
appropriations, 41; appoints special
agents, 42; addresses American
Chemical Society, 43; elected to
vice-presidency and presidency of
national food and drug organization,
44, 45-46, 54, 80; position of, on
food additives, 44-4 5; influence of
Tennessee politics on, 48, 51; reappointed by Patterson, 51; reappointment conflict of, 51-61; opposition to, 52-53; works against
false weights and measures, 52, 53;
adopts grading system, 52, 53; supporters of, 53, 55, 56, 57, 60-61;
his opinion of Hooper, 54; answers
charges, 57-58; reappointed by
Hooper, 58; supported for chief
chemist of United States Department of Agriculture, 61; addresses
food officials, 62; traces growth of
department, 66; as superintendent
of weights and measures, 67; his
supervision of Tennessee employees,
67-68; enforces Sanitary Hotel Law,
69; enforces Anti-Narcotics Act, 69,
70-72; in court, 70, 72; addresses
American Public Health Association, 71-72; and enforcement of the
liquor laws, 74; applies for directorship in New York City, 74; accepts
New York City appointment, 76; and
employees in New York City, 7677; describes New York City tenement districts, 83-84; harbors misgivings about New York City position, 84-85; has faith in New York
City civil service, 88; defines responsibilities, 89; becomes acquainted
with employees, 90-91; his involvement in public health education,

92-<)3; seeks good relations with
businessmen, 93; uses campaign
technique, 94; takes up "the raid,"
94-9 5; scrutinizes fish business, 9 5;
adopts grading system, 96; campaigns against exposed food, 98-99;
supports conservation, 101; professional activities of, 102; initial work
of, in New York City compared to
Tennessee, 102-3; as target of politicians, 104; is called before Civil
Service Commission, 114; decides to
fight Tammany, 119; attacked by
MacBride, 1 20; accusations against,
and his denial of, 120; suspended
by Copeland, 121; prepares defense,
121; responds to charges, 122; supported by professional groups and
friends, 12 2-2 3; requests extension of
hearing date, 124; questions Copeland's motives, 124-2 5; submits
brief at hearing, 12 5; is reinstated,
126; demonstrates difficulty of removing civil-service appointee, 128;
is only director vindicated of charges,
130; life of, altered by New York
City health controversy, 1 31; enters
Sanitary Corps, 133; returns to New
York City position, 138; his controversy with Copeland, 1 38-40;
resigns New York City position,
140; experience of, as food and
drug official disillusioning, 140;
takes dim view of enforcement
under Pure Food and Drug Act,
1906, 141; returns to Tennessee,
142; as promotion agent for Merrell-Soule Company, 142; as administrator general of American
Dairy Products Company, 142; attends White House Conference on
Child Health and Protection, 143;
and Copeland bill, 144; death of,
145; as product of and molder of
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his times, 147; comparison of his
work in Tennessee and New York
City, 148-5 3
Brown, Mrs. Lucius Polk (Jessie Roberts Brown), 12
Brown, Mrs. Lucius Polk (Susan Catherine Massie), 12, 76, 77, 84, 88,
1 43
Brown, Percy, 12 3, 142
Brown, Susan Massie Polk ( daughter
by Susan) ( Mrs. Susan Brown
Lyon), 12
Brown, Susan Polk (mother), 8
Bruere, Chamberlain, 115
Bulletin Number 3, 40
Bureaucracies: as consequence of reform, 2, 6, 7; as by-product of Progressivism, 141; as framework for
Progressive successes and failures
118; expansion of, 148; as greatest
failure of Progressive generation,
151; as product of rational minds,
1 53
Bureaucracy: Tennessee Pure Food
and Drug Department as, 6, 7, 23 ,
25-26,40, 80
Bureaucrat, 6, 90; Brown as southern
and northern bureaucrat, 103 , 149
Bureaucrats: precarious situation of, in
New York City, 88
Bureau plan of administration, 104,
105, 114, 11 5, 116
Burgess, Ernest W., 1 43
Burke, Squire Dan U., 35
Businessmen: in Nashville, suspicious
of pure food and drug control, 30;
have temporary truce with Brown,
47; oppose Brown's reappointment,
48, 52; cast Brown as liability to
Hooper, 53; carry case to governor,
?6; as supporters of Brown, 59-60;
m New York City, Brown seeks
g?od relations with, 93; Brown
gives special consideration to small

businessmen, 9 5; economics receive
highest priority of, 98; propaganda
to win support of, 102; in Tennessee, 151-52; mentioned, 58. See
also Retail Grocers and Merchants'
Association
Butler, Colonel Smedley D., 1 34
Calhoun, Thomas P., 56
Campaign: as Progressive technique
used by Brown, 33-37, 69, 94 , 9 6,
98, 99, 102, 151
Campbell, George Washington, 8
Camp Bowie, 138
Camp Greenleaf, 133, 1 37 , 13 3
Canale, John, 37
Carmack, Edward Ward, 50
Cates, Charles T., Jr., 28
Catholics: in New York City, 118
Centennial Club of Nashville, 55
Central Atlantic Food Officials' Association, 102
Central Federated Union, 116
Chapin, Charles V., 116
Chattanooga, Tennessee, 18, 29 , 39 , 49
Chattanooga Daily Times, 59
Chemists' Club, 76
Chenery, William L., 108
Chesnutt, Representative Samuel Lee
'
33
Chicago: meat-packing industry in 16
Childress, George C., 77
'
Cities: Brown's work in, 2-3, 82; as
political battlegrounds, 3; as location of politicians and scientists 3
5-6; conditions of, as impetus
reform, 1 5; Brown tours, in Tennessee, 29
Citizens Union, 107, 11 3, 120, 128
Civil-service regulations, 66, 67, 74 ,
103, 104, 153
Civil War, 80, 142
ClarksviIIe Leaf-Chronicle, 14
Claxton, P. P., 6i
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Cocaine, 69, 1 39
Cofer, Dr. Leland, 124
Collector of the Port of New York, 107
Collier's Weekly, 16
Colorado State Board of Health, 27
Columbia Herald, 145
Commercial Club of Nashville, 78
Committee of One Hundred, 107
Committee of Twenty-one, 116
Confectioners and Ice Cream Manufacturers of New York State, 9 3-94
Coode, John, 58
Cooper, Duncan B., 50
Cooper, Robin, 50
Cooper Union Forum, 116
Copeland, Dr. Royals S.: appointed
health commissioner, 119; as physician and politician, 120; mayor .of
Ann Arbor, 120; receives letters
from well-wishers, 120; receives HyIan's support, 121; suspends Brown,
121; presents official charges against
Brown, 122; sets date for hearing,
123; as medium of Hylan, 124; required to give Brown a hearing only,
124; motives of, questioned by:
Brown, 124-2 5; holds hearing and
expresses admiration for Brown,
12 5-26; represents Tammany interests, 127; is rewarded with Senate
seat, 127; announces borough plan
of administration, 128; sponsors
food, drug, and cosmetic legislation,
131, 144; plans administrative
changes in Health Department, 1 33;
grants Brown leave of absence, 1 34;
his controversy with Brown, 13840; works with drug addicts, 1 3940; health controversy a godsend
for, 144; as an enigma, 1 5 3; mentioned 129, 1 30
Copeland bill, 144, 145
Corbett, E. F., 42
Cornell University, 41, 94

Cowan, R. J., 78
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Cramp, Dr. Arthur J., 122
Crane, Dr. Frank, 119
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Crockett, Dr. S. S., 22, 42 , 12 3
Crockett, Mrs. S.S., 42
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Crump, Edward H., 3, 5,35
C. T. Cheek & Sons, 59
Cutler, Dr. William P., 46
Davidson County: Brown's work in,
29,70
Davidson County Medical Society, 57
Davis, Allen F., 132
De Lima, Agnes, 121
Democratic party: in Tennessee, 24,
47, 48-49; States' rights faction of,
49; small-farmer element in, 49; old
Whigs of, 49; altered by prohibition, 51; supports food and drug
appropriations, 63; reunification of,
64; outwardly accepts prohibition,
73; split in, 80; in New York City
fight for offices with reformers, 104;
in Brooklyn, 109. See also Regular
Democratic party; Independent
Democrats; "Fusionist" movement;
Tammany Hall
Democrats : from Shelby and Knox
counties oppose food and drug laws,
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County support food and drug laws,
18

Desha, Dr. L. J., 36, 41
Dinstuhl, C. M., 36
Dixon, Representative Currie, 19
Draper, George, 67, 77, 140
Draper, W.W., 67
Drug addicts: Brown's contact with,
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York City, 1 39-40
"Drug Habit in Tennessee from the
Viewpoint of an Enforcing Official,
The" (Brown) , 70
Drugs: provision for, under AntiNarcotics Act, 69-70; use of, by
women and men, 71; Brown's work
with, 151; mentioned, 39
Dudley, Blaine, 34, 42
Duignan, T. Spencer, 120, 140
East Nashville Women's Christian
Temperance Union, 74
East Tennessee: Republicans of, 18,
48, 49; the press in, 59; drug addicts
in, 71. See also Republicans
Eighth Annual Conference on Weights
and Measures, 66
Ekroth, Clarence V., 102
Ellington Field, 1 38
"Embalmed beef," 16
Emerson, Dr. Haven, 91, 106, 111,
120,127, 129,143
Emerson Society of the University
Settlement House, 92
Employee relations: Brown's efforts
in Tennessee with, 67-68; Brown's
efforts in New York City with, 7677, 90-91; comparison of, in Tennessee and New York City, 149-50
Engineering Association of the South,
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Enright, Richard, 124
Eskew, Harry L., 77-78, 79, 140, 141
Ewell, General R. S., 9
Ewell Farm, 9, 10, 11, 142, 145
Ezell, Joseph, 30, 37
Farmers, 25, 40, 53, 54, 55-56, 59
Faucon, Xavier, 37
Federal food, drug, and cosmetic legislation, 131
Federal Food Administration, 101

Flanders, George L., 46
Flinn, William, 3
Florida: Brown's work with phosphates in, 11
Foley, Big Tom, 109
Food additives, 44-45
Food adulteration, 31, 36, 40-41 , 9596, 98, 99-100
Food conservation, 100-101
Food exposure, 34-35, 98-99
Food Inspectors' Association : in New
York City, 91
Food waste, 101 , 136-37
Fort, Dr. R. E., 76
Four-Mile Law, 49, 61. See also Prohibition
Frankel, Dr. Lee K., 116
Franklin, Tennessee, 76, 142
Frazier, C. R., 12 3
Frazier, D. J., 53, 69
Frazier, Governor James B., 12
Frick, Dr. John, 36
Fritz, H.P., 78
Fulton Fish Market, 9 5
"Functions of a State in Food Control" (Brown), 93
"Fusionist" movement, 50
Fusionists: in New York City, 107
Gaynor, Mayor William J., 107, 116
Goldwater, Dr. S. S. : as health commissioner, 76, 84, 89, 91 , 106;
creates Bureau of Public Health
Education, 88, 119; notes objections
to bureau plan, 88, 11 5; and health
controversy in New York City, 117,
127,129

Grading, 53, 58, 96, 97, 102, 151
Granite, Mark, 145
"Great American Fraud, The" ( Adams), 16
Greater New York City, 86, 100, 104,
107,109
Guilfoy, Dr. William F., 114
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Hamilton Place, 8
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Harris, Isham G., 49
Harris, Dr. Louis, 114, 120, 129, 1 30
Havana, Cuba: Brown's work there,
142
Haynes, Tom, 51
Hearst, William Randolph, 107, 109,
127
Hepburn pure food bill, 27
Herrick, Walter R., 139
Hillquit, Morris, 111
Hirschfield, David, 11 3
Hoboken, New Jersey: Brown stationed there, 1 38
Hogdon, Mrs. F. C., 99
Hollingshead, W. H., 77, 79
Homeopathic Specific Medicine Company, 62
Hooper, Governor Ben W.: and reappointment controversy involving
Brown, 47, 48, 53-54, 56, 57, 58;
conditions of election of, 50, 60;
considers his administration turbulent, 61; comments on the Pure
Food and Drug Department, 65;
mentioned, 66, 67, 73, 150, 152
Hoover, President Herbert, 101, 143,
146
Houghton, W. M., 111
Howard, Charles D., 122
Howse, Hilary, 6i
Hurricane Iron & Mining Company,
11

Hyde, H. B., 70
Hylan, Mayor John F.: mayoralty
campaign and election of, 105, 10910, 1 u; and the press, u 1-12; appoints Amster as health commissioner, 11 3; and health controversy

of 1918, 113, u4, u6, 117, u8,
u9, 121, 122, 123, 127; campaigns
on administrative competence and
health achievement, 129; mentioned, 104, 130, 1 33, 153
Immigrants, 5, 14-15, 82-83, 104,
105
Independent Democrats, 50
Independents: in New York City, 107,
110
Indiana: grading of food-handling
establishments in, 53
Industrialization, 10, 14, 2 3
Jackson, Andrew, 49
Jacksonville, Florida, 71, 72
Jacobi, Dr. Abraham, u 6, 11 7
Jefferson Market, 99
Jews: in New York City, 93, l l 8
Johns Hopkins University, 41
Johnson, Andrew, 49
Johnson City, Tennessee, 69
Jones, Howard Mumford: The Age of
Energy, 3
Journal of Industrial and Engineering
Chemistry, 102
Jungle, The (Sinclair) , 16
Justice, J. E., 77
Kansas: grading of food-handling
establishments in, 53
Keen, Harold W. J., 120, 140
Kentucky: food and drug work in, 38
Kentucky Agricultural Experiment Station, 38, 75
Kentucky Division of Food and Drug
Control, 38, 75
Kings County Democratic Executive
Committee, 109
Kirkland, Chancellor James, 61
Kittredge, Mabel, 101
Klein, H. H., 123
Klim, 142
Knoxville, 18, 39, 49, 68
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Lakey, Alice, 126
Larson, J. H., 116
Lea, Luke, 6i
Lederle, Dr. Ernest J., 89
Leibe, Alexander, 120
Lethia, 31
Lewinson, Edwin R., 108
Lexington, Kentucky, 38
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Lindsley, John Berrien, 14
Lippmann, Walter, 16
Lomasney, Martin, 3
Louisiana: grading of food-handling
establishments in, 53
Louisville, Kentucky: milk supply in,
38
Lower East Side, 15, 83
Lucius P. Brown & Company Analytical Chemists, 11
Lynchburg News, 12
Lyon, W. L., 42
McAneny, George, 107, 117
MacBride, James E.: and health controversy of 1918, 114, 115, 116,
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McCally, Edward E., 107
McCann, Alfred W., 92
Mccarren, Boss Patrick, 109
McClellan, George, 107, 110, 116
McCombs, Dr. Carl E., 121
McCooey, John Henry, 109, 110, 127
McFerrin, Mrs. Porter, 42
Machine politics: in the North and
South, 5. See also Democratic party;
Tammany Hall
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McMillan, Marion B., 7 5
Maine: grading of food-handling establishments in, 53
Mallon, M. T ., 53, 58
Mansfield bill, 20, 21
Marr, Representative W. B., 19-20,
22
Marr pure food and drug bill, 19-21
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Massie, Judge Thornton, 6i
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See also Mitchel, Mayor John Purroy; Hylan, Mayor John F.
Mayor's Defense Committee, 101
Mayor's Food Committee, 101
Memminger & Brown, 11
Memphis, Tennessee, 13, 18, 22, 3536, 49, 59, 68, 7o
Memphis Commercial-Appeal, 59
Merrell-Soule Company, 142
Metropolitan Sanitary District, 8 5
Michigan, University of, 41
Middle Tennessee, 10, 48, 49
Middle Tennessee Farmers' Association, home section of, 55
Miles, General Nelson A., 16
Miller, Major Casper W., 133
Mitchel, Mayor John Purroy: and
Department of Health, 91, 97;
forms New York City Food Aid
Committee, 101; term of, ends, 103;
provides rare interlude for reformers,
105, 106; career of, 106-7; fails to
show improvement over predecessors, 108; seeks reelection, 110-11;
death of, 111; administration of,
116; World War I provides exit for,
133; mentioned, 75
"Mitchelites," 121, 122, 127, 129
Mitchell; Dr. William C., 27
Monaghan, Dr. Frank J., 114, 128, 129
Montgomery Bell Academy, 9
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Murlin, Major John F., 1 33, 1 34
Murphy, Charles F. : as a political
boss, 3, 109-10; and health controversy of 1918, 112, 113, 117, 118,
119, 127, 152
Myers, Gustavus, 108
Nashville, Tennessee: as Brown's base
of operations, 11; sanitary conditions
in, 1 3-14; establishment of board of
health in, 14; representatives from,
favor food and drug legislation, 18;
Brown's work in, 29, 34-35; medical
college in, 39; remains wet, 49; and
food and drug matters, 57, 68, 70
Nashville Academy of Medicine, 57
NashviIIe American, 12
Nashvi1Ie Banner, 29, 34, 51, 59
Nashville Board of Public Works, 35
Nashville Board of Trade, 32
Nashville City Salesman's Association,
78-79
Nashville Housekeepers' Club, 32, 42
Nashville Manufacturers' Association,
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Nashville Tennessean, 50, 59
Nashville Tennessean and American,
46, 51, 52, 55, 58, 78, 123
Nation, 144
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National Association of State Dairy
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43
Negroes, 5, 13, 37-38, 71, 82, 83
Neil, Judge A. B., 70

New Deal, 131, 145
Newman, Chancellor J.B., 70, 79
New York Academy of Sciences, 122
New York American, 112, 126
New York Association for Improving
Conditions of the Poor, 98
New York Child Labor Committee,
116
New York City: sanitary conditions
in, 1 5; population of, compared to
Tennessee, 82-83; charter of 1898,
86; sanitary code of, 86, 88, 94, 95,
98; push carts in, 98-99; public
markets in, 99, 103; battle between
health experts and politicians in,
104; mayoral election of 1917 in,
105, 111; pure food and drug control languishes in, 1 31
New York City Board of Aldermen,
107,118
New York City Board of Education,
101

New York City Board of Health, 1 5,
85, 86, 88, 89, 97, 121, 124, 125,
126, 127, 149, 1 53
New York City Bureau of Municipal
Research, 112, 121
New York City Department of Health :
as bureaucracy, 6, 7; seeks new director of food and drugs; 74; status of,
81; origins and powers of, 85:...86;
establishment of bureaus in 86, 88;
chart showing organization of, in
1915, 87; objections to bureau plan
of, 88; Annual Report, 1915, of, 89;
staff and budget of, 89; considers
permit plan for restaurants, 97; carries patent-medicine case to court of
appeals, 1 oo; as utopia for experts,
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probe to eradicate bureaus in, 114;
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working conditions in, 11 7; efficiency of, impaired, 119; Annual
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politics, 127-28; survival of bureaus
in, 128; corruption flourishes in,
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1 30; drug-addiction program in,
139; mentioned, 3, 150, 152, 153
New York City Department of Health,
Bureau of Child Hygiene, 88, 114,
115,119
New York City Department of Health,
Bureau of Food and Drugs: Brown's
position as director of, 2-3; seeks
new director, 74; Brown as director
of, 82; responsibilities of director of,
88-89; origins of, 89-90; eliminates
duplication of services, 90; number
of employees in, 90; organization of,
90; chart on organization of, 90;
inspectors accept bribes in, 91-92;
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adopts grading program for restaurants, 96--97; table showing inspections, prosecutions, fines, and sentences by, 100; drug division of,
100; attempts to force registration
of patent-medicine dealers, 100;
MacBride charges with graft, 119;
corruption permeates, 129; decentralization and decline of, 1 38, 140;
Brown's inability to enlarge, 148;
mentioned, 88, 114
New York City Department of Health,
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New York City Department of Health,
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New York City Department of Health,
Bureau of Hospitals, 88, 114
New York City Department of Health,
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New York City Department of Health,
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of, 121,130
New York City Department of Health,
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88, 89, 92, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119
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New York City Department of Health,
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New York City Department of Health,
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113
New York City Department of Health,
Bureau of Sanitary Inspection, 11 3
New York City Department of Health,
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New York City Department of Health,
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New York State Department of Narcotic Drug Control, 1 39
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New York World, 111-12
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Oysters: illegal content of water in,
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Park, Dr. William H., 114, 117, 120
Parrington, Vernon L., 132
Pasteur, Louis, 1 3
Patterson, Governor Malcolm R.: appoints Brown, 8, 22; supports creation of food and drug office, 19-20;
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and drug inspector, 21; supports
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reappoints Brown, 51; supported by

Democratic machine, 60; does not
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Perkins, George W., 101
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Phosphates: Brown's work with, 11,
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Plunkitt, George Washington, 4
"Poison squad," 16
Poliomyelitis epidemic, 97, 111
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113, 114, 128, 129, 152, 153. See
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politics, 2-5; Brown's concern with,
43
Progressive era, 1, 6, 15, 80, 85, 135
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also Reform; Reformers; Reformism
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Prohibition: as disruptive force in
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Pure Food and Drug Department,
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Public health, 8, 1 3-1 5, 11 3
Public health education, 29, 32, 38,
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Purrington, W . F ., 41
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"Relation of the Department of
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